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One issue that has confronted democratic states for many years is the often broad 
and vague nature of security laws, and the consequent need for striking a balance 
between security laws and the rule of law as well as human rights. A number of 
democratic states currently rely on legal interpretation as a method for striking the 
requisite balance. However, it is unfortunate that the courts do not have a consistent 
record when it comes to interpreting security laws consistently with the rule of law and 
human rights. To try and solve this conundrum, this thesis studies and analyses the 
South African security and emergency laws, and thereafter concludes that certain 
techniques which have evolved over time, can be used to secure the interpretation of 
security laws in a manner that is cognisant and respectful of the rule of law and human 
rights. Taken together, these techniques constitute what in this thesis is termed the 
‘security laws’ interpretation regime’. Thus, the present thesis proposes the formal 
establishment of the said interpretation regime. Once established, the interpretation 
regime will become a precedent for how judges in democratic states can achieve a 
transformative, liberal, purposive and substantive interpretation of security laws that is 
cognisant and respectful of the rule of law and human rights. The envisaged 
interpretation regime will also set South Africa on the right path to being a precedent 
of good practice when it comes to the interpretation of security laws consistently with 
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1.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
There are three premises from which this thesis proceeds. The first is that the state of 
emergency jurisprudence emerging on the international stage places at the forefront, 
among others, the ordinary state security laws (this being a concept denoting those 
laws (whether common-law or statutory) which deal with threats against the security 
of the state, and which are permanent within a particular legal system and do not 
amount to emergency provisions) as the ideal measure for democratic states to invoke 
during an emergency. However, even though this is the case, state security laws still 
typically comprise provisions which are overly broad and vague and therefore stand in 
violation of the rule of law and human rights.  
The second premise is that there are certain developments taking place mainly within 
the South African political landscape, which developments are indicative of the need 
to be vigilant and to take whatever steps necessary to guard against the use of security 
laws in a manner that compromises the rule of law and human rights. At the same 
time, however, there are also developments that indicate the need to have security 
laws readily in place to deal with legitimate security threats (which, in turn, also 
threaten the rule of law and human rights).  
From a legal perspective, both the first and second premise call for the striking of a 
balance between security laws, on the one hand, and the rule of law as well as human 
rights, on the other. Consequently, the third and last premise is that the courts’ power 
of legal interpretation, as informed by the separation of powers doctrine,1 seems to be 
                                                          
1 The Constitutions of South Africa have historically been modelled on the British Westminster system, 
which is mainly characterised  by a sovereign legislature to which the judiciary, the Executive and other 
organs of state are subordinate. However, elements of the American constitutional model also infiltrated 
the South African law. Chief amongst these was the separation of powers doctrine, in terms of which 
the division of state power is such that the Legislature is empowered to make the law, the Executive 
implements the law made by Parliament, and the Judiciary interprets the law. The American Constitution 
is also known for its preference of constitutional supremacy, and that it comprises a justiciable Bill of 
Rights and a system of judicial review. These are features which are foreign to the British Westminster 
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the preferred method for striking the necessary balance. Each of these three premises 
merit further elaboration in the discussion which follows, preceding the articulation of 
the purpose of the study. 
 
1.1.1 International emergency jurisprudence 
The point of departure in articulating the international emergency jurisprudence is to 
highlight those models and theories which inform the various emergency systems that 
democratic states can adopt in a time of crisis. These models and theories were 
revisited and critically scrutinised in the aftermath of the United States’ 11 September 
2001 bombings, a season of the frantic search for emergency systems which, ideally, 
commit to upholding and protecting the rule of law and human rights while, at the same 
time, not stifling the ability of governments to counter emergencies as swiftly as 
possible.  
Oren Gross distinguishes between three models of emergency systems. In no 
particular order, the first model is the ‘Business as Usual’ model, which envisages an 
emergency system that retains, even in a time of crisis, the ordinary rules or principles 
applicable in a time of peace.2 The second model is Gross’s own model, which he 
calls the ‘Extra-Legal Measures’ model.3 This model proposes an emergency system 
that empowers the authorities to act outside the law or the Constitution, provided that 
the relevant actors or officials believe that so doing is necessary to protect the state 
and that they openly and publicly acknowledge the nature of their actions.4 It is then 
open to the public to decide whether to endorse ex post facto  the conduct of the 
official(s) in question or whether to hold them accountable for the actions taken in 
                                                          
system. See generally I Currie & J De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative law Vol I (2001) 
Part I. 
 
2 O Gross ‘Chaos and rules: Should responses to violent crises always be constitutional?’ (2003) 112 
Yale Law Journal 1014 at 1043-1052. For further detail on this model, refer to the discussion under 
subheading 3.5.1.1 in chapter 3 below. 
 
3 For more detail on this model, refer to the discussion under subheading 3.5.1.4 in chapter 3 below. 
 




response to the emergency.5 This can be done through the elected representatives in 
the Legislature passing an Act of Indemnity.6  
The third and last of Gross’s models, the ‘Models of Accommodation’, groups together 
those models which propose an emergency system that keeps the ordinary 
constitutional system intact, but with some exceptions in order to accommodate the 
time of crisis or emergency.7 Gross lists the different models grouped under this 
category as: (a) the Interpretative Accommodation model, in terms of which the 
ordinary security laws of a state are interpreted by the courts in a manner that is 
sensitive to the emergency, but without modifying, altering or replacing any aspects or 
provisions of the ordinary security laws;8 (b) the Legislative Accommodation model, 
which entails the introduction of emergency-driven legislative measures in an effort to 
confront and eliminate an emergency;9 and (c) the Executive Inherent Powers model, 
which makes provision for the inherent emergency powers of the Executive within the 
normal constitutional order.10   
Another relevant model is advanced by David Dyzenhaus11 and is called the ‘model 
of legality based on experiments in institutional design’. This model envisages an 
emergency system that commits to, and upholds, the rule of law. In enforcing 
compliance with the rule of law, the model of legality prefers to experiment with the 
design of institutions instead of the traditional approach of relying on the courts as the 
vanguard of the rule of law, as designated by the separation of powers doctrine. 





7 Ibid at 1058. For further detail on the models of accommodation and one other similar model (the state 
of siege model), refer to the discussion under subheadings 3.5.1.2 and 3.5.1.3 in chapter 3 below. 
 
8 Ibid at 1059-1064. 
 
9 Ibid at 1064-1066. 
  
10 Ibid at 1066-1068. 
 
11 D Dyzenhaus ‘The state of emergency in legal theory’ in VV Ramraj, M Hor, & K Roach (eds) Global 
Anti-terrorism Law and Policy 1 ed (2005) 65-89. For a further discussion on this model, refer to 




Dyzenhaus cites the use of special administrative tribunals as an example of what 
could be an imaginative institutional design to preserve and protect the rule of law.12  
Another model is Bruce Ackerman’s ‘escalating cascade of supermajorities’.13  in 
terms of this model, the Executive exercises unlimited emergency powers, but is 
subject to, among other controls, the supermajoritarian escalator. The essence of the 
supermajoritarian escalator is that a state of emergency automatically terminates after 
the lapse of the stipulated time period, and that the extension of the stipulated period 
can be achieved with a significantly high majority vote in Parliament. Finally, there also 
exist theories that could also underpin some emergency systems.14 Despite having 
different content, features and even names, these theories share a common ideology 
to the effect that the law plays no role in an emergency.  
Amongst the models and theories that have been identified above, the Legislative 
Accommodation model appears to be gaining traction as the model which gives rise 
to the preferred emergency system for democratic states.15 There are numerous 
                                                          
12 Dyzenhaus op cit (n11) 82-83. 
 
13 B Ackerman ‘The emergency constitution’ (2004) Yale Law Journal 1029 at 1047-1049. Full detail on 
this model follows in 3.5.1.5 in chapter 3 below. 
 
14 For instance, there is the theory of ‘militant democracy’ and the ‘theory of the exception’. For a 
discussion on these theories, refer to subheading 3.5.2.2 and 3.5.2.3 respectively in chapter 3 below.  
 
15 J Ferejohn & P Pasquino ‘The law of the exception: A typology of emergency powers’ (2004) 2 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 210 at 215. The Legislative Accommodation model is so 
popular that the approach to emergencies seems to be that even those jurisdictions which have a 
Constitution that provides for special emergency powers (following a declaration of a state of 
emergency) hardly make use of that mechanism in a time of crisis, but would rather rely on legislation. 
The foregoing is true for stable democracies that face no need to invoke the extreme constitutional 
powers to protect their constitutional order (ibid).  
There are two reasons that have been advanced by Ferejohn & Pasquino (ibid at 215-216) for the 
reluctance to officially declare states of emergency and thereafter invoke the accompanying emergency 
powers. The first is that it may well be that there are hardly any emergencies of a sufficiently serious 
magnitude to warrant the declaration of a state of emergency. It is generally accepted that the 
declaration of a state of emergency is reserved for serious threats to the constitutional order of a state, 
such as invasion, revolution or catastrophic military defeat. The second reason is that the advanced 
policing tactics (supported by technology and other powers made available by ordinary security 
legislation in place) are so effective that what would have constituted an emergency before can 
nowadays be easily dealt with using ordinary policing methods.  
The one factor that is often overlooked, yet is a significant reason operating against the declaration of 
a state of emergency, is the adverse economic repercussions which normally follow such a declaration. 
For instance, following the declaration of the state of emergency in 1960 occasioned by the resistance 
against the carrying of passes in terms of the then pass law, the apartheid government in South Africa 
was so concerned about the low investor confidence in the country that it subsequently opted to 
incorporate emergency provisions into ordinary security legislation, rather than to declare a state of 
emergency every time there may have been a need to do so. What followed was a series of draconian 
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reasons for this,16 but the main seems to be that, regardless of how exceptional the 
emergency legislation that the Legislative Accommodation model gives rise to in an 
emergency, the said emergency legislation nonetheless exists within the ordinary legal 
system and is therefore subject to democratic values such as the rule of law, human 
rights and judicial review.17  
The Legislative Accommodation model encompasses two emergency measures, 
namely the use of emergency legislation,18 as well as the use of ordinary security laws 
(usually in the form of security legislation).19 The emergency legislation option appears 
                                                          
security legislation, thus confirming that South Africa was, during apartheid, under a permanent state 
of emergency. See J Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 112.   
 
16 The other reasons for the preference of the legislative model can be summarised as follows: (a) since 
the emergency powers are provided for in legislation, the legislative model places Parliament in the 
position of recognising the emergency, of determining the extent of the powers available in an  
emergency, of regulating and monitoring the exercise of such powers, of investigating the abuses 
thereof, and of determining when an emergency has come to an end (Ferejohn & Pasquino op cit (n15) 
217); (b) unlike the emergency powers entrenched in the Constitution and which give the Executive 
special and ‘difficult-to-control’ powers, legislation permits closer supervision of the Executive in their 
use of legislative emergency powers (ibid at 218); (c) because legislation is passed by the Legislature, 
it is seen to be giving popular support to, and thereby legitimises, the Executive’s use of emergency 
powers (ibid at 220); and (d) legislation offers a flexible method of responding to emergencies as its 
legal instruments can be tailored to the actual circumstances of each individual case (ibid at 229). 
 
17 Ferejohn & Pasquino op cit (n15) 215. What is ironic about the preference of the legislative model is, 
firstly, that, while it is acknowledged that modern emergencies are more devastating than ever before, 
there is a notable shift away from an equally drastic response to such a catastrophic danger, that being 
the declaration of a state of emergency.  Secondly, it is submitted that the alternative to the declaration 
of a state of emergency (i.e. reliance on legislation) was previously abandoned seemingly because it 
subjected the exercise of statutory powers to certain constitutional constraints (such as adherence to 
the rule of law and human rights) which, despite noble intentions, had the effect of hindering 
governments from acting quickly and decisively in order to counter the emergency. However, part of 
what makes the legislative model more attractive today is the very fact that it attracts constitutional 
constraints that were previously seen to be hindering swift and decisive action on the part of the 
government. 
 
18 In those  states where there is no provision for the declaration of a state of emergency in the 
Constitution, the  emergency legislation is often relied upon, and it provides for emergency powers that 
are equivalent to those which are normally available following the declaration of a state of emergency. 
The emergency legislation operates in two ways. The least common modus operandi is for special 
emergency measures or powers to be incorporated into other existing legislation, thus elevating that 
existing legislation into emergency legislation or at least giving the existing legislation an ‘emergency-
flavour’ or make it to be ‘emergency-driven’ (Gross op cit (n2) 1065). The most common modus 
operandi is the enactment of a new (and usually temporary) emergency legislation which vests in the 
Executive the extraordinary emergency powers (ibid). 
  
19 Such is clear from the submission by Gross to the effect that the legislative model also operates by 
modifying the ordinary system through the introduction of ordinary legislation with emergency-driven 
provisions (Gross op cit (n2) 1065). It is submitted that the ordinary legislation envisaged here is the 
ordinary security legislation, which is permanent within the legal system and comprises security 
measures which are less drastic in comparison to those which are found in the emergency legislation 
or those available following a declaration of a state of emergency. This makes the ordinary security 
legislation ordinary in name, but emergency-driven in substance (ibid). 
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to be more popular in comparison to the ordinary security legislation option. This is 
deduced from the fact that the emergency legislation is the most commonly written 
about and used measure during emergencies in advanced democracies, such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom.20 The popularity of the  emergency legislation 
appears to be also driven by the fact that governments would want to be seen to be 
actually doing something rather drastic to counter the emergency.21 Merely putting 
faith in existing enactments, structures and systems does not enhance the picture that 
the government is doing something meaningful.  
As already mentioned, there is a second emergency measure that forms part of the 
legislative model, and that is the use of ordinary security laws. In most instances, 
ordinary security laws come in the form of security legislation, such as South Africa’s 
Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act.22 
However, in South Africa, there also exists the common-law security measures (such 
as the common-law crimes of treason and sedition). What trivialises the ordinary 
security laws when compared to the  emergency legislation is the very fact that 
ordinary security laws comprise measures that are ‘ordinary’ in the face of an 
extraordinary situation (i.e. the emergency). By virtue of being a less popular measure 
for responding to emergencies, it comes as no surprise that ordinary security laws 
occupy limited space in the writings on the Legislative Accommodation model.  
The attitude towards ordinary security laws changed drastically after Resolution 1373 
of the United Nations Security Council, which was adopted following the 11 September 
2001 bombings in the United States. This Resolution compelled all member states of 
the United Nations ‘to put in place measures against the financing of terrorism’, it 
instructed states to refrain from supporting terrorist acts, and also instructed them to 
bring to justice those who participate in the financing, planning, preparation or 
                                                          
 
20 These jurisdictions do not have their emergency provisions embedded in the Constitution, thus the 
general approach in times of emergency is to invoke the emergency powers provided for in the 
emergency legislation. The Constitution of the United Kingdom, in particular, even dictates that that the 
Executive can only exercise power delegated to it by Parliament by means of legislation. 
 
21 O Gross & F Ní Aoláin Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (2006) 69. 
 




perpetration of terrorist acts.23 Many states, including South Africa, responded by 
enacting security legislation (commonly known as anti-terrorism legislation), thus 
triggering the rise to prominence of ordinary security laws.  
However, the prominence of ordinary security laws also exposes the extent of under-
development of this area of the law, in that security laws remain notorious for 
containing provisions that are overly broad and vague, and thus in conflict with the rule 
of law and certain constitutional rights. Therefore, the fact that ordinary security laws 
are touted as the ideal measure even in the emergency context notwithstanding  the  
shortcomings they suffer, is a loud call for suitable measures to be put in place so as 
to strike a balance between security laws on the one hand, and the rule of law as well 
as human rights, on the other. This exercise has already been undertaken in the 
context of emergency laws. Some of the models and theories cited above strive to 
strike a balance between emergency laws and the rule of law, as well as between 
emergency laws and human rights. However, the same has not been done in the 
context of security laws. The preferred method of striking the much-needed balance 
(and challenges therewith) will be revealed in 1.1.3 below. 
 
1.1.2 Developments within the South African political and legal landscapes 
As already stated, the second premise from which this thesis proceeds is that there 
are certain developments taking place mainly within the South African political 
landscape. These developments could, on the one hand, be viewed as indicating the 
need to be vigilant and to take whatever steps necessary to guard against the improper 
use of security laws to the detriment of the rule of law and human rights. On the other 
hand, however, some of these developments are a reminder of the need to have 
security laws readily in place to deal with legitimate security threats which might 
compromise the rule of law and human rights.  
It is submitted that these developments bolster the call to put in place measures that 
will strike a balance between security laws and the rule of law as well as human rights. 
The consideration of the developments in the South African legal landscape lends 
                                                          
23 CH Powell ‘South Africa’s legislation against terrorism and organised crime’ 2002 Singapore Journal 
of Legal Studies 104. 
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further credence to the need for striking a balance mainly between security laws and 
the rule of law. I now turn to discuss these developments. 
 
1.1.2.1 Developments within the South African political landscape 
South Africa’s democracy had a rough start as it confronted a record of 338 bombing 
incidents between 1994, being the year of its inception, and 1998. 24  Organised 
terrorist groups aimed at pursuing domestic acts of terrorism also emerged at the time. 
Chief amongst these was an organisation named the People Against Gangsterism and 
Drugs (PAGAD)25 as well as the Boeremag.26 Fortunately, the operations of PAGAD 
and the Boeremag were successfully halted. Members of the Boeremag are currently 
serving imprisonment terms.  
More recently, however, there has been a re-emergence of incidents which the 
authorities could characterise as a security threat and therefore merit the invocation 
of security laws. The upsurge of violent protests27 is one of the incidents envisaged 
                                                          
24 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 92 (project 105) Review of Security Legislation 
(terrorism: section 54 of the Internal Security Act 1982 (Act No. 74 of 1982)) (2000) para 1.5. See also 
A Hubschle ‘Among the less restrictive? South Africa’s anti-terror law: commentary’ (2005) 14 African 
Security Review 105 at 106. 
25 PAGAD began as a multi-religious group aimed at fighting crime and violence in the drug-stricken 
Cape Flats near the City of Cape Town. Due to being dominated mainly by Muslim people, PAGAD 
later became an Islamic organisation which adopted an anti-government and anti-Western stance. It 
also became notorious for acts of terrorism, such as vigilante attacks on various ‘synagogues, gay 
nightclubs, moderate Muslims, tourist attractions and restaurants with Western associations’.   It is also 
reported to have had links with other terrorist groups in the Middle East. See ‘People Against 
Gangsterism and Drugs’ available at http://www.sahistory.org.za, accessed on 17 July 2019.  
 
26 In 2002, an Afrikaner right-wing group called the Boeremag began its operations by detonating bombs 
in Soweto, a township near the City of Johannesburg. Members of this group were subsequently 
arrested, and they faced trial which began in May 2003. Due to the various legal wrangles ranging from 
jail conditions to issues pertaining to legal aid, the Boeremag trial holds the record as one of the longest 
running criminal trials in South African legal history. It culminated in a conviction and sentence in 2012 
and 2013 respectively. See ‘Boeremag treason trial timeline’ available at http://www.sahistory.org.za, 
accessed on 17 July 2019.  
 
27 It is a well-known fact that the political, social and economic challenges facing South Africa have led 
to many communities taking to the streets to express their demands. However, since the year 2004, 
these protests have gradually been adopting the culture of violence. Be that as it may, these protests, 
amongst other factors, have exposed the ruling African National Congress’s (ANC) service delivery 
shortcomings, thus damaging the public image of the party. Such a state of affairs can only benefit the 
opposition parties, as was seen from the results of the 2016 local/municipal government elections in 
which the ANC’s electoral support declined significantly to a point that it lost control of three of the major 
metropolitan councils that it used to govern. The downward trend of the ANC continued even in the 
2019 general elections when its electoral support suffered a further decline, though the party did not 
lose the elections. For a full discussion of the statistics and other issues relating to violent protests, see 
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here. In the year 2015, there were reports of two instances where security laws were 
sought to be invoked in order to prosecute the perpetrators of alleged violence during 
protests. The first incident took place in June 2015 when a prosecutor in the Durban 
Magistrates’ Court sought authorisation from the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions to charge with terrorism the perpetrators of violence during a violent 
demonstration by taxi operators in the City of Durban.28 The second incident took 
place in October 2015 when it was reported that the students who wreaked havoc 
during the march to Parliament organised under the #FeesMustFall campaign were 
charged with treason.29  However, the National Prosecuting Authority and the Hawks, 
a specialised police investigations unit, have since denied the latter allegation.30 In 
such cases, vigilance is required because of the real possibility that the invocation of 
security laws might just be nothing more than the abuse of security laws in the name 
                                                          
K Khumalo Re-opening the debate on developing the crime of public violence in light of the violent 
protests and strikes (unpublished LLM thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2015) 9-16.  
The changing trends around protest action, particularly the level of violence, gave rise to the landmark 
decision in SATAWU and Another v Garvas and Others 2013 (1) SA 83 (CC), being the first judgment 
in a democratic South Africa to pronounce on right to freedom of assembly as enshrined in section 17 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. In essence, the court upheld the 
constitutionality of a statutory provision (section 11 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1992) 
which allows for the imposition of a civil sanction on organisers of protest action in the event that the 
protest action in question turns violent.  It found that the imposition of a civil sanction was a justifiable 
limitation of the right to freedom of assembly.  For a discussion and other views on this case, see K 
Khumalo ‘Developing the crime of public violence as a remedy to the violation of the rights of non-
protesters during violent protests and strikes – a critical analysis of the South African jurisprudence’ 
(2015) 36 Obiter 578 at 581-584; M Bishop & J Brickhill ‘Constitutional Law’ 2013 Annual Survey of 
South African law 150-215; and IM Rautenbach ‘The liability of organisers for damage caused in the 
course of violent demonstrations as a limitation of the right to freedom of assembly SATAWU v Garvas 
2012 8 BCLR 840 (CC): regspraak’ 2013 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 151-164.  
 
28 See, inter alia, K Padayachee ‘Taxi drivers likely to face terror charges’ IOL News, 11 June 2015, 
available at http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime/taxi-drivers-likely-to-face-terror-charges, accessed on 29 
July 2016; G Stolley ‘Taxi strikers facing terrorism charges seek bail’ News24, 11 June 2015, available 
at http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Taxi-strikers-facing-terrorism-chargesseekbail20150611, 
accessed on 29 July 2016; and A Khoza ‘Durban taxi operators face Terrorism Act charges’ News24, 
11 June 2015, available at http://www.news24.com/South Africa/News/Durban-taxi-operators-face-
Terrorism-Act-charges-20150611, accessed on 29 July 2016. 
 
29 See, inter alia, ‘#FeesMustFall arrested students to face serious charges’ eNCA News, 22 October 
2015, available at http://www.enca.com/south-africa/students-held-cape-town-central-police-station-
released, accessed on 3 October 2016.  
 
30 See C Bernado ‘No treason charges for protesting students’ IOL News, 22 October 2015, available 
at http://www.iol.co.za/crime-courts-no-treason-charges-for-protesting-students-19341, accessed on 3 




of maintaining peace and security,31 yet the rule of law and human rights are adversely 
affected. 
Another development that constitutes a reason to be wary of the invocation of security 
laws is the increasing trend in present-day South Africa of confusing political speech 
with calls of terror, which invite the invocation of security laws. This is evident from two 
instances where flamboyant politicians who had unequivocally called for the removal 
of former President Zuma had charges of treason and/or terrorism being laid against 
them. The ruling African National Congress (ANC) laid a charge of high treason 
against the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), Julius Malema, for his 
public utterances that the EFF will take over the country over a barrel of a gun.32  A 
charge of treason and/or terrorism was also laid against one Sipho Pityana, a popular 
figure in business circles, following Pityana’s call for former President Zuma to step 
down as President of South Africa or be removed before the end of his term of office. 
The argument here was that, while free speech is permissible, actively organising the 
business sector to support the call for a regime change constituted economic 
terrorism.33  
As was mentioned earlier, there are also incidents in the political sphere that serve as 
a reminder for the need to have security measures readily in place to deal with 
legitimate security threats (which endanger the rule of law and human rights). It may 
very well be that South Africa currently faces no significant security threats, but that is 
not a reason to dispense with security measures altogether, especially given that 
terrorism is a scourge from which no country is immune.  
                                                          
31 At this juncture, one is reminded of the very first line in the much-celebrated article by Matthews and 
Albino which reads: ‘[a]nd we should recognise that the proper basis of our security is in good 
administration rather than in fear of legal penalties’.  See AS Matthews & RC Albino ‘The permanence 
of the temporary: an examination of the 90- and 180-day detention laws’ (1966) 83 South African Law 
Journal 16. 
 
32 This statement has since been qualified by the EFF to mean that the EFF would only have taken over 
the country over a barrel of a gun had the 2016 local government elections been rigged – see LM Khoza 
‘ANC says its laid charges of high treason against Malema’ EWN News available at 
http://ewn.co.za/2016/04/26/ANC-confirms-laid-charges-against-EFF, accessed on 23 September 
2016. 
 
33 ‘Manyi formally lays treason charges against Pityana’ SABC News, 20 September 2016 available at 




There are at least five incidents that have occurred in South Africa and which bear 
testimony to the need to have security laws readily in place. Firstly, South Africa 
grapples not just with violent protests, but also other social ills such as sporadic 
xenophobic attacks, taxi violence, and gang-related violence. Since instability or 
unrest is a common breeding ground for terrorist activities,34 the regular occurrence of 
the aforementioned sporadic incidents of violence can one day be the manifestation 
of terrorist acts, in which case security laws must be readily available to deal with such 
situations.  
Secondly, South Africa has observed an upsurge in reported incidents of members of 
certain organisations who are found to be plotting to carry out terrorist acts,35 and who 
must therefore be dealt with using the country’s security laws. Thirdly, the public 
utterances of Mr Gwede Mantashe (the former secretary-general of the ANC, now 
chairperson of the party), to the effect that there are external forces operating to effect 
a regime change in South Africa,36 may have been cast aside as nothing more than a 
political gimmick or paranoia of the ANC, but they nonetheless add some weight, no 
                                                          
34  R Kalidheen Policing mechanisms to counter terrorist attacks in South Africa Magister 
Technologicae-Policing (unpublished LLM thesis, University of South Africa, 2008) 94-99.  
 
35 In the year 2012, a group of men belonging to a certain Afrikaner right-wing group were arrested and 
charged with high treason for orchestrating a plan to bomb the ANC’s elective conference in Mangaung.  
The plan also entailed the killing of former President Zuma and other senior ANC leaders, in execution 
style.  The men were arrested, and various weapons were seized from their possession (see V Pillay & 
S Evans ‘Mangaung ‘bomb’ part of Zuma assassination plot’ Mail & Guardian, 18 December 2012, 
available at http://mg.co.za/article/2012-12-18-mangaung-bomb-part-of-zuma-assassination-plot, 
accessed on 22 September 2016). One of the accused persons in this case has already pleaded guilty 
to the charge of conspiracy to take part in terrorist acts and is serving an eight-year sentence (see 
‘Malema’s threats sparked right-wing plot’, IOL News, 13 February 2012, available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/malemas-threasts-sparked-rightwing-plot, accessed on 23 
September 2016).  
Furthermore, in July 2016, two South African men allegedly with links to a terrorist organisation, ISIS, 
were apprehended and charged with terrorism for planning to bomb the American embassy as well as 
other Jewish Institutions (see I Pijoos ‘SA brothers charged with planning to blow up US embassy and 
‘Jewish institutions’’ News24, 11 July 2016, available at http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/sa-
brothers-charged-with-planning-to-blow-up-US-embassy-and-Jewish-Institutions, accessed on 22 
September 2016). 
As recent as December 2019, leaders of a particular right-wing organisation in South Africa were 
arrested ahead of executing plans to conduct various terrorist activities, including bombing shopping 
malls and informal settlements populated by black people (see ‘Hawks arrest 3 more alleged members 
of 'terrorist' Christian Resistance Movement’ IOL News, 19 December 2019, available at 
https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/hawks-arrest-3-more-alleged-members-of-terrorist-
christian-resistance-movement-38443530, accessed on 5 January 2020). 
 
36 I Pijoos & W Pretorius ‘South Africans must defend the revolution – Mantashe’ News24, 19 February 
2016, available at http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/south-africans-must-defend-the-
revolution, accessed on 23 September 2016. 
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matter how little, to the need for the country to have security measures readily in place 
should such an eventuality materialise at some stage.  
Fourthly, in 2017, the draft emergency regulations contained in the internal 
memorandum of the military were widely publicised in the media. 37  Despite the 
Presidency under former President Zuma denying any knowledge of the draft 
regulations and reiterating that it was not working on new emergency regulations,38 
one is left wondering what the military was preparing for.  Fifthly, as recent as the first 
half of 2018, South Africa experienced a number of bomb scare incidents, although 
none have materialised into a catastrophe or have been declared as an act of 
terrorism.39  
The foregoing illustrates clearly that the need to be vigilant whenever security laws are 
being invoked is as equally important as the need to have security laws readily in place 
to deal with security threats. The only solution to this riddle is to seek to strike a 
balance between security laws, the rule of law and human rights. Once again, the 
preferred method in this regard (and the challenges associated therewith) is identified 
in 1.1.3 below.   
 
1.1.2.2 Developments within the South African legal landscape40 
The present study comes after some interesting developments in the South African 
legal sphere have unfolded, which developments bolster the need for striking a 
balance between security laws and the rule of law, in particular. The study comes at a 
time when the Executive, especially under former President Zuma, had been found 
wanting in many highly sensitive political cases, and in which the rule of law (usually 
                                                          
37 E Gibson ‘Draft regulations for state of emergency drawn up’ News24, 12 December 2017, available 
at http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/draft-regulations-for-state-of-emergency-drawn-up-2017-1211, 
accessed on 19 July 2019. 
 
38 S Writer ‘9 alarming state of emergency law proposals you really need to know about’ Businesstech, 
12 December 2017, available at http://businesstech.co.za/news/government/216191/9-alarming-state-
of-emergency-law-proposals-you-really-need-to-know-about, accessed on 19 July 2019. 
39 N Mngoma ‘Hawks step in to investigate Durban bomb incidents’ IOL News, 10 July 2018, available 
at http://www.iol.co.za/mercury/news/hawks-step-in-to-investigate-Durban-bomb-incidents, accessed 
on 11 July 2018. 
 
40 A further discussion of the cases cited in this section can be found throughout S Ellman ‘Struggle for 
the rule of law in South Africa’ (2015) 60 New York Law School Law Review 57-104. 
13 
 
represented by the principle of legality) was at the centre 41  either directly or 
indirectly. 42 As a result, tension had since arisen between the Executive and the 
judiciary. The tension reached boiling point following the judgment in Southern Africa 
Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development,43 in which the 
full bench of the North Gauteng High Court upheld the government’s obligation under 
international law to have arrested the former Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, 
when he was in South Africa.  
The strained relations between the judiciary and the Executive prompted a meeting of 
delegations comprising senior members of both the judiciary and the Executive, led by 
their heads (the Chief Justice and President of the Republic respectively), to iron out 
relations between the two arms of state.44 It was not long after the judgment in the 
Omar al-Bashir matter that the wrath of the rule of law once again fell on the Executive. 
This time, it was the North Gauteng High Court pronouncing on the ‘spy tapes’ 
                                                          
41 These cases have contributed to the development of a vibrant body of administrative laws based on 
the principle of legality, an aspect of the rule of law.  In this regard, see C Hoexter ‘The rule of law and 
the principle of legality in South African administrative law today’ in M Carnelley and SV Hoctor (eds) 
Law Order and Liberty - Essays in Honour of Tony Mathews (2011) 55-74.   
 
42 Loosely speaking, the rule of law can be said to apply directly if the basis of the review of certain 
(Executive) conduct is the principle of legality or the rule of law itself.  It applies indirectly if the review 
is based on other grounds, such as those which are provided for in the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000, the latter being indirectly influenced by the rule of law. 
 
43 2015 (5) SA 1 (GP). The judgment of the High Court was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (SCA) in Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Southern Africa Litigation 
Centre 2016 (3) SA 317 (SCA). 
 
44 ‘Statement on the meeting of the National Executive and the Judiciary, Union Buildings, Pretoria’ 27 
August available at http://thepresidency.gov.za, accessed on 3 October 2016.   
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debacle45 and subsequently the Constitutional Court in the Nkandla saga.46 The same 
trend continued in the context of the appointment of public office bearers, which started 
notably with the setting aside as irrational of the appointment of Advocate Menzi 
Simelane as the then National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP).47   
The rule of law also played a central role in the legal woes that plagued the South 
African Police Service’s (SAPS) National Head of Crime Intelligence, Richard Mdluli.  
These legal woes took a different turn when the North Gauteng High Court in Freedom 
Under Law v National Director of Public Prosecutions,48 guided by the rule of law, 
reviewed and set aside two decisions pertaining to Mdluli. The first was that of the 
officials of the NPA to withdraw the charges of fraud, corruption, murder and other 
related crimes against Mdluli. The second was that of the National Police 
Commissioner to withdraw the disciplinary proceedings and suspension of Mdluli.  
                                                          
45 The earliest judgment in the protracted litigation which was to ensue in the spy tapes debacle was 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director 
of Public Prosecution 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA). In this matter, the Democratic Alliance (DA), the official 
opposition party in South Africa, successfully relied on the rule of law to secure a favourable finding 
from the SCA to the effect that it (the DA) be furnished with the controversial spy tapes. These spy 
tapes had informed the decision of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to discontinue the 
prosecution of former President Jacob Zuma for corruption on the basis of the abuse of process by the 
NPA officials, as well as political interference in the prosecution. The court reasoned that the decision 
to discontinue a prosecution may not have been administrative action under Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000, but it was nonetheless reviewable in terms of the rule of law. The court further 
reasoned that its exercise of the power of review in this matter was dependent upon the release of the 
spy tapes to the DA.  
A couple of years after the SCA ordered the release of the spy tapes, the DA, in Democratic Alliance v 
Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 2016 (2) SACR 1 (GP), once again relied successfully 
on the rule of law in having the decision of the NPA to discontinue former President Zuma’s prosecution 
reviewed and set aside as irrational. Zuma’s appeal to the SCA failed, and the charges against him 
have since been reinstated. 
 
46 See Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker, National Assembly 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) in which the 
Constitutional Court, the highest court in South Africa, found that former President Zuma had failed to 
uphold, defend and respect the Constitution when he failed to act on the recommendations of the Public 
Protector to pay a portion of the non-security upgrades done to his private residence in the area known 
as Nkandla. The court also pronounced on the unlawfulness of Parliament’s conduct in subverting the 
report and remedial actions of the Public Protector. 
 
47 Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC).  In this case, 
the Constitutional Court overturned the appointment of Simelane because of the scathing findings of 
dishonesty on his part by the Ginwala Commission of Inquiry. The Commission had been tasked with 
investigating the fitness of the then head of the NPA, Advocate Vusi Pikoli, to hold office. Simelane was 
found by the Commission not to have been a credible witness as he had lied and fabricated evidence 
several times during the course of the Inquiry. For these reasons, the court found Simelane’s character 
and integrity not to be consistent with the constitutional requirements of the head of the NPA, and 
declared his appointment to be irrational. 
 
48 2014 (1) SA 254 (GNP). 
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However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) partially upheld the decision 
of the court a quo.49    
The rule of law was also instrumental in the lengthy litigation between the Democratic 
Alliance (DA), the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and the Minister of 
Communications. The subject of this litigation was the promotion of one Hlaudi 
Motsoeneng from the position of Acting Chief Operating Officer to permanent Chief 
Operating Officer (COO) of the SABC. The promotion had been granted in spite of the 
scathing findings of the Public Protector which rendered questionable Motsoeneng’s 
integrity to hold such an office.  
The DA approached the court seeking two outcomes.  The first was the enforcement 
of the recommendations of the Public Protector50 i.e. that Motsoeneng be subjected 
to disciplinary proceedings on allegations of his irregular appointment to the post of 
acting COO and other misconduct, including misrepresenting his qualifications. The 
DA successfully obtained an order from the SCA which upheld the binding nature of 
the recommendations of the Public Protector.51   
The second outcome which the DA successfully obtained was an order reviewing and 
setting aside as irrational the recommendation by the Board of the SABC that 
Motsoeneng be appointed as permanent COO, as well as the subsequent approval of 
the Board’s recommendation by the Minister of Communications.52  Both the Western 
Cape High Court and the SCA have refused the SABC and the Minister of 
                                                          
49 See National Director of Public Prosecutions v Freedom Under Law 2014 (4) SA 298 (SCA). The 
SCA held that the decision to withdraw the charge of murder and other related charges was not 
irrational, but the High Court had gone too far and infringed the separation of powers doctrine when it 
ordered the reinstatement of the charges and disciplinary proceedings without delay. 
 
50 The Public Protector is one of the six independent state institutions that are known as Chapter 9 
institutions. These are provided for in chapter 9 of the Constitution, and they are mandated to support 
and defend democracy. These institutions are independent from the government and are subject only 
to the Constitution and the law. They also report annually to Parliament. In terms of the preamble to the 
Public Protector Act 23 of 1994, the Public Protector is particularly tasked with investigating, and thus 
protecting the public, against maladministration in government and other improper conduct of public 
officials (see ‘The office of the Public Protector 1995’ available at 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/office-public-protector-1995, accessed on 2 August 2019). 
 
51 South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Ltd v Democratic Alliance 2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA). 
 
52 Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Ltd 2016 (3) SA 468 (WCC). 
16 
 
Communications leave to appeal due to there being no reasonable prospects of 
success or any other compelling reason to hear the appeal.   
Berning Ntlemeza’s appointment as the national head of the Directorate for Priority 
Crimes Investigations (DPCI) has also been dealt a fatal blow by the judgment of the 
North Gauteng High Court fuelled by the rule of law.53  Had the DA persisted with 
litigation against South African Airways (SAA), it was expected that the rule of law 
would have played a central role in its challenge of the decision of the cabinet to 
reappoint one Dudu Myeni as the Chairperson of the Board of SAA, despite her failure 
to run profitably the said state-owned airline. 54  However, Dudu Myeni has since 
vacated this position, and the DA has apparently abandoned this matter.  
What can be deduced from the foregoing is that the rule of law often finds application 
in politically-sensitive public law matters. Although the rule of law is commended for 
standing firm in its dispensation of justice even if that means it has to operate against 
powerful political actors, the reality is that the conclusions which the courts arrive at in 
following the rule of law have largely been against the Executive, and this has 
culminated in tension between the two arms of state.  
It must be noted with concern that the decay of the rule of law in South Africa’s 
neighbouring country, Zimbabwe, was preceded by similar tension between the 
Executive and Judiciary following the judiciary’s stance in opposition to the 
Zimbabwean government’s land redistribution policy which led to widespread land 
grabs.55 Therefore, the obvious danger posed by the tension between the Executive 
and the Judiciary is that it might lead to the South African government also withdrawing 
                                                          
53 See Helen Suzman Foundation v Minister of Police 2017 (1) SACR 683 (GP). 
 
54 See media statement delivered by the former DA leader, Mr Mmusi Maimane MP, at a press briefing: 
‘SAA: DA to challenge Dudu Myeni reappointment in court’ available at 
http://www.da.org.za/2016/09/saa-da-challenge-dudu-myeni-reappointment-court, accessed on 23 
September 2016. 
 
55 GE Devenish ‘The rule of law revisited with special reference to South Africa and Zimbabwe’ 2004 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 675 at 686-690. 
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its compliance with, and respect for, the rule of law, which event would send the 
country back to apartheid-style56 governance and even lead to a state of anarchy.57  
State security is another politically-sensitive area in which the rule of law will certainly 
find application. The application of the rule of law to declare security laws 
unconstitutional would most likely exacerbate the already existing tension, since state 
security is undoubtedly one of the high-ranking interests of any government, and the 
survival and authority of any government is dependent upon there being peace and 
security. This state of affairs discourages the hasty declaration of security laws as 
unconstitutional. Instead, it encourages the formulation of creative and innovative 
methods of striking a balance between security laws and the rule of law. This thesis 
proposes a method that will assist in striking the required balance.  
The method proposed in this thesis is identified during the course of the discussion 
that follows under heading 1.2 below. For present purposes, it is sufficient to mention 
that the proposed method is neither skewed in favour of upholding the rule of law and 
human rights nor is it skewed in favour of producing a result that is favourable to the 
Executive. Thus, it will produce an outcome that upholds the rule of law and human 
rights where justified, likewise, it will produce a result that favours the Executive where 
that is required.  
Given the objective nature of the proposed method, its operation should convince the 
Executive that, before a security measure is declared unconstitutional, the courts will 
have done everything possible to preserve its constitutional validity. This way, state 
security issues would be removed from the list of issues that contribute to the friction 
between the judiciary and the Executive, thereby reducing the risk of the Executive’s 
withdrawal from complying with the rule of law.  
Most importantly, through the method proposed in this thesis, the removal of state 
security issues from the list of factors that contribute to the friction between the 
Judiciary and the Executive will be achieved without the judiciary having appeared to 
                                                          
56  Apartheid (an Afrikaans language term meaning ‘apartness’) was effectively a policy of racial 
segregation that was perpetuated by the National Party government from 1948, when it assumed power, 
until 1994 when the new democratic dispensation was ushered in (see ‘A history of Apartheid in South 
Africa’ available at http://www.sahistory.org.za, accessed on 2 August 2019).   
 
57 It remains to be seen whether the incumbent President Cyril Ramaphosa’s promise of change from 
the Zuma era will also translate to less friction between the Executive and the Judiciary.   
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be ‘backpedalling’58 when it comes to making tough decisions against the Executive. 
After all, it is well established in South African jurisprudence that the Constitution and 
the rule of law reign supreme,59 and the other democratic institutions, such as the 
courts in the main, should call the Executive to order in the event that it deviates from 
the rule of law. This falls squarely within the words of Mangu60 who aptly states that:  
‘The principles of the rule of law are indispensable cornerstones of constitutional 
democracy on South Africa. A court must fearlessly address this through its judgments, 
and not hesitate to keep the executive within the law, failing which it would not have 
complied with its constitutional obligations to administer justice to all persons alike without 
fear, favour or prejudice’.   
 
1.1.3 Legal interpretation as the preferred method of striking the required balance 
The third and last premise from which this thesis proceeds is that the preferred method 
of resolving conflicts in the law, clearing ambiguities, developing the law and striking 
a balance between competing interests in law, is to rely on the courts’ power of 
interpretation.61 Normally, the courts are assisted by academic writings in executing 
this task, albeit the courts’ position is strengthened by the fact that its pronouncements 
are authoritative and binding, whereas academic views are only persuasive. While the 
whole of this thesis is filled with examples of jurisprudential development being done 
through legal interpretation by the courts (with the support of academic writings), 
chapter 4 below provides direct and specific examples in this regard.   
The foregoing is a common practice in many democracies, and it has the backing of 
eminent international and local scholars. Legal interpretation therefore remains the 
preferred measure for striking a balance between ordinary security laws and the rule 
                                                          
58 The term ‘backpedalling’ is borrowed from AM Mangu ‘The Bashir case and backpedalling on human 
rights and the rule of law in post-Mandela South Africa’(2015) 2 African Journal of Democracy and 
Governance 179 at 190.  
 
59 Ibid at 192. 
 
60 Ibid at 190.  
 
61 Evidence of the preference of legal interpretation is located throughout chapters 4 to 7 below. 
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of law as well as human rights, especially after prosecutorial restraint has not curbed 
the temptation to unduly invoke the broadly- and vaguely-worded security laws.  
Such heavy reliance on legal interpretation in the present context can be seen as an 
acknowledgement that security laws are by their very nature and of necessity couched 
in broad terms, presumably in an effort to capture as much conduct that can be 
deemed to be a security threat. As a result, there is a reluctance to call for the wording 
of security laws in precise language. Instead, legal interpretation would rather be relied 
upon in order to prevent the abuse of security laws, which ultimately compromises 
both the rule of law and human rights. The ultimate goal which is facilitated by the 
courts’ power of legal interpretation is the preservation of the nature of security laws 
(i.e. being couched in broad terms), while these laws are clothed with interpretation 
that renders them consistent with the rule of law and human rights, thus passing 
constitutional muster. 
Despite being vested with the power of interpretation, history proves that the courts do 
not have a consistent record of upholding and protecting the rule of law and human 
rights in the face of security breaches requiring the invocation of security laws.62 This 
                                                          
62 The courts’ inconsistent record when it comes to the protection of the rule of law and human rights 
persists not only when security laws are invoked, but also when emergency laws are being used.  
It remains to be seen whether the legal developments which ensued following government action in the 
fight against the recent Covid-19 scourge, provide any indication of the courts’ behaviour during crisis. 
Interestingly, in one of the cases heard during the ‘hard’ (i.e. level 5) Covid-19 lockdown in South Africa, 
the presiding judge reportedly did not take kindly to the fact that many of the lawyers who appeared in 
the matter had travelled without permits. The judge went as far as to make obiter remarks to the effect 
that the ‘present extreme circumstances caused by Covid-19 justifies the regulations and directives’ 
made in terms of the Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002, and that these are ‘justifiable and 
reasonable in an open democratic society’. This statement is quite a significant approval of the 
regulations issued by the Executive, and shows that the judge already has a preconceived view of their 
constitutionality even before there is an official challenge to these (see P De Vos ‘Some lawyers think 
they are above the law when it comes to lockdown’ Daily Maverick, 8 April 2020, available at 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2020-04-08-some-lawyers-think-they-are-above-the-law-
when-it-comes-to-lockdown/, accessed on 12 April 2020. 
In another case also decided during the level 5 lockdown,  the Constitutional Court refused to even hear 
an application challenging the constitutionality of some of the regulations. Unfortunately, the application 
was in any event brought on blatantly shoddy grounds, such that no court would have found differently 
(see A Karrim ‘Concourt dismisses NGO’s application to challenge SA’s 21-day lockdown’ News24, 30 
March 2020, available at https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/concourt-dismisses-ngos-
application-to-challenge-sas-21-day-lockdown-20200330, accessed on 05 April 2020). 
Another judgment handed down during level 5 lockdown was in Ex Parte Karel Willem van Heerden 
(MN) unreported case no 1079/2020 of 27 March 2020. In this case, the applicant was refused an order 
permitting him to bury a loved one in contravention of the lock-down regulations. The court made it clear 
that it would not grant an order allowing the applicant to act in breach of the regulations. 
As is typically the case whenever a country is emerging from a disaster or an emergency, the courts 
started entertaining legal challenges to the state of disaster rules after the exigency or the hard 
lockdown had subsided. 
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could be attributed to two factors. The first is that there are those instances where the 
courts are prevented by the applicable security laws from properly exercising the 
power of interpretation. The second is that, generally in some cases of a security 
nature, even well-meaning and liberal courts can develop the tendency to become 
executive-minded and thus prefer to defer to the Executive the making of judgment in 
matters concerning state security, or they opt for Executive-friendly interpretations of 
security provisions (such as preferring an interpretation which is aligned to, or 
consistent with, government policy), or they invoke principles and doctrines which 
prevent them from deciding security matters on the merits. All these factors have had 
a detrimental effect on the protection of the rule of law and human rights.63  
Of course, the foregoing is not an indictment particularly on the post-apartheid South 
African courts as they have not even had a chance to pronounce on security laws and 
therefore prove themselves. Indeed, nowhere to date have the courts failed to abide 
by their constitutional mandate. Instead, they have done very well even in politically 
sensitive cases as seen in the discussion under 1.1.2.2 above. The only drawback is 
that, when it comes to the lived experience of the South African courts’ engagement 
with security laws, only lessons from apartheid exist, and these paint a bleak picture. 
Apart from examining the behaviour of the courts in security matters and later 
bemoaning their failure to fulfil the obligation to uphold and protect the rule of law and 
human rights, hardly any scholar has sought to overhaul the very system that places 
the courts’ power of interpretation at the forefront of striking a balance between 
security laws and the rule of law as well as human rights. That being said, it is now 
appropriate to set out the purpose of the present study.  
 
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This thesis studies and analyses the South African security and emergency laws64 and 
concludes that there emerge certain techniques for securing the interpretation of 
                                                          
63 Chapter 4 provides practical examples of what is stated in the current paragraph. 
 
64 The main reason for studying emergency laws alongside security laws is that both security and 
emergency laws share a common trait, which is to regulate the security space. The only difference 
might just be that emergency laws regulate security threats of serious proportions, whereas ordinary 
state security laws regulate security threats of less serious proportions. Therefore, the broader study 
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security laws in a manner that upholds and protects the rule of law. Taken together, 
these techniques constitute what is termed the ‘security laws’ interpretation regime’. 
The purpose of this study is therefore to formally establish a mechanism termed the 
security laws’ interpretation regime, which is a collection of techniques that will bolster 
the interpretation of security laws in a manner that upholds and protects the rule of law 
and human rights. The interpretation regime would therefore strike the appropriate 
balance between security laws, on the one hand, and the rule of law and human rights, 
on the other.  
The thinking behind the establishment of the envisaged interpretation regime is that, 
since unaided interpretation does not always guarantee the protection of the rule of 
law and human rights as it should, the courts’ power of interpretation must be 
supplemented with, or anchored by, an interpretation regime that ought to be observed 
whenever security laws are being interpreted and applied, whether in a time of peace 
or turmoil. The idea of establishing this regime therefore satisfies the desire for 
something innovative when it comes to addressing the sometimes fruitless reliance on 
the courts’ unaided power of interpretation.  
Establishing the envisaged interpretation regime is no different from what the leading 
scholars in the emergency law field did in the aftermath of the 9/11 bombings era. 
Given the exigency of the time and the need for democratic states to respond 
effectively to the exigency, many scholars turned to establishing models and theories 
of emergency systems which best serve democratic states during an emergency. 
Some scholars advanced models drawn from their reading of the work of a renowned 
                                                          
and analysis of both security and emergency laws, as opposed to a narrow consideration of security 
laws only, can only benefit this thesis in its search for a mechanism that bolsters the interpretation of 
security laws in a manner that upholds and protects the rule of law and human rights.  
In any event, the existing state security jurisprudence is not as developed as the emergency 
jurisprudence. As such, the justification and/or authority for the techniques of the envisaged 
interpretation regime might well have to be sought outside the security jurisprudence. There is no better 
place than the emergency field to seek such authority. This is not to suggest that the South African 
emergency system is perfect. Indeed, the system is yet to be even tested in a court of law. However, 
the logic here is simply that, since the emergency jurisprudence regulates security matters of serious 
proportions (i.e. emergencies), the same jurisprudence can be relied upon in setting up a scheme which 
seeks to regulate security matters of less serious proportions.  
Borrowing principles from the emergency jurisprudence and applying them in the security context 
should not be problematic because there are many similarities shared by security and emergency laws. 
To mention a few, the two have historically been developing alongside one another and they have been 
abused by the apartheid government in a similar fashion; they both suffer the same criticism of being 
couched in broad and vague terms, and they have been, and continue to be, challenged on the same 
ground of violating the rule of law and human rights.  
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English legal scholar, Albert Venn Dicey. Other models or theories are based on the 
study of the Roman law approach to regulating emergencies, while others can be 
traced back to the Roman-Dutch and English law notion of martial law. Other models 
and theories emerge from the study and analysis of the practice during emergencies 
in various jurisdictions, mainly the advanced democracies such as that of the United 
States and the United Kingdom. 
In the present context, accepting that the alignment of security laws with the rule of 
law and human rights is achieved mainly through interpretation, the challenge being 
faced is that of the courts’ failure to always interpret security laws in a manner that 
upholds and protects the rule of law notwithstanding the exigency of the time. As with 
the challenge of responding to emergencies, democratic states have to somehow 
respond to the challenge of the courts’ failure to always fulfil its duties and therefore 
strike the necessary balance between security laws and the rule of law as well as 
human rights, especially at a time of a security breach or an emergency. Thus, this 
thesis carefully studies and critically analyses the South African security and 
emergency jurisprudence and concludes that there evolve  certain techniques for 
securing the interpretation of security laws in a manner that upholds and protects the 
rule of law. These techniques collectively constitute the security laws’ interpretation 
regime. 
The idea of naming this innovation the ‘security laws’ interpretation regime’ is inspired 
by section 37 of the South African Constitution, 65  also popularly known as the 
country’s ‘emergency regime’. As this section neatly organises the laws and powers 
applicable in an emergency, this thesis cherishes an arrangement of this sort because 
it consolidates the relevant laws and powers and makes them readily accessible amid 
the exigency and pressure to hastily resolve all legal obstacles so that the Executive 
can act to counter the emergency. The envisaged interpretation regime is also 
intended to consolidate and make readily available the techniques or methods 
applicable in interpreting the ordinary security laws. 
                                                          
65 A full discussion of this section appears in chapter 5 below. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that South Africa’s leading constitutional law texts66 bemoan 
the lack of development in the area of state security,67 this thesis will reveal that the 
South African jurisprudence is nonetheless exemplary in the field of state security. 
This is because, as we shall see in chapter 7 below, the techniques of the 
interpretation regime are located within the country’s security and emergency 
jurisprudence, though they are currently operating as uncoordinated units, to the 
detriment of their efficacy in bolstering the interpretation of security laws that is 
consistent with the rule of law and human rights. In this sense, South Africa probably 
surpasses most democracies as the efforts of other democratic jurisdictions in 
balancing security laws with the rule of law and human rights are hindered by certain 
practices, principles and doctrines which in South Africa are either inapplicable or are 
significantly restricted in their operation. In addition, the proposed interpretation regime 
will become a precedent of a transformative, liberal, purposive and substantive 
interpretation of security laws expected to be undertaken by judges of truly democratic 
states.  
Of course,  other jurisdictions are welcome to adopt the same idea of establishing the 
interpretation regime if that will assist them in facilitating the interpretation of security 
laws in a manner that upholds and protects the rule of law and human rights. Should 
the need also arise, the proposed interpretation regime can certainly be applied not 
only by the domestic courts of the countries in which ordinary security laws are being 
invoked, but also the regional and international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, 
especially when these are faced with difficult questions surrounding the interpretation 
of security laws at regional and international level. 
  
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis entails the study and analysis of South Africa’s security and emergency 
laws so as to show the emergence of certain techniques which are crucial for 
                                                          
66 See S Woolman ‘Freedom of assembly’ in S Woolman, T Roux, J Klaaren et al (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed (2005) 61-3. See also I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed 
(2005) 816.  
 
67 At the same time, these texts acknowledge the lack of development in the area of state security as a 
reality which many would rather live with given the country’s past encounters with state security laws. 
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bolstering the interpretation of security laws in a manner that upholds and protects the 
rule of law and human rights. Taken together, these techniques constitute what in this 
thesis is termed the security laws’ interpretation regime. Therefore, the contribution to 
knowledge or the originality part of this thesis lies mainly in the careful study and critical 
analysis or reading of the content of both security and emergency laws. 
Since the essence of this thesis is to study and analyse the existing security and 
emergency laws, it should come as no surprise that the chapters preceding the one in 
which the envisaged interpretation regime is formally established, contain, for the most 
part, the content of security and emergency laws which, once carefully studied and 
analysed, would show that there exist  certain techniques for securing the 
interpretation of security laws in a manner that is in harmony with the rule of law and 
human rights. Therefore, the first six chapters of this thesis set out the content of 
security and emergency laws in South Africa, with the view to enable a careful study 
and critical analysis thereof. 
Turning to the breakdown of the chapters, the first and current chapter is titled the 
introduction. It details the premises from which the study proceeds, and sets out the 
purpose of the study. It is also used to convey certain preliminary information that the 
reader needs to be aware of ahead of reading the entire thesis. Thus, the chapter is 
an appropriate platform for setting out the structure of the thesis, the research 
methodology used in the thesis, as well as the key research questions that this thesis 
will seek to answer.  
Chapter 2 is titled the centrality of the rule of law and human rights in the South African 
legal system. The chapter examines how and why the rule of law and human rights 
came to be so central in South Africa’s legal system and in the regulation of the 
security and emergency space. The extent of the centrality of the rule of law and 
human rights in South Africa’s constitutional democracy is such that all laws, including 
security and emergency laws, have to be consistent with the rule of law and human 
rights, failing which those laws are unconstitutional. The chapter ends with an 
examination of the prevailing relationship between the rule of law (represented by the 
principle of legality) and security laws, as well as between the rule of law / legality and 
emergency laws.  
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Chapter 3 is titled the origins of security and emergency laws. The chapter sets out 
the Roman, Roman-Dutch and English law origins of both security and emergency 
laws, as these are the main legal systems whose security and emergency laws came 
to influence the South African law. In the later parts, chapter 3 reveals that, arguably 
with the benefit of the knowledge acquired from the study of the Roman, Roman-Dutch 
and English law emergency systems, modern states have since proceeded to develop 
other models and theories of emergency systems that democratic states can adopt in 
a time of crisis. The chapter also shows that there have since evolved various other 
practices, principles and doctrines which have become an integral part of security and 
emergency laws. Ultimately, the chapter sets out the foundations of the South African 
security and emergency laws which are a subject of study and analysis in this thesis.68 
Chapter 4 is titled the early development of South African security and emergency 
laws. The chapter primarily expands from chapter 3 and demonstrates the influence 
that Roman-Dutch and English security and emergency laws had on the formation and 
development of South Africa’s common-law security69 and emergency measures.70 
Later, the chapter visits South Africa’s embrace of draconian security and emergency 
legislation, as well as how legal challenges to, or based on, these far-reaching laws 
were prevented. In essence, the chapter outlines South Africa’s early security and 
emergency order, with the ultimate view to unearth the detail that will be shown in 
chapter 7 to have contributed to the establishment of the envisaged interpretation 
regime.  
Chapters 5 and 6 are titled the delineation of South Africa’s post-apartheid emergency 
jurisprudence and the delineation of South Africa’s post-apartheid state security 
jurisprudence respectively. Both chapters are concerned with delineating and 
providing a comprehensive breakdown of the prevailing security and emergency 
jurisprudence. This way, the content of the delineation can be studied and analysed 
so as to uncover the detail that will be shown in chapter 7 to have contributed 
significantly to the establishment of the envisaged interpretation regime.  
                                                          
68 For a discussion on South Africa’s early security and emergency jurisprudence, see chapter 4 below. 
 
69 The common-law security measures being referred to include the crimes of high treason and sedition. 
 
70 There is only one common-law emergency measure in place, and that it is the notion of martial law. 
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Given the content of security and emergency laws disseminated in the first six 
chapters of this thesis, the ground would then be fertile for chapter 7, which is titled 
the proposed security laws’ interpretation regime, to derive and piece together what is 
deemed to be the techniques for securing the interpretation of security laws in a 
manner that is consistent with the rule of law and human rights, thus constituting the 
envisaged interpretation regime. Later in the chapter appears further justifications for 
the interpretation regime.  
Chapter 8 is then the overview of the entire thesis and conclusion. The main message 
being communicated is that the interpretation regime facilitates the transformative 
liberal, purposive and substantive interpretation of security laws that can be expected 
from judges of truly democratic states. In the final analysis, the interpretation regime 
sets South Africa on a path to being a precedent of good practice when it comes to 
the interpretation of security laws consistently with the rule of law and human rights. 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The study undertaken in this thesis is qualitative rather than quantitative. It involves a 
desktop study of existing legal materials, such as textbooks, journal articles, case law 
(both foreign and local), various official reports, newspaper articles and various 
internet sources. In terms of presentation, the thesis invokes a legal-historical 
methodology of research as it traces the South African state security and emergency 
laws from their origins until currently. This is done in the first six chapters. Chapter 7 
then records the outcome of a careful study and analysis of the content of state 
security and emergency laws, which is that there emerge certain techniques which are 
crucial for securing the interpretation of security laws in a manner that upholds and 
protects the rule of law. These techniques, taken together, form what in this thesis is 
termed the ‘security laws’ interpretation regime’.  
Throughout the thesis, there are also elements of a legal comparative methodology of 
research. Indeed, there are instances, particularly in chapters 4 and 5, where South 
African security and emergency laws are, to the extent justified by the context, 
compared with those of other jurisdictions. It is envisaged that the South African 
approach to interpreting state security laws, as encapsulated in the interpretation 
27 
 
regime proposed in this thesis, will make a good point of reference and comparison 
for other democratic states. 
The main research question sought to be answered is what mechanism can be put in 
place in order to bolster or facilitate the courts’ interpretation of state security laws in 
a manner that upholds and protects the rule of law and human rights. There also exist  
a few other questions which are ancillary to the above main research question and 
which are also addressed in this thesis. These are as follows: 
(a) What makes state security a topic that is worthy of being visited with research 
in modern South Africa? 
(b) What is currently the nature of the relationship between state security laws and 
the rule of law as well as human rights? 
(c) What is the generally accepted legal measure for protecting and upholding the 
rule of law and human rights in the face of the broad and vague security laws? 
(d)  What are the shortcomings of the measure in (c) above, which shortcomings 
are sought to be remedied by means of the mechanism established in the 
present thesis?  













THE CENTRALITY OF THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
2.1 GENERAL 
Not so long ago, security and emergency laws were some of the topical areas of South 
African law into which only brave academics dared to venture for fear of being 
persecuted or purged by the apartheid government using the draconian security and 
emergency laws of the time. These were interesting areas of law because a lot was 
open to be said about the sustained violation of the rule of law and human rights 
occasioned by, among other things, the overly broad and vague provisions of these 
laws, the common exclusion of the courts’ jurisdiction in security and emergency 
matters, the disregard for individual liberties, and the wide-ranging powers (even of 
detention without trial) vested in the Executive not subject to meaningful forms of 
control.  
With the demise of apartheid and the elevation of the rule of law and human rights to 
being the founding values of South Africa’s post-apartheid Constitution,71 one would 
expect that the enactment or invocation of security and emergency laws in modern 
South Africa should no longer generate the same level of controversy as before. That, 
however, has certainly not been the case72 owing to South Africa’s recent history of 
                                                          
71 See s 1 of the Constitution which provides that: ‘[t]he Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, 
democratic state founded on the following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and 
the advancement of human rights;…(c) Supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law’. 
 
72 For instance, the recent publication of the draft emergency regulations by the military was met with a 
widespread public outcry (refer to notes 37 & 38 above). Furthermore, when the member states of the 
United Nations were required (by Resolution 1373 (2001) of the United Nations Security Council) to put 
in place anti-terrorism measures following the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 
2001, an intense debate ensued with many using the public comment proceedings to voice their 
opinions. The basis of the opposition to the then draft anti-terrorism legislation was mainly the fear of 
the return of draconian security legislation which characterised the apartheid era. Others held the view 
that South Africa had sufficient laws already in place to deal with the scourge of terrorism. The main 
argument advanced by those who advocated for the adoption of the anti-terrorism legislation was that 
the existing laws at the time were not sufficient to cover the various forms in terms of which terrorism 
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the abuse of these laws, as well as the delicate nature of the competing interests of 
the government and citizens aroused by security and emergency laws.   
In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that the rule of law and human rights are central 
in South Africa’s legal system such that all laws, including the security and emergency 
laws, have to be consistent with these. This chapter examines how and why the rule 
of law and human rights came to occupy centre stage in the South African legal system 
and to be central in the regulation of security and emergency laws, hence the need for 
the striking of a balance and the achievement of consistency between these laws, on 
the one hand, and the rule of law as well as human rights, on the other.  
The reason(s) for the centrality of the rule of law and human rights will become clear 
in the discussion of the history of the rule of law and human rights under heading 2.2 
below. To complete the discussion on the centrality particularly of the rule of law, this 
chapter will, under heading 2.3 below, also examine the prevailing relationship 
between the rule of law (represented by the principle of legality) and security laws, as 
well as between the rule of law (also represented by the principle of legality) and 
emergency laws.  
This thesis would be fundamentally lacking in detail if the examination of the rule of 
law and human rights envisaged in this chapter is not undertaken. After all, this chapter 
addresses a key aspect of this thesis, which is why security and emergency laws have 
to be consistent with the rule of law and human rights in the first place.  
 
2.2 THE HISTORY OF THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
The study of South Africa’s interaction with the rule of law and human rights has to 
start from the time of the gradual introduction of English law into South African law. 
This process began effectively from the year 1806 when the United Kingdom seized 
control of the Cape of Good Hope.73 The introduction of English law also marked the 
                                                          
could manifest itself. They also argued that the trend internationally was to adopt omnibus legislation. 
See South African Law Commission (project 105) Review of Security Legislation (terrorism: section 54 




start of what became a tradition of modelling the South African Constitution on the 
Westminster system.74 It also marked the beginning of South Africa’s engagement 
with English constitutional principles, such as, inter alia, human rights75 and the rule 
of law.76 
The introduction of English law into South Africa was, however, met with a mixed 
reaction since the English Constitution, which at the time was underpinned by a 
sovereign Legislature, the absence of a justiciable Bill of Rights and some precepts of 
the rule of law (which included access to courts and equality before the law), was 
completely foreign to the Dutch settlers  of the Cape of Good Hope. Although the Dutch 
settlers were receptive of many of the English systems, the introduction of equality 
between the Cape natives and whites was rejected by the Dutch settlers, and so that 
became partly the reason for the mass departure of the Dutch settlers (the Great Trek) 
                                                          
73 In modern South Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, as it was then known, is located in the Western 
Cape province, which is presently one of the nine provinces of South Africa. 
 
74 The introduction of English law did not replace Roman-Dutch law as the common law which was 
applied in the Cape since 1652. when the Dutch settlers occupied the Cape territory. This was in 
accordance with the Cape Articles of Capitulation of 1806, which allowed the inhabitants of the Cape 
to retain ‘all their rights and privileges which they have enjoyed hitherto’. It was also consistent with the 
English common-law principle that ‘the laws of the conquered country continue in force, until they are 
altered by the conqueror’.  
What made entrenchment of English law principles easier when the United Kingdom took charge of the 
Cape is that Roman-Dutch law was no longer developing because Holland, a province in the 
Netherlands which is the birthplace of Roman-Dutch law, discarded the Roman-Dutch law system after 
being conquered by France’s Napoleon, resulting in the introduction of French law in the Netherlands. 
Other factors which strengthened the English law influence on the South African law was the 
introduction of the English court systems, English statutes, the use of English as the language of the 
courts and the training of advocates in English law. See Dugard op cit (n15) 3-37 (Part 1); and Currie 
& De Waal op cit (n1) 1-38 (Chapter 1) & 39-71 (Chapter 2). 
 
75 The theory of human rights was first expounded in the 17th century by John Locke (Q Dlamini ‘Mass 
action and the law – can South Africa do without the Regulation of Gatherings Act?’ (2009) 1 African 
Journal of Rhetoric 86 at 88). Since then, the Constitutions of various jurisdictions now incorporate the 
basic human rights consolidated in the Bill of Rights section. The first Constitution to incorporate an 
entrenched and justiciable Bill of Rights was that of the United States of America in the 18th century 
(Rautenbach op cit (n27) 158). 
 
76 The classical formulation of the rule of law was pioneered and popularised by a renowned English 
legal scholar, Albert Venn Dicey, in his book titled An introduction to the Study of the Laws of the 
Constitution, which was first published in 1885. Dicey defined the rule of law in terms of at least three 
interrelated propositions or ideas which Mathews, an eminent South African scholar on the rule of law 
and security laws, aptly summarises as follows: the first proposition is that ‘no man may be punished 
except for a distinct breach of the law established before the ordinary court of the land’. Second, 
‘everyone in the State is subject to the ordinary law and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
courts’. Third, ‘the principles of the constitution (i.e. the two propositions) are the result, not the source, 
of the ordinary law of the land’. See AS Mathews ‘A bridle for the unruly horse’ (1964) 81 South African 
Law Journal 312 at 313. For a historical account of the development of the rule of law in the United 
Kingdom, refer to the discussion under subheading 3.5.1.7 in chapter 3 below. It is considered 
expedient to have that discussion later in chapter 3. 
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who headed for the interior of South Africa to form two colonies which became known 
as the Orange Free State and the South African Republic (Transvaal). 77  The 
Constitutions of these colonies were, to a large extent, modelled on the American 
Constitution. Therefore, they were characterised mainly by the rejection of major 
tenets of English constitutionalism, that being the supremacy of Parliament, equality 
before the law and the absence of a justiciable Bill of Rights.78   
It was not long until the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 following which Britain seized 
control of the two Afrikaner colonies, the Orange Free State and Transvaal. The result 
of the seizure was the idea to amalgamate the two Afrikaner colonies with the Cape 
and Natal colonies to form the Union of South Africa. The Union Constitution, officially 
known as the South Africa Act of 1909 (passed by the Westminster Parliament in the 
United Kingdom and proclaimed on 31 May 1910), thereafter followed. The English 
notion of a sovereign Legislature or parliamentary supremacy made its way back to 
the Union Constitution, thus paving the way towards its entrenchment in South Africa’s 
then legal system.79 The rule of law, which accompanied parliamentary supremacy in 
the United Kingdom, was however restricted to the point of being non-existent. I shall 
return to the point on the rule of law later below. 
As already indicated above, parliamentary supremacy was incorporated into South 
Africa’s constitutional structure of 1910. Its full effect, however, was realised gradually 
over time as the consolidation of the white minority’s control over South Africa was 
being entrenched. This consolidation project started in 1910 and continued even post-
1948.80 The ground was certainly fertile for this project because the period from 1910 
until about the 1950s was relatively stable in that there were no more internal wars 
                                                          
77 Dugard op cit (n15) 17. 
 
78 On the functioning of the Constitutions of these colonies and the problems encountered, see Dugard 
op cit (n15) 18-24. Furthermore, for a synopsis of the American constitutional model, refer to note 1 
above. 
 
79 Section 90 of the Union Constitution provided that parliament could make laws ‘for the peace, order 
and good government of the Union’. In making such laws, parliament was subject only to certain 
procedural limitations, and there were no substantive limitations. See Currie & De Waal op cit (n1) 44. 
 
80 The year 1948 marks the National Party government’s assumption of power and the official start of 
the implementation of the policy of apartheid. On the meaning of apartheid, refer to note 56 above. 
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being fought.81 The war efforts of the indigenous people of South Africa had been 
successfully quashed. In the same period, the English and Afrikaans-speaking whites 
had put their differences aside, and they had their agreement recorded in, and 
protected by, the Union Constitution.  
In 1931 came the repeal of the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865.82 This piece of 
legislation had restricted the sovereignty of the Union Parliament through a provision 
that ‘there could be no competition between Westminster and a colonial legislature: 
any colonial law repugnant to an Act of the British Parliament extending to that colony 
was null and void’.83 The passing of the Colonial Laws Validity Act opened way for the 
whites only Parliament to utilise parliamentary supremacy to its fullest by passing 
whatever law it deemed appropriate.  
The first target of the enormous power in the hands of Parliament became the limited 
right of Black and Coloured people to vote.84 In 1936, Parliament flexed its muscle and 
passed the Representation of Natives Act.85 In passing this Act, Parliament used the 
unicameral procedure laid down in the Union Constitution, and the effect of the Act 
was that it removed African voters from the common voters’ roll and gave them 
separate representation. Parliament’s stance must also have been strengthened by 
the fact that parliamentary supremacy had received judicial endorsement from the 
                                                          
81 This excludes, of course, the first and second World Wars. Also, in 1914, there was a challenge of 
white labour unrest, but the government passed the Riotous Assemblies Act 27 of 1914 in order to 
effectively deal with that unrest. 
 
82 This legislation was repealed by the Statute of Westminster in 1931. The Statue of Westminster was 
notably passed after the Commonwealth Convention had already started to restrain the English 
Parliament from legislating for the colonies without their consent (see Dugard op cit (n15) 28). 
 
83 Dugard op cit (n15) 28. Also see Currie & de Waal (op cit (n1) 46). Therefore, requirements such as, 
among others, that all parliamentary Bills needed the assent of the Governor-General or the King before 
becoming law were also repealed by the same Act which repealed the Colonial Laws Validity Act (Currie 
& de Waal op cit (n1) 44-45). 
 
84 It is noteworthy that during the negotiations which preceded the Union Constitution, a compromise 
was reached to the effect that the Cape would retain the qualified franchise for Africans and Coloureds. 
This became entrenched in section 35 of the Union Constitution. Section 152 of the Union Constitution 
allowed Parliament to alter or repeal sections 35 and 137 (which entrenched the equality of two official 
languages, being English and Afrikaans) only if this was done with a two-thirds majority vote of the two 
Houses of Parliament sitting together (Dugard op cit (n15) 26-29). 
 
85 12 of 1936. 
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Appellate Division86 in the case of Sachs v Minister of Justice87 wherein the Court 
found that:  
‘Once we are satisfied on a construction of the Act, that it gives the Minister an unfettered 
discretion, it is no function of a court of law to curtail its scope in the least degree, indeed 
it would be quite improper to do so. The above observation is, perhaps, so trite that it 
needs no statement, yet in cases before the courts when the exercise of a statutory 
discretion is challenged, arguments are sometimes advanced which do seem to me to 
ignore the plain principle that Parliament may make any encroachment it chooses upon 
the life, liberty or property of any individual subject to its sway, and that it is the function 
of the courts of law to enforce its will’. 
A court challenge to the Representation of Natives Act in Ndlwana v Hofmeyr N.O.88  
provided the Court with occasion to pronounce that:  
‘Parliament…can adopt any procedure it thinks fit; the procedure express or implied in 
the South Africa Act so far as Courts of Law are concerned is at the mercy of Parliament 
like everything else… . Parliament’s will…as expressed in an Act of Parliament cannot 
now in this country, as it cannot in England, be questioned by a Court of Law, whose 
function it is to enforce that will not to question it’. 
Shortly after the 1948 elections which saw the National Party ascend to government 
and begin implementing the policy of apartheid, Parliament resumed the process of 
removing the Coloured voters from the common voters’ roll and to give them separate 
representation. The events accompanying the removal of Coloured voters plunged the 
country into a constitutional crisis89 from which South Africa emerged with the result 
that parliamentary sovereignty was officially entrenched.  
                                                          
86 This was the country’s highest court at the time. 
 
87 1934 AD 11 at 36-37. 
 
88 1937 AD 229 at 237-238. 
 
89 Unlike the removal of African voters which was done following the procedure laid down in the Union 
Constitution, this time, the apartheid Parliament, driven by its sovereign status, wanted to have the 
Coloured voters’ removal passed with a simple majority in both Houses of Parliament sitting separately. 
This was because the ruling party knew that it lacked the necessary majority in Parliament, and there 
also existed some legal authority supporting the approach of the ruling party. The Separate 
Representation of Voters Act 46 of 1951 was then passed. However, a successful challenge to the Act 
was lodged in Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952 (2) SA 428 (A), with the court basically upholding 
not so much the substantive constraints on legislation, but certainly the procedural constraints on 
Parliament in passing the aforementioned legislation. Government responded by passing the High 
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Given the foregoing developments, the ground was, as early as the 1950s and for 
many years thereafter, fertile for the apartheid government (which enjoyed unlimited 
powers of Parliament guaranteed by the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy and a 
party system which ensured loyalty to the Executive) to take  bolder steps towards the 
implementation of its apartheid policy. What followed was a series of racially-charged 
laws permeating every sphere of life ranging from race classification; 90  separate 
facilities; 91  family life, morality, marriage and sexual relations; 92  separate living 
                                                          
Court of Parliament Act 35 of 1952 through a simple majority. This Act empowered Parliament, acting 
through a body called the High Court of Parliament, to review and set aside the decision of the Appellate 
Division nullifying any Act of Parliament. Parliament’s response was itself struck down by the Appellate 
Division in Minister of the Interior v Harris 1952 (4) SA 769 (A). Finally, the success of the ruling party 
in removing the Coloured voters from the roll came after the government increased the size of the 
Appellate Division from five to eleven judges in cases involving the validity of an Act of Parliament. This 
was in terms of the Appellate Division Quorum Act 27 of 1955. Using the Senate Act 53 of 1955, 
Parliament also increased the number of representatives in the Houses of Parliament, and also changed 
the method of their election. Assured of success, the National Party government amended the Union 
Constitution through the South Africa Act Amendment Act 9 of 1956 which was passed by a two-thirds 
majority of both Houses sitting together. The latter legislation which amended the Union Constitution 
revalidated the Separate Representation of Voters Act, it did away with the entrenchment of a qualified 
non-racial franchise, and also did away with the courts’ jurisdiction to pronounce on the validity of a law 
passed by Parliament, except the law that alters or repeals the remaining entrenched provisions (these 
being the equality of two official languages (s 137) and s 152 which, after amendment, allowed 
Parliament to alter or repeal s 137 only with a two-thirds majority vote of the two Houses of parliament 
sitting together). A challenge to the foregoing legislative scheme failed before the then newly-
reconstituted Appellate Division in Collins v Minister of the Interior 1957 (1) SA 552 (A).  See generally 
Dugard op cit (n15) 28-34. See also Currie & de Waal op cit (n1) 46-50. 
 
90 One piece of legislation which falls into the present category is the Population Registration Act 30 of 
1950, which provided for the compilation of a population register in terms of which an individual could 
be classified as White, Coloured or Bantu. For the Bantu (or Black people), there was a further 
classification into the ethnic or other group to which that person may belong. The basis for the 
classification was imperfect, as it was simply based on the criteria of appearance, social acceptance 
and descent. The government’s main aim was to avoid attempts to cross the colour line from a less 
privileged racial group to a more privileged one (see generally Dugard op cit (n15) 59-62).  
 
91 The attitude of the South African courts towards cases concerning the allocation of separate facilities 
for different races was largely influenced by the law in the United States at the time. The courts in the 
United States had been upholding the policy of separate but equal facilities for different races. The 
rationale was that the ‘Legislature is presumed not to intend anything so unreasonable as inequality 
between races’. Thus, it was found in Minister of Posts and Telegraphs v Rasool 1934 AD 167 that the 
regulations establishing separate post office counters for blacks and whites may have constituted 
discrimination, but because there were equal resources, the regulations were not unreasonable. Where 
the regulations created separate but substantially unequal facilities in railway coaches and premises, 
the courts struck down those regulations (see, for instance, R v Abdurahman 1950 (3) SA 136 (A) and 
R v Lusu 1953 (2) SA 484 (A)). Therefore, only in cases where there has been separate but unequal 
facilities did the courts strike down the subordinate legislation, unless there was empowering legislation 
which specifically provided for separate and unequal facilities. As would be expected, the government 
did introduce the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 49 of 1953. This piece of legislation permitted 
any person in control of public premises to reserve separate but unequal facilities for different races, 
and did away with the power of the courts to declare such reservations invalid. As a result, the separate 
and unequal facilities policy of the apartheid government permeated every public sphere ranging from 




areas;93 separate education;94 labour;95 and liberty and freedom of movement.96 The 
foregoing is not a comprehensive list, but indicates some of the aspects of life which 
the apartheid policy permeated.  
The ushering in of parliamentary supremacy, with the result that Parliament, in 
exercising its law-making power, was subject only to certain procedural limitations and 
not substantive limitations, had significant implications for the rule of law and human 
rights. For human rights, parliamentary supremacy meant that the common-law  rights 
and freedoms were available to the extent that they were not restricted or excluded by 
an Act of Parliament. Accordingly, various pieces of legislation were passed 
notwithstanding the adverse effects that these pieces of legislation had on human 
rights.  
                                                          
92 The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949 is one of the first laws to be passed by the National 
Party government after it assumed power in 1948. It forbade marriages between Europeans and non-
Europeans and even criminalized the solemnisation of a marriage by a marriage officer in contravention 
of this law. Sexual intercourse between people of different races was also criminalized under the  
Immorality Act 23 of 1957 (see Dugard op cit (n15) 69-71). 
 
93 The Bantu Land Act 27 of 1913 and the Bantu Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 reserved some 13% of 
the land in South Africa for occupation by Africans. In terms of the 1913 Act, Bantu or Africans were 
allocated reserve land and could not transfer or lease the reserved land to other races. Africans also 
could not acquire land from elsewhere. The 1936 Act sought to give Africans more land, a promise that 
was never really fulfilled. The statutory basis for racial segregation in the urban areas was the Group 
Areas Act 36 of 1966, which created separate group areas in towns and cities for different races  
(Dugard op cit (n15) 78-82). 
 
94 The Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 catered for the education of Africans and was at the centre of 
the protest by school pupils in 1976. Also, tertiary education in some universities was open based on 
merit (the so-called open universities). However, in 1959 the government introduced the Extension of 
University Education Act 45 of 1959 which imposed the requirement that Blacks obtain a permit from 
the relevant Minister before attending the open universities. The same Act also provided for the 
establishment of separate universities for Africans and other non-whites. White students were barred 
from the universities designated for non-whites (Dugard op cit (n15) 83-85). 
 
95 The discriminatory laws in the labour context operated to reserve many skilled and best paying jobs  
for whites. It also restricted the access of Africans to bargaining tables, which resulted in lower wages 
for Africans. See for instance, the Mines and Works Act 27 of 1956, which, in the mining context, 
reserved skilled jobs for Whites and Coloureds only. The Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1976 
empowered the Minister of Labour to reserve certain classes of jobs for certain races and to prevent 
inter-racial competition (Dugard op cit 85-89). 
 
96  Freedom of movement for people of Indian descent was notably regulated in terms of Union 
Regulation Act 22 of 1913, the Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act 59 of 1972, and 
the Aliens Control Act 40 of 1973. For Africans, permission was required for travelling within the Union 
as the law confined them to tribal homelands. The most notorious statute in point is the Bantu (Urban 
Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945, which controlled the influx of Africans into urban areas and also 
made provision for the carrying of a pass (Dugard op cit (n15) 71-78).  
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Apart from the operation of parliamentary supremacy, what also bolstered the 
apartheid government’s sustained violation of human rights with impunity was the 
insistence on the omission of a justiciable Bill of Rights from the Constitution. It also 
did not help the plight of human rights that the rule of law suffered its own limitations 
at the hands of parliamentary supremacy, as will be indicated immediately below. 
For the rule of law, parliamentary supremacy meant that, in order for the rule of law to 
be consistent with the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy (which at the time was the 
cornerstone of the South African legal system), it (the rule of law) had to be restricted 
strictly to the formal/procedural conception (which conception is discussed later on 
below). There are at least four factors which must have assisted the apartheid 
government in achieving the objective of restricting the rule of law conception strictly 
to the formal/procedural conception.  
The first is the fact that the rule of law had always been a controversial and contested 
concept,97 and its meaning was open to be swayed in different directions. The second 
factor is the fact that society held different views on the rule of law, and some of these 
views coincided with those of the apartheid government.98 The third factor is that, in 
seeking to show that it was complying with the rule of law, the apartheid government 
also drove the narrative of its own account of the requirements of the rule of law (i.e. 
the procedural requirements).99 The fourth and last factor is the fact that the rule of 
                                                          
97 To enhance this point, one of the most incisive critiques of the rule of law was that of Sir Ivor Jennings 
who, in his book titled The Law and the Constitution (published in 1959), dismissed Dicey’s rule of law 
as a ‘principle of political action and not a juridical principle’ (see Dugard op cit (n15) 678). For a 
summary and response to the arguments raised by Jennings, see generally Mathews op cit (n76) 312-
326. 
 
98 Thus, the apartheid government embraced with glee the views of some academics, lawyers and 
judges whose ideologies and religious convictions coincided with the essence of parliamentary 
supremacy and the formal conception of the rule of law. For instance, one Afrikaans scholar, Mr F 
Venter, once rejected the rule of law arguing that it ‘presupposes the notion of fundamental rights 
accruing to the individual against state authority and thus reflects a humanist philosophy, which is 
unacceptable in South Africa’ (Dugard op cit (n15) 41, citing F Venter The Withering of the Rule of Law’ 
(1973) 8 Speculum Juris 69 at 86-88). This view was driven not by the support of the policy of apartheid, 
but by the author’s belief that a state in which God is sovereign must stand in opposition to a humanist 
philosophy (ibid).  
In addition, many of the Afrikaans-speaking politicians and lawyers, including those considered to be 
liberal, held the view that the rule of law imposed a procedural or a due-process restraint on Parliament 
(Dugard op cit (n15) 39). They also held the view that Dicey’s concept of the rule of law was not an 
appropriate standard by which to judge the South African legislation because it closely identified with 
English legal traditions, it was uncertain in its content, it was not acceptable to legal positivists and was 
too narrow in its scope (Dugard op cit (n15) 41). Once again, it was merely coincidental that the above 




law lacked precise meaning and content, and so the competition for the appropriate 
conception or understanding of the rule of law was coincidentally between the 
substantive conception and the formal/procedural conception.100  
A substantive conception of the rule of law means that the scope of the rule of law 
extends to the actual content of the law.101 Therefore, this conception permits the rule 
of law to venture and enquire into issues such as whether a particular law protects 
human rights and other liberties.102  
On the formal/procedural conception of the rule of law, the darling of the apartheid 
government, the scope of the rule of law is limited to the way in which the law is 
enacted.103 In this sense, the rule of law merely imposes procedural or due process 
restraints on law-making or any government action.104 Thus, on the formal conception, 
the rule of law will be complied with if, for instance, there is certainty in the laws being 
passed105 or  if the exercise of certain powers is authorised by law.106  As a result, the 
criticism of the formal/procedural conception is that even those jurisdictions the laws 
                                                          
99 In 1968, the Department of Foreign Affairs Board sought to show that the rule of law was being 
complied with in South Africa. It then produced a document entitled ‘South Africa and the Rule of Law, 
in which it defined the rule of law as follows:  
‘[t]he rule of law may mean different things to different people, but there is a general agreement that it 
requires that a person on trial be accused in open court; be given an opportunity of denying the charge 
and of defending himself and that he be given the choice of a counsel. These rights are at all times 
assured by the South African Courts’ (see Dugard op cit (n15) 42). 
The foregoing account of the rule of law is very limited. For instance, it is silent on the rule of law also 
embracing the requirement of equality before the law. Indeed, it says nothing about the substantive 
ideals of the rule of law. The stance of the apartheid government on the rule of law cannot be clarified 
better than the words of BJ Vorster, the then Minister of Justice, who in 1962 declared that ‘there were 
as many interpretations of the Rule of Law as there are people…’ (Dugard op cit (n15) 43). 
 
100 The perspectives of various eminent writers across the world on the content of the rule of law are 
documented in FC De Coste ‘Redeeming the rule of law’ (2002) 39 Alberta Law Review 1004 at 1007. 
 
101 AL Young ‘The rule of law in the United Kingdom: Formal or substantive’ (2012) 6 Vienna Online 
Journal on International Constitutional Law 259 at 273. 
 
102 D Dyzenhaus ‘The pasts and future of the rule of law in South Africa’ (2007) 124 South African Law 
Journal 734 at 736.  
 
103 Young op cit (n101) 273. 
 
104 Dugard op cit (n15) 39. 
 
105 Young op cit (n101) 273. 
 
106 Dyzenhaus op cit (n102) 736. 
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of which facilitate the worst forms of human rights abuses, like apartheid, do comply 
with the formal conception,107 thus passing off ‘rule by law’ as the ‘rule of law’.108        
Given the operation of parliamentary supremacy, the accompanying absence of a 
justiciable Bill of Rights, as well as the restriction of the rule of law to a 
formal/procedural conception, the South African courts, in exercising the power of 
judicial review of legislation, could only test whether the procedural steps in making 
the law were complied with. It was not open to the courts to venture into the substance 
of the laws made by Parliament. To further prevent any possibility of the court 
reviewing the substance of legislation, the outright ousting of the courts’ jurisdiction in 
certain matters (especially security and emergency matters) was not a strange 
occurrence during apartheid.109 Furthermore, the apartheid government was notorious 
for appointing only pliable judges to the country’s then top court, the Appellate 
                                                          
107 It must be stated that, notwithstanding its shortcomings, the importance of the formal conception 
must not be underestimated, for it distinguished the apartheid state from a prerogative state where 
parliamentarians could remove legal requirements (both substantive and procedural) if they so wished. 
Of course, this does not change the fact that, to a large extent, adherence to the formal conception and 
not to the substantive conception effectively undermined the rule of law itself.  
 
108 Young op cit (n101) 273. This view is also echoed by De Coste op cit (n100) 1004-1005. The 
following quote  from Dyzenhaus (op cit (n102) 738) also captures the point:   
 
‘Consider that decisions in the early 1960s by the Appellate Division signalled to the officials of 
the apartheid state that as long as they had a bare formal warrant in law for their decisions in 
important areas of government policy, including security, the courts would not generally act to 
control them. As I have argued elsewhere, those decisions allowed the government to have its 
cake and eat it too. Because the courts were ready to equate the rule of law with rule by law, 
the government could have statutes enacted that gave its officials authority to act in a legally 
uncontrolled fashion at the same time as the courts endorsed the officials' actions as in 
accordance with the rule of law. In other words, pockets of the Prerogative State can emerge 
within the law if courts subscribe to the formal conception alone and the legislature does not 
impose explicit rule of law controls on public officials, or even indicates, more or less explicitly, 
that it does not intend such controls to apply. The officials have formal authority to act as they 
do, so do not, as in the Prerogative State, have the power simply to sidestep the law when its 
controls seem inconvenient. But the authority they wield seems so barely limited that within their 
mandate they seem virtually uncontrolled’. 
 
109 One of the earliest examples of the ousting of the courts’ jurisdiction came with the South Africa Act 
Amendment Act 9 of 1956 (which amended the Union Constitution). Amongst other things, the Act 
dispensed with the courts’ jurisdiction to pronounce on the validity of a law passed by Parliament, except 
the law that alters or repeals the remaining entrenched provisions (see note 89 above). This provision 
was further incorporated into the Constitution Act 32 of 1961 (the Republic Constitution), which was 
passed in order to declare South Africa a Republic following a referendum which voted in favour of this 
route. The abovementioned Acts cemented the limitation of the courts’ testing power (judicial review) 
only to legislation that repeals or amends or purports to repeal and amend the remaining entrenched 
provisions of the Union Constitution. Other examples of security and emergency legislation which 
explicitly ousted the jurisdiction of the courts appear in the discussion under headings 4.4 and 4.5 in 
chapter 4 below. 
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Division.110 When all else failed, the sovereign Parliament would go as far as to 
override any court judgment it was uncomfortable with.111 
An unintended result of the distortion of the rule of law was the opening of the way for 
significant attempts, especially by the Congress of the International Commission of 
Jurists,112 to give the rule of law precise content. In this regard, the one significant 
contribution of the Congress was its Declaration of New Delhi in 1959 where it 
recognised that the ‘Rule of Law is a dynamic concept … which should be employed 
not only to safeguard and advance civil and political rights of the individual in a free 
society, but also to establish social, economic, educational and cultural conditions 
under which his legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realised’.113 Over the years 
the rule of law came to be widely understood to include within its content the 
substantive and procedural rights and much more. 
Amongst many things, the rule of law is nowadays acknowledged as also representing 
the aspirations of good governance and respect for human rights, it ‘demands that 
disputes be adjudicated in accordance with the law’, it ‘requires access to the courts’, 
it ‘obliges the state to provide mechanisms for the resolution of its citizens’ disputes’ 
and for the ‘execution of court orders without undue social disruption’, and it ‘requires 
that judges must be accountable and not act arbitrarily’. 114 It is also argued that 
included within the scope of the rule of law is the requirement that laws comply with 
international law obligations, and that they adhere to principles of procedural fairness 
and natural justice.115 The rule of law is also argued to be at odds with public officials’ 
                                                          
110 Dyzenhaus op cit (n102) 737. It will also be recalled that the strategy of appointing pliable judges 
was used as one of the methods to secure the removal of Coloured voters from the common roll (for a 
full discussion, see note 89 above). 
 
111 Dyzenhaus op cit (n102) 737. The overriding of a court judgment by an Act of Parliament occurred 
during what has been dubbed the constitutional crisis of the 1950s. Refer to the discussion under note 
89 above. 
 
112 The International Commission of Jurists is a non-governmental organization that was formed in 1952 
in order to promote respect for the rule of law (Dugard op cit (n15) 47) 
 
113 Dugard op cit (n15) 47. 
 
114 See Hoexter op cit (n41) 55-56. 
 
115 Young op cit (n101) 261. 
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‘inefficiency’, ‘incompetence’, ‘laziness’, ‘corruption’ and ‘failure to implement court 
orders’.116 The possibilities are indeed endless. 
Understood in the foregoing sense, the rule of law emerges as a catalyst for a true 
democratic order, hence it is central to any democratic dispensation, including that of 
South Africa. Human rights too have  received protection through being entrenched in 
a Bill of Rights and being recognised as part of the substantive conception of the rule 
of law. The discussion in this section thus illustrates the turbulent historical 
developments towards the triumph of the rule of law and human rights as the 
cornerstone of South Africa’s democracy. The end result is that all laws, including 
security and emergency laws, that are inconsistent with the rule of law and human 
rights are unconstitutional and therefore invalid. 
 
2.3 THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY 
It will be recalled that one of the propositions in terms of which Mathews117 views Dicey 
to have defined the rule of law is that ‘no man may be punished except for a distinct 
breach of the law established before the ordinary courts of the land’. This proposition 
is widely accepted as representing the aspirations of the principle of legality, a concept 
which lies at the heart of the rule of law. This section examines the prevailing 
relationship between the rule of law (represented by the principle of legality) and 
security laws, as well as between the rule of law (also represented by the principle of 
legality) and emergency laws. However, before doing so, the principle of legality, 
particularly its own relationship with the rule of law, needs to be understood within its 
historical context.  
It must be stated upfront that that there is no consensus as to the origins of the legality 
principle. Mathews118 suggests that the idea of legality first found expression in the 
contrast between the idea of ‘government according to law’ and ‘government by 
arbitrary decree’, with the legality principle facilitating the attainment of the former. He 
                                                          
116 H Corder ‘Securing the rule of law’ in M Carnelley and SV Hoctor (eds) Law Order and Liberty -  
Essays in Honour of Tony Mathews (2011) 24.  
 
117 Refer to note 76 above. 
 
118 AS Mathews Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa (1971) 5. 
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observes further that its underlying principle (that is, the reign of law over authority) is 
ancient. It was there even in the early thinking about the law and society and its roots 
can be traced back to the early writings of Plato and Aristotle.119  
Another proposition as to the origins of the legality principle is that the expression of 
the legality principle in Latin terms as nullum crimen sine lege (which means that 
prohibited conduct is only punishable if it is explicitly identified by a properly made law 
as constituting a crime) and nulla poena sine lege (which means that, for there to be 
a crime in law, there must be punishment affixed to the commission of that crime), 
suggests that the legality principle is of Roman origin. Hall120 identifies some traces of 
the legality principle in Roman times, though he concedes the incoherence in the line 
of development. Unlike Hall who sought to present conclusive proof of the link between 
the legality principle and its Roman law antecedents, it is perhaps best to conclude 
that the ideas which are presently encapsulated in the principle of legality were present 
in Roman times, though these were unelaborated and not clearly organised as forming 
part of the principle of legality. This conclusion is further supported by an accepted 
historical fact that the most visible assertion of the idea of legality took effect in the 
Middle Ages (which is a period after the Roman empire had fallen) where clear 
references to the reign of law over authority were made and certain bold steps taken 
in order to realise this principle.121 
In the 15th century United Kingdom, it had become established policy that judges were 
bound by oath to determine rights according to the law, not the will of the King.122 The 
formal acceptance of the theory of the reign of law is marked by the recording of the 
said theory in the Year Book of 1441.123 For quite some time thereafter, this principle 
was never challenged in English law.124 Parliamentary supremacy was at the time not 
yet a dominant theme in English jurisprudence. In the early 17th century, a renowned 
                                                          
119 Ibid.   
 
120 J Hall General Principles of Criminal Law 2 ed (1960) 28-29. 
 
121 Mathews op cit (n118) 6.  
 
122 Ibid.  
 





English jurist, Sir Edward Coke, affirmed the reign of law (that being the common law) 
as being authoritative and even binding on Parliament. 125  When parliamentary 
supremacy subject to the rule of law became the norm, the above aspirations of the 
legality principle were incorporated by Dicey into his account of the rule of law. 
Despite the lack of consensus as to the origins of the legality principle, there seems to 
be agreement that although the legality principle may be adumbrated in the early 
writings of some scholars, as well as in the jurisprudence of Roman law, the middle 
ages and of English law, its formal acceptance is recognised to have come after the 
French revolution when the principle was openly stated in the French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789.126 Subsequent developments saw the 
incorporation of the legality principle into the 1810 Code Penál, as well as into the 
Bavarian Code in 1813, owing largely to the work of Feuerbach who was instrumental 
in systemising and popularising the principle.127 In 1871, the principle of legality was 
incorporated into the German Penal Code.128 Today, the principle is included in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
Presently, it is widely accepted that, for the criminal law, the principle of legality, now 
recognised as an aspect of the rule of law, encompasses two principles which are 
expressed in Latin terms as nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege 
Snyman129 summarises the rules or principles embodied by the principle of legality as 
follows: (a) the accused person may only be found guilty of a crime if the type of act 
so committed is regarded by the law as a crime (ius acceptum); (b) the accused person 
may only be found guilty of a crime if the unlawful act so committed was recognised 
as a crime at the time of its commission (ius praevium); (c) the definitions of crimes 
should reasonably be precise and not vague (ius certum); (d) the definitions of crimes 
                                                          
125 See Dugard (op cit (n15) 15) who cites various dicta from historic cases of the 17th and early 18th 
centuries, which cases reaffirm that an Act of Parliament is void to the extent that it is inconsistent with 
the common law.  
 
126 S Hoctor ‘Specific crimes’ (2007) 20 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 78 at 80.  See also G 
Williams Criminal Law 2 ed (1961) 576.  
 
127 Hoctor op cit (n126) 80. 
 
128 Ibid.  
 
129 CR Snyman Criminal Law 6 ed (2014) 36-37. 
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should be interpreted narrowly rather than broadly (ius strictum); (e) After conviction, 
the sentencing must be in accordance with the above-named principles, which is to 
say that the sentence for the crime must have been already fixed and that the words 
defining punishment must be interpreted narrowly (nulla poena sine lege). 
The constitutional recognition of the principle of legality in South Africa is marked by 
section 35(3)(l) and (n) of the Constitution. Section 35(3) provides for the right to a fair 
trial, which, under paragraph (l) of subsection 3, includes the right ‘not to be convicted 
for an act or omission that was not an offence under either national or international 
law at the time it was committed or omitted’.  Section 35(3)(l) is a clear reference to 
the ius praevium principle and, by implication, the ius acceptum principle.130  In section 
35(3)(n), the right to a fair trial further includes the right ‘to the benefit of the least 
severe of the prescribed punishments if the prescribed punishment for the offence has 
been changed between the time that the offence was committed and the time of 
sentencing’. This relates to the nulla poena sine lege principle.  Although there are no 
direct references to the ius certum and ius strictum principles in section 35 of the 
Constitution, Snyman131 is of the view that the Constitutional Court can interpret the 
said section in such a way that it incorporates the principles that have been omitted.       
Turning to the relationship between the rule of law/legality and security laws, as well 
as between the rule of law/legality and emergency laws, the constitutionality of security 
and emergency laws is rendered questionable if tested against the principle of legality, 
owing to the fact that these laws are couched in broad and vague terms. The usually 
broad and vague security and emergency provisions directly infringe the ius certum 
principle, which denotes that crimes must be defined in a reasonably precise manner. 
This aspect of legality is further enhanced by section 35(3)(a) of the Constitution which 
makes provision for the accused’s right to be informed of a charge with sufficient detail 
to be able to answer it.132 The implication of violating the ius certum principle is that 
security and emergency laws also violate the ius acceptum and ius praevium principles 
insofar as the vagueness of security and emergency laws casts doubt as to whether 
                                                          




132 J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 5 ed (2016) 35.  
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the law regards particular conduct as a crime and whether the conduct in question was 
regarded as crime at the time of its commission. 
The courts have stressed that, in order to comply with the ius certum principle, what 
is required is not absolute clarity but reasonable clarity in the definitions of crimes.133 
Furthermore, the courts are directed to approach the issues of precision in the 
definitions of crimes on the basis that they are is dealing with reasonable and not 
foolish or capricious people.134 Therefore, the question is always whether the security 
and emergency laws are so broad and vague that they exceed the limits of reasonable 
clarity, and that no reasonable person can understand exactly what conduct is being 
criminalised. As already mentioned, it does appear that the broad and vague security 
and emergency provisions typically exceed these limits and therefore violate the 
principle of legality.  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the reality of the matter is that it would not be prudent 
to hasten to declare, without more, the security and emergency laws as 
unconstitutional on the basis of their non-compliance with the rule of law or the legality 
principle. The reason for this is that it also serves the interests of the rule of law to 
have adequate security and emergency laws readily in place. Just as Corder135 views 
the public officials’ ‘inefficiency’, ‘incompetence’, ‘laziness’, ‘corruption’ and ‘failure to 
implement court orders’ as ultimate threats to the rule of law which may seem 
temporary at the moment but carry the possibility of being permanent,136 by the same 
logic, the rule of law is threatened if the security of the state and its people is 
threatened. Just as Devenish137 convincingly argues that the rule of law is not an 
enemy of radical economic reform done within the framework of the Constitution and 
the relevant law, by the same logic, the rule of law is certainly not an enemy of peace 
                                                          
133 Snyman (op cit (n129) 43), citing R v Pretoria Timber Co (Pty) Ltd 1950 (3) SA 163 (A) at 176H; and 
S v Engeldoe’s Taxi Service (Pty) Ltd 1966 (1) SA 329 (A) at 339G. 
 
134 Snyman (op cit (n129) 43), citing S v O’Malley 1976 (1) SA 469 (N) at 474G; and S v Mahlangu 1986 
(1) SA 135 (T) at 141G-H. 
 
135 Corder op cit (n116) 24.  
 
136 By these words, Corder (ibid) was referring to the much-celebrated article by Mathews and Albino 
(op cit (n31) 16-43). In this article, the authors address the issue of detention without trial, which was 
typically a temporary emergency measure but easily became a permanent security measure during 
apartheid.  
 
137 Devenish op cit (n55) 682. 
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and security and would thus endorse the existence of measures for the attainment of 
such peace and security.  
The foregoing illustrates that, as things stand, security and emergency laws may be 
at odds with the principle of legality or the rule of law, owing to their overbroad and 
vague provisions. However, declaring these as unconstitutional is both naïve and 
untenable. What is required is that a balance be struck so as to render the security 
and emergency laws consistent with the principle of legality or the rule of law. As can 
be observed from the discussion under subheading 1.1.1 in chapter 1 above, as well 
from the discussion under heading 3.5 in chapter 3 below, significant steps (in the form 
of the formulation of various models, theories, principles and/or doctrines) have been 
taken in an effort to strike the required balance between the rule of law and emergency 
laws. This thesis is also taking a step towards striking a balance between the rule of 
law and security laws through proposing the envisaged interpretation regime. 
Ultimately, neither the rule of law can guarantee its existence without security and 
emergency laws, nor can security and emergency laws do the same without the rule 
















THE ORIGINS OF SECURITY AND EMERGENCY LAWS 
 
3.1 GENERAL 
This chapter sets out the Roman, Roman-Dutch and English law origins of both 
security and emergency laws, as these are the main legal systems whose security and 
emergency laws came to influence the South African law. It will then become apparent 
in the discussion under heading 3.5 below that, arguably with the benefit of knowledge 
acquired from the Roman, Roman-Dutch and English law emergency systems, 
modern states have since developed other models and theories of emergency 
systems that democratic states can adopt in a time of crisis. Also, there has been the 
evolution of various other practices, principles and doctrines which have become an 
integral part of the legal response mechanism to security threats and emergencies.138  
Because South Africa encountered and engaged these models, theories, practices, 
principles and doctrines in developing its early security and emergency laws,139 it is 
imperative that the present chapter covers the detail thereof. Therefore, in essence, 
chapter 3 sets out the early security- and emergency-related content, which later 
informed the early South African security and emergency laws. The foundations of 
                                                          
138 The models, theories, practices, principles and doctrines envisaged above are divided into two 
categories. The first category comprises those models, theories, practices, principles and doctrines 
which have the effect regulating, limiting or controlling emergency laws and powers. In this category, it 
is possible to access the courts in order to subject security and emergency laws to judicial scrutiny and 
to legal interpretation which is cognisant and respectful of the rule of law and human rights. The second 
category comprises those models, theories, practices, principles and doctrines which have the effect of 
restricting the regulation, limitation or control of security and emergency laws and powers. Under this 
category, access to courts is either prohibited altogether or certain restrictions are imposed so as to 
shield security and emergency laws from any judicial scrutiny and interpretation in light of the rule of 
law and human rights. Consequently, the latter category provides a veneer of legality for the virtually 
unregulated, unlimited or uncontrolled security and emergency laws as well as powers. I shall return to 
this point in the discussion under heading 3.5 below. 
 
139 As is shown in chapters 4 and 5 below. 
47 
 
South African security and emergency laws, which are a subject of study and analysis 
in this thesis, are thus articulated in the present chapter. 
 
3.2. ROMAN LAW 
The challenges faced by states in responding legally to security threats and 
emergencies have long been recognised, hence the existence of legal remedies dating 
back centuries.  In early Roman law, ‘betrayal to the enemy’ was the common act 
perceived to threaten the ‘security’140 of the Roman state,141 and the crime of high 
treason (perduellio) existed as a remedy against such acts.142  
In the later parts of Roman history, notably towards the fall of the Roman Republic143 
and throughout imperial Rome or the principate (being a period during which the 
emperor reigned),144 acts which threatened the security of the Roman state were 
punished as the crimen laesae majestatis.145 The crimen laesae majestatis was a 
generic name for various prohibited acts listed in the statute called the lex Julia de 
Majestatis. 146  The statute made provision for offences against the existence, 
independence, safety, authority or dignity of the majestas or supreme power.147 The 
crime of treason (perduellio) became an important species of this generic crime.148   
                                                          
140 The word security is placed in inverted commas in order to indicate that it is modern terminology 
denoting the various threats to the sovereignty, safety, dignity, honour or respect for the Roman state. 
 
141 Note that the state was at the time personified in the figure of the majestas or the sovereign ruler. 
As a result, the applicable laws criminalised the threat to the personal safety and honour of the majestas 
as a threat to the safety and honour of the state itself. 
 
142 Burchell op cit (n132) 841. 
 
143 SV Hoctor ‘Criminal law’ in WA Joubert (founding ed) The Law of South Africa Vol 11 (2017) par 
173. 
 








148 Hoctor op cit (n143) para 173. 
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Another important crime that emerged from the genus crimen laesae majestatis 
became known as the crime of sedition. Although this crime emanates from the genus, 
there is very little that was known about it in Roman law because the various species 
of the genus were not properly defined.149 Only Roman-Dutch law, as discussed in 3.3 
below, provides a clearer version of the crime of sedition in its infant stages.  Be that 
as it may, Milton150 does highlight three points which he deems to be common cause 
regarding the Roman law stance on sedition.  These are: (a) all the instances given in 
the writings on the crimen laesae majestatis which could amount to the crime of 
sedition appear to entail acts against public authority, and not merely against peace 
and order; (b) in all instances which are likely to amount to the crime of sedition, what 
is envisaged is the assembly of a mob which creates tumult and/or violence; and (c) 
the intent required is not ‘hostile intent’ (as this is the requirement for treason).    
The various ill-defined security offences of Roman law origin remained the law 
throughout the Middle Ages 151 until the 18th century. 152  The period after the 18th 
century saw most legal systems remove the figure of the majestas from the institution 
of the state, and regarded treason to be committed mainly by external enemies in 
pursuit of a goal to overthrow the established government of a state.153   
It appears from the writings of Nicollò Machiavelli 154  that while Roman law was 
developing as outlined above, it was, at the same time, also generating a significant 
body of laws for dealing with grave security threats or emergencies, such as war. 
Modern scholars therefore glean from the writings of Machiavelli the detail of the 
                                                          
149 JRL Milton South African Criminal Law and Procedure vol II: Common Law Crimes 3 ed (1996) 44-
45. 
 
150 Ibid at 45. 
 
151 To enhance the point, Milton (ibid at 10) notes that the early Germanic law (which applied after the 
fall of the Roman empire) was applied by small and close-knit tribal communities in which strict fidelity 
to the ruler was jealously observed. Departure from this norm amounted to treasonable conduct.  
Under the feudal system, again the state subject owed allegiance to the state ruler (personified in the 
figure of the king). A breach of allegiance was also viewed as treason. This state of affairs remained 
until about the end of the 18th century. 
 
152 Burchell op cit (n132) 816.   
 
153 Ibid at 841. 
 
154 Nicollò Machiavelli’s contribution titled Discourses upon the first ten (books) of Titus Livy is available 
at http://www.constitution.org/mac/disclivy.htm. A useful summary is provided by Woolman op cit (n66) 
61-4 and 61-5. 
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Roman emergency system applicable notably from the Roman Republic onwards. The 
Roman emergency system entailed the appointment of a dictator in times of crisis.155 
The powers of the dictator were constrained by a series of predominantly ex ante  
controls (i.e. controls applicable prior to the exercise of specific powers). Examples of 
such ex ante controls include the following:156  
(a)  that the Senate, being the body which recognised and declared an emergency, 
was separate from the body which identified and appointed the dictator (i.e. the 
Consuls);  
(b)  although the dictator enjoyed absolute powers during an emergency, which 
includes the power to even suspend the constitution and other ordinary laws, 
he could not arbitrarily alter, amend, repeal or modify the constitutional order of 
the state as well as the ordinary laws;  
(c) that the dictator could not serve for more than six months;  
(d) that the dictator was empowered to ‘suspend rights and legal processes and to 
marshal military and other forces to deal with the threat of invasion and 
insurrection for the purpose of resolving the threat to the Republic’; and  
(e)  that upon cessation of the threat, the dictator would step aside and normal order 
would be resumed.157 
It can be observed from the foregoing that the first connection between security and 
emergency laws emerges as early as the Roman law. Both security and emergency 
laws shared the state security space, with the crime of high treason (perduellio) and 
later the crimen laesae majestatis constituting the ordinary security laws, and the 
appointment of the dictator being the emergency measure of the time. The dictator 
model was in use during the Roman Republic era and for three hundred years 
                                                          
155 One scholar by the name of Clinton Rossiter developed the ‘constitutional dictator’ model based on 
the institution of a dictator of Roman origin. Clinton Rossiter’s writings are cited and summarised well 
in D Dyzenhaus The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (2006) 35-38. 
 
156 These examples are found throughout Ferejohn & Pasquino op cit (n15) 210-239. See also Gross & 
Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 17-26.  
 
157 Thus, the authority of the dictator did not extend to introducing permanent changes to the existing 
constitutional order but was limited solely to addressing the threat in order to return the constitutional 
state to its normal functioning. 
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thereafter.158 It is noted to have been invoked 95 times,159 hence the system is hailed 
as having contributed immensely to the success and greatness of the Roman 
Republic.160 Centuries later, the legal systems of the world still benefit from the Roman 
law innovation captured in the writings of Nicollò Machiavelli.161  
 
3.3 ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 
The Roman-Dutch law security system in Holland, Netherlands, developed along the 
same lines as that of Roman law. Therefore, the Roman-Dutch law authorities also 
recognised the generic crime called the crimen laesae majestatis. There is also 
consensus that, for the Roman-Dutch law, the genus crimen laesae majestatis 
comprised the following species: (a) high treason (hoog-verraad), which is the 
equivalent of the Roman perduellio; 162  (b) disrespectful behaviour towards the 
majestas of the state (laesae venerationis); and (c) the usurpation of the power of 
authority of the state.163     
The aforementioned species of the genus omit one species which Roman-Dutch law 
recognised as ‘oproer’ (which later became the crime of sedition in South African 
law).164 Milton165 attributes the omission to the fact that the Roman-Dutch law scholars 
could not locate the crime of sedition independently from either the crime of treason 
                                                          




160 Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 17-18. Of course, this is not to say that there was no abuse of this 
institution by some rulers, or that the possibility of abuse is a phenomenon of the modern world. 
 
161 This will become clear in the discussion under heading 3.5 below. 
 
162 High treason was undoubtedly the most serious of the three species of the genus, singling out acts 
committed by people who acted like external enemies of the state even if there was at the time no such 
external enemy (Milton op cit (n149) 12). 
 
163 Burchell op cit (n132) 841.  See also Milton op cit (n149) 10-12. This classification of the species of 
the genus is attributed to Humanist Gothofredus, and is supported by other eminent Roman-Dutch law 
scholars, including, among others, Voet, Decker and Moorman (Milton op cit (n149) 11). 
 
164 Roman-Dutch law dealt with sedition under the notion of ‘oproer’, though this concept is understood 
to connote public disorder and riotousness, instead of the subversion of government authority. The 
subversion of government authority constitutes the essence of what the crime of sedition seeks to 
criminalise (Burchell op cit (n132) 851). 
 
165 Milton op cit (n149) 11. 
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(though it was accepted that a ‘hostile intent’ was required for treason) or the crime of 
public violence. Although some Roman-Dutch law scholars could locate the crime of  
sedition in Roman-Dutch law, their view is seemingly drowned by the overwhelming 
endorsement of the aforementioned three-fold classification of the species of the 
genus.   
Fortunately, Milton 166  resolves the conundrum surrounding the Roman-Dutch law 
stance on sedition or oproer, by making the following concluding remarks: (a) sedition 
or oproer is an offence directed primarily against the authority of the state; (b) there 
must be a gathering of a number of people (whether or not they are violent); and (c) 
the intent of the gatherers is that of defying the government or subverting its authority 
(if there is a ‘hostile intent’, then high treason would be committed).     
Roman-Dutch law responded to emergencies using the notion of martial law.167 By 
way of description, martial law denotes an existing state of affairs, usually the 
existence of war, insurrection or internal strife.168 There are no fixed rules during 
martial law, and the state, acting through the military, is empowered to use all force 
necessary as required by necessity.169 Individual rights can also be curtailed to the 
extent required by the interests of the safety of the state.170 Thus, in Roman-Dutch 
law, martial law provided a legal justification for the actions of the state committed in 
self-defence171 or as born out of necessity.172 The two conditions recognised to have 
been applicable to the exercise of martial law were that the courts could inquire into 
                                                          
166 Milton op cit (n149) 47. 
 
167 GE Devenish ‘Martial law in South Africa’ (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse 
Reg 349 at 350. See also RS Welsh ‘Martial law’ (1941) 58 South African Law Journal 111 at 112. 
 
168 Devenish op cit (n167) 350. Welsh op cit (n167) 112. 
 




171 If action was to be taken based on self-defence, the requirement was that there must have been an 
unlawful and imminent threat to safety of the state, and that the action so taken must have been 
commensurate with the threat so confronted (Devenish op cit (n167) 351). 
 
172 If the steps taken were justified by necessity and not self-defence, then the action needed not be 
directed at the unlawful action of the aggressor. However, it still had to be proportional to the danger, 
so that the rights of citizens would not be curtailed to the extent that was beyond what was required by 
the emergency (Devenish op cit (n167) 351). 
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whether the material conditions objectively justified martial law, and whether the 
measures adopted were justified by the emergency.173 
 
3.4 ENGLISH LAW 
The English version of the crime of treason is largely the result of the Treason Act of 
1531.174 The acts of treason listed in the Act pertained largely to the protection of the 
personal safety and honour of the monarch.175 Although the Act also created other 
treasonable acts, it is noteworthy that those acts were not comprehensive, hence 
many subsequent laws relating to treason were enacted with the aim to fill the gaps in 
the original statute of 1531.176 The bias of the Treason Act and other subsequent 
English treason laws in favour of the protection of the personal safety and honour of 
the king (and later the protection of the state) makes the English law of treason 
comparable to that of Roman and Roman-Dutch law, which was also centred on the 
impairment of the safety and dignity of the majestas or the sovereign figure.177 
Another of the earliest traces of the criminalisation of the threat to the security of the 
English state seems to have come in the form of the 17th century crime of seditious 
libel. This crime criminalised any written, printed or depicted criticism, whether truthful 
or not, of the government.178 The thinking behind such criminalisation was that, for a 
government to be able to govern effectively, it needed to command the respect and 
allegiance of the people, and if people openly criticised the government, that could 
lead to disorder and the undermining of such respect and allegiance.179 As can be 
                                                          
173 Devenish op cit (n167) 353. 
 
174 Milton op cit (n149) 15. 
 
175 Ibid. Milton further notes that the statute provided that the following acts constituted treason: (1) 
compassing the sovereign’s death; (2) violating his wife or eldest unmarried daughter; (3) levying war 
against the king in his realm; (4) being ‘adherent to the king’s enemies in his realm giving to them aid 
and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere; and (5) killing certain of the king’s officers while performing their 
duties’.  
 




178 Ibid at 47. See also Burchell op cit (n132) 825. 
 
179 Milton op cit (n149) 47. 
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expected, numerous prosecutions for this crime followed,180 and the crime became 
the main state machinery against the advocacy of political reform in the United 
Kingdom.181 The relaxation of seditious libel laws came in the 19th century when, 
following widespread criticism, the definition of the crime was confined to the advocacy 
of violent or revolutionary change.182  
English law also recognised and made special provision for emergencies through 
martial law.183 In the context of the United Kingdom, martial law184 emerged as military 
law designed to ensure the order and discipline of soldiers during wartime, but 
transcended over time to represent a series of extraordinary and non-statutory powers 
for dealing with emergencies.185 The scope of the powers available during martial law 
remains, as in the case of the Roman-Dutch law,186 debatable,187 as is the legal 
source of martial law. One view on the legal source of martial law is that it derives from 
the inherent right of governments and citizens to repel force by force.188 The other 
view is that the legal source of martial law is the royal prerogative.189 Another view is 
                                                          
180 Ibid. 
 
181 Burchell op cit (n132) 825 
 
182 Milton op cit (n149) 48.  
 
183 For a description of martial law, refer to the discussion under 3.3 above. 
 
184 The roots of martial law go as far back as the early Roman-Dutch law and English law. In the 19th 
century, the United States also joined the two abovenamed jurisdictions in having the invocation of 
emergency powers justified on the basis of martial law or necessity. An example in point dates back to 
the 19th century civil war when President Lincoln availed to himself various emergency powers and 
justified these on the basis of constitutional necessity, among other things (Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit 
(n21) 47-49) . Nowadays, these powers are also justified as the Executive inherent powers or the war 
powers of the federal government (Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 48).  
 
185 Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 31. 
 
186 Refer to the discussion under heading 3.3 above. 
 
187 In their early (but now obsolete) sense, the emergency powers available under martial law were 
unlimited and uncontrolled. However, this has since been qualified to a certain extent. For instance, 
English martial law powers are subject to the same conditions recognised under Roman-Dutch law. 
That is, the courts can review or test whether there exist objective material conditions justifying martial 
law, and can also test the legality of the actions taken by the authorities during martial law (see Devenish 
op cit (n167) 352 & 354). 
 
188 Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 31-32. 
 
189 Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 31. See also Welsh op cit (n167) 112; and Devenish op cit (n167) 
352. According to John Locke, the leading proponent of the royal prerogative, prerogative power vests 
in the Crown (or the Executive) and means, in a nutshell, the discretionary power to act contrary to, or 
even beyond, the law for the ‘public good’. Some of the famous descriptions of the concept of 
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that martial law is the result of paramount necessity. 190  Notwithstanding the 
uncertainty, the common denominator is that martial law gave the Crown discretionary 
powers to quell an emergency.   
In his Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, Dicey treated Executive 
discretionary power with suspicion,  characterising it as leading to the use of arbitrary 
power which could undermine the supremacy of Parliament.191 Dicey, however, had 
foresight of a unique challenge that emergencies would present. Thus, he conceded 
the need for the use of discretionary power in the case of an emergency, provided the 
Executive obtained ex ante authority for the use of such powers from Parliament 
through (exceptional) legislation. 192  This is generally accepted as being Dicey’s 
preferred approach193 seemingly because it enables Parliament to put in place the 
grounds for the exercise of emergency powers and for testing the legality and 
legitimacy of such emergency powers.  
Dicey also had foresight of a different dimension to emergencies, one which the nature 
of the emergency is such that the law must be broken and faith be placed in the ex 
post ratification of an illegality done by the Executive during an emergency. Such ex 
post ratification could be achieved through Parliament’s passing of an Act of 
Indemnity.194 Dyzenhaus submits that, in the latter situation, Parliament would have 
been slow or unable to act and provide the Executive with the required resources to 
                                                          
prerogative power include that it is ‘nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule’ or, put 
differently, ‘the power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the 
law and sometimes against it’. Locke’s justification for prerogative power is that Parliament could not at 
all times proscribe in advance for the public good, or that the ordinary legislative process may be too 
slow to respond to the necessity of the time. Locke expounded these views in his Two Treatises of 
Government, a useful summary of which can be found in Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 119-123; Gross 
op cit (n2) 1102-1104; and O Gross ‘Stability and flexibility: A Dicey business’ in VV Ramraj, M Hor, & 
K Roach (eds) Global Anti-terrorism Law and Policy 1 ed (2005) 95-98. 
 
190 This point is clear from the dictum of Selikowitz J in End Conscription Campaign v Minister of 
Defence SA 1989 2 SA 180 (C) at 186F, which reads:  
‘In seeking a theoretical basis for martial law, lawyers have suggested a number of possibilities. 
Dicey ... and Stephen ... favour urgent and paramount necessity as the origin and justification of 
all actions taken under martial law which are taken bona fide in the interest and in the defence of 
the realm. Other writers classify martial law as part of the inherent prerogative’. 
 
191 Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 130. 
 
192 Ibid at 131. See also Gross op cit (n189) 93-94. 
 
193 Dyzenhaus op cit (n11) 66. 
 
194 Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 131-132. See also  Gross (stability and flexibility) op cit (189) 94-95. 
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repel the emergency. 195  The power to pass an Act of indemnity thus revives 
Parliament’s supremacy, as it gives it (Parliament) the power to render legal that which 
the officials did illegally in order to overcome an emergency.  
 
3.5 SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The war-time experience of various jurisdictions has for a long time been a cause for 
the honing of security and emergency laws. In recent times, however, sporadic terrorist 
attacks have since taken over as the leading factor behind the honing of both security 
and emergency laws. Modern states now approach the honing of security and 
emergency laws armed with knowledge obtained from earlier emergency systems, 
such as the Roman, Roman-Dutch and English law emergency systems.196  
Being ‘all the wiser’ as a result of knowledge gained from previous emergency 
systems, modern states have since developed more models and theories of 
emergency systems that democratic states can invoke in a time of crisis. In addition, 
modern states have also developed certain practices, principles and doctrines which 
have become an integral part of the response mechanism to security threats and 
emergencies.  
The discussion which follows below sets out the content of the subsequent models, 
theories, practices, principles and doctrines. The approach will be to first classify these 
into one of two categories under which their content will be unpacked. The first 
category (hereinafter referred to as ‘the first category’) comprises those models, 
theories, practices, principles and doctrines that have the effect of regulating, limiting 
or controlling the security and emergency laws and powers. The second category 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘second category’) comprises the models, theories, 
practices, principles or doctrines that have the effect of restricting the regulation, 
limitation or control of security and emergency laws and powers.  
                                                          
195 Dyzenhaus op cit (n11) 66. 
 
196 In so honing the security and emergency laws, modern states also have to pay attention to the 
dictates of the applicable Treaties and Resolutions of the United Nations. One glaring example is the 
bombing of 11 September 2001 in the United States, following which the United Nations Security 
Council exercised its power under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to pass Resolution 1373 (2001) which 
bound all member states to put in place anti-terrorism laws. 
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3.5.1 The first category 
This section sets out the content of the various models of emergency systems which 
have the effect of regulating, limiting or controlling the emergency laws and powers.197 
Later on, it sets out the content underlying the substantive and formal conception of 
the rule of law,198 since the rule of law is the main doctrine that has the effect of 
regulating, limiting or controlling the security and emergency laws and powers. 
 
3.5.1.1 The ‘Business as Usual’ model 
Emanating from the majority judgment of the United States’ Supreme Court in Ex Parte 
Miligan199 is the Business as Usual model. In the Miligan case, Justice Davis declared 
that the Constitution was ‘law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and 
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all 
circumstances’. Therefore, an emergency system adopting the Business as Usual 
model insists on the law being the same in a time of peace and in a time of war.200 
Thus, even in an emergency, the government is not vested with additional powers 
which it does not ordinarily have in a time of peace.  
It is quite clear that the present model rejects the Roman, Roman-Dutch and English 
approach of establishing a set of laws for the time of peace and the other set for 
emergencies. Instead, the present model has faith in the perfection of the ordinary 
legal system, and assumes that it (the ordinary legal system) has sufficient remedies 
for both the ordinary and crisis situations. One similarity that the Business as Usual 
model coincidentally shares with the Roman dictator model is that all its legal 
responses to the emergency are determined ex ante. Therefore, by putting in place 
the ex ante legal requirements, the Business as Usual model undoubtedly regulates, 
                                                          
197 See 3.5.1.1 to 3.5.1.6 below. 
 
198 See 3.5.1.7 below. 
 
199 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 141 (1866) (Chase, C.J., dissenting), as cited in Gross op cit (n2) 1060, and in 
Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 75. 
 
200 Gross op cit (n2) 1042. 
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limits or controls the emergency laws and powers, and thus falls under the first 
category. 
  
3.5.1.2 The Models of Accommodation 
The Models of Accommodation are a group of models of emergency systems which 
share a common characteristic, which is to keep the ordinary legal system intact but 
with exceptions to accommodate an emergency. From the foregoing characteristic, it 
can be deduced that the Models of Accommodation accommodate an emergency by 
allowing the invocation of special emergency laws and powers that are not applicable 
in the ordinary legal system. It can also be deduced from the same characteristic that 
the accommodation models adopt the Roman, Roman-Dutch and English law 
approach of having two sets of laws, one for the time of peace and the other for the 
time of crisis. Be that as it may, the roots of the accommodation models do not go that 
far back in history, as these models are extracted mainly from the 19th century 
practices of the United States in combatting emergencies.  
Starting with the Legislative Accommodation model, which is one of the three models 
classified as the Models of Accommodation, this model operates by either modifying 
the ordinary legal system through the introduction of ordinary legislation with 
emergency-driven provisions, and/or by introducing the emergency provisions 
contained in a new stand-alone emergency legislation, and/or by having the 
emergency provisions incorporated into already existing legislation, thus elevating that 
legislation into emergency legislation.201 In practice, we often observe both ordinary 
and emergency legislation vesting in the Executive varying degrees of emergency 
power, subject, however, to several legislative regulations, limits and controls. It is this 
trait that places the Legislative Accommodation model under the first category. 
In terms of the Interpretative Accommodation model, the second accommodation 
model, the courts are, during an emergency, afforded the power to clothe the existing 
ordinary laws with expansive interpretation that is sensitive to the emergency, but 
without modifying, altering or replacing any aspect of these ordinary laws.202 This 
                                                          




model originates from the minority judgment of Chief Justice Chase in the United 
States’ case of Ex Parte Miligan.203 Chief Justice Chase agreed with Justice Davis 
(who wrote for the majority) that the powers to deal with an emergency must be 
sourced from the Constitution, and that the interpretation of such powers must also be 
‘constrained within the existing constitutional framework’. The two justices only differed 
in that, while Justice Davis favoured the continuity of the laws applicable in ordinary 
times (the so-called Business as Usual approach), Chief Justice Chase saw the 
possibility of expanding the powers of government through interpretation.204 
Explained differently, the Interpretative Accommodation model’s point of departure is 
the Business as Usual approach, which keeps the ordinary legal system intact. 
However, in order to accommodate an emergency, the interpretative accommodation 
model modifies the ordinary laws through interpreting them in an emergency-sensitive 
manner. Once the emergency has ceased, the courts will also cease to interpret the 
ordinary laws in a manner that is sensitive to the emergency. Thus, at no point are 
emergency laws and powers unregulated, unlimited or uncontrolled, hence the 
interpretative model falls under the first category.  
Of course, the expansion of Executive powers following a special emergency-sensitive 
interpretation results in an increase of government powers and the contraction (though 
not the total suspension) of the protection of fundamental rights. 205  All this is, 
according to Chief Justice Chase, acceptable and justified within the constitutional 
framework. By analogy, the Interpretative Accommodation model applies in the same 
manner as in the context of crime rates, such that if crime is high, the restrictions on 
law enforcement agencies are reduced, but if crime is less, the restrictions are 
increased.206 Chief Justice Chase’s dissenting view in Miligan has subsequently been  
                                                          
202 Gross op cit (n2) 1059. 
 
203 Supra (n199).  
 
204 Gross op cit (n2) 1060. 
 
205 Ibid at 1060-1061. 
 
206 See Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 74, citing the analogy of William Stuntz in WJ Stuntz ‘Local 
policing after the terror’ (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal  2138-2139. 
59 
 
favoured and cited with approval by the majority of the Supreme Court in Wilson v 
New207 and in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v Blaisdell.208  
Turning to the Inherent Executive Powers model, the third and last of the 
accommodation models, this model has its genesis from the manner in which the then 
United States’ President Lincoln availed to himself the far-reaching powers to deal with 
the civil war in the late 19th century. These powers were used before Congress had 
convened to decide on the emergency powers it would allow. 209  Given that the 
President had already exercised various emergency powers, Congress had no choice 
but simply to ratify the decisions the Executive had already taken.210 Lincoln’s actions 
were explained and justified as constitutional on the basis of the ‘war powers’ of the 
government, thus introducing the theory of Inherent Executive powers.211  
It would appear that the classification of the Inherent Executive powers as a Model of 
Accommodation can be explained on the basis that this model accommodates an 
emergency situation by availing certain powers which inherently vest in the Executive. 
However, the difficulty lies in justifying that these inherent powers of the Executive, 
which are exercised in the Executive’s discretion, are regulated, limited or controlled. 
The fact that Gross now associates the inherent Executive powers with the notion of 
necessity (in terms of which an emergency is not regulated by law) aggravates the 
difficulty.212  
A response to the above might be that the inherent Executive powers are subject to 
some legal control, although it is a weak form of control. To illustrate the point, one 
must return to the example of President Lincoln. Albeit he assumed inherent Executive 
powers in dealing with the civil war, he nonetheless still needed parliamentary 
approval, which he received after the fact. The legal requirement of parliamentary 
authorisation, especially ex post authorisation, is a fully-fledged legal requirement, 
                                                          
207 243 U.S. 332 (1917), as cited in Gross op cit (n2) 1061. 
 
208 290 U.S. 398 (1934), as cited in Gross op cit (n2) 1062. 
 




211 Ibid at 1067-1068. 
 
212 See Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 46-54.  
60 
 
though it imposes a weak form of control on the inherent Executive powers.213 For this 
reason, the Inherent Executive Powers model does regulate, limit or control the 
emergency laws and powers, and thus falls under the first category. 
 
3.5.1.3 The ‘State of Siege’ model 
Another model of emergency systems which falls under the first category is the ‘State 
of Siege’ model. This is because the operation of the State of Siege model does have 
the effect of regulating, limiting or controlling the applicable emergency laws and 
powers. For instance, the state of siege could only be declared by law, and only in the 
event of imminent danger resulting from a foreign war or an armed insurrection; only 
Parliament could declare a state of siege and determine when it ceases; the law 
providing for the declaration of a state of siege also had to indicate the time period 
upon which the state of siege would automatically terminate; the law had to be specific 
as to which parts of the country the state of siege would apply; during the state of 
siege, all state power was delegated to the military commander, the equivalent of the 
Roman dictator; and the powers of the military during a state of siege were determined 
by law prior to the emergency.214  
The State of Siege model emerged from France in the 19th century.215 Its approach to 
regulating emergencies is therefore similar to that of Roman law since it subjected 
emergency powers to a series of ex ante controls.  
 
3.5.1.4 The ‘Extra-legal Measures’ model 
                                                          
213 It is submitted that the requirement particularly of ex post parliamentary authorisation offers a weak 
form of control on emergency power. This is mainly because such a requirement only comes into effect 
after the emergency powers have been exercised without any form of legal control. Whether the 
exercise of those emergency powers is subsequently ratified or not, that does not change the damage 
already done by the unrestricted exercise of such powers. It is even doubtful that a tyrant who enjoys 
unrestricted power would ever surrender such power knowing that an objective assessment of his/her 
exercise of emergency power is to be conducted by Parliament with a view to either ratify or not ratify 
his/her actions.  
 
214 Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 26-30.  
 
215 Ibid at 28. 
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The Extra-legal Measures model proposes that, in order to counter an emergency, it 
may be necessary for the government to act outside the law, provided it does so 
openly.216 At  first glance, the idea that the government can act outside the law subject 
to no limits or constraints gives the impression that this model makes provision for 
unregulated, unlimited and uncontrolled emergency powers. However, because the 
model further subjects the government’s extra-legal action to, among other things,217 
the requirement of ex post ratification, 218  the Extra-legal Measures model does 
regulate, limit or control the emergency laws and powers, thus it falls under the first 
category. 219  This remains the case regardless of the criticism that ex post 
parliamentary ratification amounts to a weak form of control on emergency power.220  
 
3.5.1.5  The ‘escalating cascades of supermajorities’ model 
The escalating cascades of supermajorities model is advanced by Bruce Ackerman221 
who proceeds from the premise that little faith can be placed in the ability of judges to 
                                                          
216 Gross op cit (n2) 1099. 
 
217 For other controls of emergency power offered by the Extra-legal measures model, see Gross & Ní 
Aoláin op cit (n21) 169-170. For an incisive critique of the Extra-legal measures model, see Dyzenhaus 
op cit (n11) 65-77. For a response to Dyzenhaus’s critique, see Gross (stability and flexibility) op cit 
(n189) 90-106. 
 
218 Such ratification can be given directly by members of the public or indirectly through, for example, 
the Courts or the Legislature (Gross op cit (n2) 1099). It is most common for the required ratification to 
be granted through Parliament’s passing of legislation which indemnifies the government officials from 
liability following their extra-legal acts committed during an emergency. This approach is derived from 
Dicey’s idea of an Act of Indemnity, which he advanced as an alternative to the norm that it is better for 
Parliament to grant the Executive the emergency powers in advance through exceptional legislation 
(refer to the discussion on English law in 3.4 above). 
 
219 The only rare aspect of the Extra-legal Measures model is that it subjects emergencies to legal 
regulation after the fact and not beforehand, as is typically the case especially for the models founded 
on the Roman model. The reason for this is that the Extra-legal Measures model is founded on, and 
therefore takes the posture of, the English notion of martial law or the royal prerogative (in terms of 
which the Executive enjoys unlimited and uncontrolled powers during an emergency), but adds certain 
ex post controls instead of leaving the exercise of emergency powers totally unregulated. 
 
220 The criticism levelled against ex post parliamentary authorisation in the context of the Inherent 
Executive Powers model also applies in the present context (refer to note 213 above). Another factor 
that weakens the requirement of ex post parliamentary ratification is that it is possible for politicians to 
manipulate the process and obtain the desired indemnity. A glaring example is how Hitler’s actions in 
rendering legal the obnoxious actions of his government were justified ex post by the passing of 
indemnifying legislation by the Executive following the delegation of legislative power by the Legislature. 





constrain the powers of the Executive in an emergency, and so prefers political 
solutions in which judges have a limited role. 222  A major political solution that 
Ackerman relies upon is the ‘supermajoritarian escalator’, in terms of which a state of 
emergency automatically terminates upon the expiry of a stipulated short period of 
time, and an extension thereof requires a significantly high majority of the members of 
Parliament who vote in favour of such an extension.223  
During the period of the subsistence of a state of emergency, the Executive enjoys 
unlimited emergency powers. The only restraint on the emergency powers of 
Executive is the fact that, with the supermajoritarian escalator in force, the emergency 
will come to an end within a short period.224 The coming to an end of a state of 
emergency will be occasioned either by the lapse of the often limited time period 
stipulated for the subsistence of the state of emergency or by the failure to secure the 
majority of the Legislature required to extend the operation of a state of emergency 
beyond the set time limit.  
Therefore, in terms of the escalating cascades model, the time periods stipulated for 
the duration of a state of emergency, as well as the staggered parliamentary majority 
required for extending the state of emergency beyond the stipulated period, are the 
legal requirements which regulate, limit or control the applicable emergency laws and 
powers. It is thus these requirements that qualify the present model to fall under the 
first category. The model falls under the first category regardless of the likely  criticism 
that the foregoing requirements amount to weak forms of control on emergency 
power.225   
                                                          
221 See Ackerman op cit (n13) 1029-1091. A useful summary is provided in Dyzenhaus op cit (n155) 
40-42. 
 
222 Ackerman op cit (n13) 1031. 
 
223 An example in point is a requirement in s 37(2)(b) of the South African Constitution, to the effect that 
the declaration of a state of emergency may be effective for no more than 21 days. This period may be 
extended by Parliament for no more than three months at a time. Further, the first extension must be 
taken by resolution of Parliament adopted with a supporting vote of a majority of the members of 
parliament, and any subsequent extension requires a supporting vote of 60% of the members of 
parliament. 
 
224 Ackerman op cit (n13) 1069. 
 
225 Such a criticism is justified by the fact that the said requirements impose only procedural constraints 
on emergency power, and not substantive constraints. Take, for instance, a country like South Africa 
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3.5.1.6 The ‘model of legality based on experiments in institutional design’ 
The model of legality based on experiments in institutional design is advanced by 
David Dyzenhaus.226 His thinking in formulating the model was shaped by Dicey’s 
view that it is better for Parliament to state in advance the powers of the Executive and 
therefore rely on legislative solutions that preserve the rule of law.227 While this model 
is not opposed to the existence of emergency laws and powers, it nonetheless places 
at the forefront the relentless subjection of such laws and powers to the rule of law. In 
enforcing compliance with the rule of law, the model is willing to abandon the traditional 
approach of relying on the courts as the custodian of the rule of law, and instead rely 
on creative experiments with the design of institutions.  
Dyzenhaus228 cites as an example of such creative experiment with the design of 
institutions the establishment of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) 
in the United Kingdom. This is a body that is statutorily empowered to hear appeals in 
cases of deportation from the United Kingdom on security grounds. Initially, those who 
were deported from the United Kingdom on security grounds had as their only 
recourse the option to appeal to an Executive committee, which then advised the 
responsible minister.229 This placed the power of deportation beyond the reach of the 
courts and the law. 
After the European Court of Human Rights refused to accept that the Executive 
committee was a proper platform before which the legality of detention and 
deportations could be challenged, 230  the government responded with the 
establishment of the SIAC, a quasi-judicial body before which appeals could be 
brought. Even the most sensitive and confidential security information could be 
disclosed before the SIAC in the interests of holding government officials accountable. 
                                                          
where the ruling party occupies around 60% of the seats in Parliament, the procedural requirements of 
the supermajoritarian escalator would be met with ease. 
 
226 Dyzenhaus op cit (n11) 65-89. 
 
227 Ibid at 83. 
 




230 See Chahal v UK (1996) 23 EHRR 413, as cited in Dyzenhaus op cit (n11) 81. 
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The SIAC thus seemed to be a workable experiment in institutional design. It 
preserved the rule of law especially by enabling the holding of government officials 
accountable, while at the same time catering for the unique demands of security 
cases, such as keeping certain sensitive information secret. Through various creative 
design of institutions, the model of legality is able to regulate, limit or control the 
emergency laws and powers, and thus falls under the first category. 
 
3.5.1.7 The formal and substantive conception of the rule of law  
The rule of law is one doctrine that has the effect of regulating, limiting or controlling 
the security and emergency laws and powers (thus falling under the first category). As 
shown in the discussion under heading 2.2 in chapter 2 above, the controversy 
surrounding the rule of law turned on the preferred conception of the doctrine, i.e. the 
formal/procedural conception versus the substantive conception. This debate is, 
however, resolved in favour of adopting both the formal and substantive conception of 
the rule of law.  
A legal system which adheres to the formal conception of the rule of law automatically 
attracts certain procedural requirements for the making of laws, which includes the 
security and emergency laws. Examples of such procedural requirements could be a 
requirement of certainty in security and emergency laws or that the exercise of security 
and emergency powers be authorised by law. Any shortcoming or failure on the part 
of security and emergency laws to observe the procedural requirements of the rule of 
law renders those security and emergency provisions unconstitutional.  
Furthermore, the laws (including security and emergency laws) applicable in a legal 
system which adopts the substantive conception of the rule of law automatically have 
to observe certain substantive requirements. An example of a substantive requirement 
is the requirement that security and emergency laws have to be consistent with human 
rights and other freedoms. Failure to observe the substantive requirements results in 
those security and emergency provisions failing constitutional muster. 
It follows that, since operation of the rule of law has the effect of imposing both formal 
and substantive requirements on the law, the rule of law has to be one doctrine that 
regulates, limits or controls the security and emergency laws and powers, and 
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therefore qualifies to fall under the first category. The one aspect of the rule of law that 
has not been discussed at this point are the origins of the rule of law. Chapter 2 above 
only considered the history of the rule of law in South Africa, but deferred to the present 
section the discussion of the origins of the rule of law. Therefore, the discussion which 
follows below traces the English origins of the rule of law.  
As a starting point in tracing the origins of the rule of law, it is noteworthy that major 
reforms in English constitutionalism emerged notably after the ‘Glorious Revolution’ 
and the revolutionary settlement of 1689.231  This was a period in English history 
which, after a gruesome struggle, marked the assumption of power and authority over 
the United Kingdom by Parliament away from the Crown. 232  In that war, 
parliamentarians had received support from the common lawyers of the time who had 
as their object the achievement of the independence of the udiciary, a goal which was 
successfully achieved and recorded in the constitutional settlement.233  
The independence of the judiciary, however, was very costly because the common 
lawyers had to compromise the advances that had been made in elevating the 
(common) law above the powers of the monarch, such that any conduct of the 
monarch could be disqualified for being contrary to the law. It was in line with the wide 
acceptance of the idea of the superiority of the common law that Sir Edward Coke  
became popular in the 17th century for his judgment in Dr Bonham’s case wherein he 
declared that the common law could invalidate any Act of Parliament that is contrary 
to it. 234 This decision was followed by other judges in the later parts of the 17th century 
into the earlier parts of the 18th century.235 The common lawyers thus acceded to the 
                                                          
231 Devenish op cit (n55) 675. For a historical perspective of English constitutionalism, see L Boulle, B 
Harris, & C Hoexter Constitutional and Administrative Law - Basic Principles (1989) 1-101 (Part I); and 
G Devenish Constitutional change and reform in South Africa (unpublished doctoral thesis, University 
of South Africa, 1986). 
 
232 Devenish op cit (n55) 675. 
 
233 Ibid. Before then, the judiciary did not enjoy any independence from the monarch (Currie & De Waal 
op cit (n1) 15). 
 
234 See Dugard op cit (n15) 14. 
 
235 Dugard op cit (n15) 15-16. The idea of the superiority of the law also  became a fundamental premise 
upon which the founding American Constitution of 1787 was based. 
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fact that their support for parliamentarians would transform the supremacy of the 
common law into the supremacy of the law made by Parliament.236  
The work of Sir William Blackstone titled Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(published in 1765) played a major role in the triumph of parliamentary sovereignty in 
the United Kingdom.237 The supremacy of Parliament is embodied in Blackstone’s 
sentiments that ‘if the legislature positively enacts a thing to be done which is 
unreasonable, I know of no power in the ordinary forms of the constitution that is 
vested with authority to control it’; that Parliament can ‘do everything that is not 
naturally impossible’; and that its power is ‘absolute and without control’.238   
Parliamentary supremacy thus reflected the victory of Parliament over the monarch.239 
However, the supremacy of Parliament was, and continues to be, qualified by the rule 
of law doctrine.240 Therefore, the rule of law was always ‘part of the fabric of the British 
Constitution, and, as such should be, and generally are, respected by Parliament’.241    
The classical formulation of the rule of law came in the work of an English scholar, AV 
Dicey, in his publication titled An introduction to the Study of the Laws of the 
Constitution. Dugard 242  reads Dicey as suggesting that the rule of law ‘forms a 
fundamental principle of the Constitution and means: 
(1) ‘The absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the 
influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of 
prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government; 
(2) Equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of 
the land administered by the ordinary courts; 
                                                          
236 Devenish op cit (n55) 676. 
 
237 See Dugard op cit (n15) 16.  
 
238 Quoted in Dugard op cit (n15) 16. 
 
239 Currie & De Waal op cit (n1) 46. 
 




242 Dugard op cit (n15) 37, citing AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 10 
ed (1959) 202-203. 
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(3) The constitution is the result  of the ordinary law of the land … the law of the 
constitution, the rules which in foreign countries naturally form part of a constitutional 
code, are not the source but the consequence of the rights of individuals, as defined 
and enforced by the courts’. 
Of the different forms of attack levelled against the rule of law, the most significant (at 
least in the South African context, if not the entire world) is the limitation of the rule of 
law to nothing more than a procedural or due-process requirement (i.e. the 
formal/procedural conception). Fortunately, the substantive conception of the rule of 
law has since triumphed, and the rule of law is presently understood to impose both 
the formal and substantive requirements and much more. In fact, the rule of law is 
presently an embodiment of many other ideals of a true democratic order.  
This marks the end the discussion on the models and doctrines which have the effect 
of regulating, limiting or controlling the security and emergency laws and powers. The 
next section discusses those practices, theories, principles and doctrines which have 
the effect of restricting the regulation, limitation or control of security and emergency 
laws and powers, and therefore falls under the second category.  
 
3.5.2 The second category 
As already indicated, there are also those models, theories, practices, principles and 
doctrines which have the effect of dispensing with the regulation, limitation or control 
over security and emergency laws and powers, thus falling under what in 3.5 above 
has been termed the second category. This section therefore sets out the following: 
firstly, the various practices which have the abovementioned effect and which fall 
under the second category;243 secondly, the content of the theories which have the 
abovementioned effect and which fall under the second category;244 and thirdly, the 
content of the various principles and doctrines which have the abovementioned effect 
and which also fall under the second category.245  
                                                          
243 See 3.5.2.1 below. 
 
244 See 3.5.2.2 and 3.5.2.3 below. 
 
245  See 3.5.2.4 to 3.5.2.6 below 
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3.5.2.1  Various practices 
The detail of South Africa’s early security and emergency laws which appears under 
heading 4.5 in chapter 4 below reveals that there emerges from apartheid security and 
emergency jurisprudence certain uniquely South African practices which effectively 
did away with the regulation, limitation or control over security and emergency laws 
and powers. To avoid repetition, these practices will, in the present section, simply be 
named without engaging the detail thereof. The provision of the detail thereof is 
deferred to chapter 4 heading 4.5 below.  
The first of the applicable practices is the use of statutory language that places the 
exercise of security and emergency powers in the subjective opinion or discretion of 
particular designated official(s). Through this practice, the apartheid government of 
South Africa managed to prevent any regulation, limitation or control on security and 
emergency powers. The second practice is the outright ousting of the courts’ 
jurisdiction in matters concerning security and emergency laws. This way, it was 
rendered impossible to enforce any of the possible methods of regulating, limiting or 
controlling security and emergency laws and powers.  
The third practice is the operation of parliamentary supremacy. The discussion under 
subheading 2.2 in chapter 2 above revealed that the operation of parliamentary 
supremacy meant that Parliament could legislate as it deems appropriate. In so 
legislating, it is not restricted in any way, save for the few procedural rules. The 
apartheid Parliament therefore could, and did, pass laws with provisions which had 
the effect of restricting any regulation, limitation or control on security and emergency 
laws and powers. The fourth and last practice is that of executive-mindedness on the 
part of the judges of the courts. Executive-minded judges are notorious for stretching 
the interpretation of the law in favour of the Executive. Thus, the law is interpreted in 
such a way that it imposes no regulation, limitation or control over the security and 
emergency laws and powers. 
It is also noteworthy that even the models of emergency systems in 3.5.1.1 to 3.5.1.5 
above can, through certain practices, be effectively weakened to the point of having 
the effect of lifting any regulation, limitation or control over emergency laws and 
powers. Starting with the Business as Usual model, the weakening of this model to the 
point that it no longer regulates, limits or control emergency laws and powers could 
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take the form of ordinary laws making provision for unlimited emergency powers of the 
Executive. To ensure the smooth enforcement of unlimited emergency powers, the 
common ex ante controls on emergency laws or powers which normally come with the 
Business as Usual model could be excluded, or only the weak forms of control could 
be imposed, or there could be a partial or permanent suspension of the operation of 
the rule of law.  
Turning to the Legislative Accommodation model, which is one of the models of 
accommodation, the weakening of this model could take the form of the applicable 
legislation making provision for unlimited emergency powers of the Executive. Once 
again, the enforcement of such a legislative provision could be achieved through the 
exclusion of the common controls on emergency powers usually imposed by such 
legislation, or through the imposition of the weakest forms of control, or through even 
the partial or total suspension of the rule of law.  
In the case of the Interpretative Accommodation model, the second of the models of 
accommodation, the weakening thereof could take the form of this model facilitating 
the interpretation of existing laws in a manner that vests the Executive with unlimited 
emergency powers, which are not subject to the rule of law or any other form of control 
or which are subject to the weakest forms of control.  In the case of the Inherent 
Executive Powers model, which is the last of the models of accommodation, the 
manipulation thereof could come in the form of the use of the inherent powers of the 
Executive subject only to the discretion of the Executive, and not subject to the usual 
requirement of parliamentary authorisation, either ex ante or ex post.  
Turning to the Extra-legal Measures model, this model already facilitates the lawful 
exercise of unfettered powers by the Executive during an emergency. However, such 
powers are still subject to some control since the restraint in place could be that, at the 
end of the emergency, the Executive will, in seeking indemnification for the extra-legal 
acts, have to account for the powers it availed to itself during an emergency. The 
removal of, or any tempering with, the requirement of ex post ratification usually by 
Parliament would be an example of the weakening of the present model so that it no 
longer regulates, limits or controls emergency laws and powers. 
The escalating cascades of supermajorities model also facilitates the exercise of 
unlimited emergency powers, but there is still one control in place in the form of a  
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supermajoritarian escalator. The majoritarian escalator provides that a state of 
emergency automatically terminates after the expiry of the stipulated short period of 
time, and that the stipulated period can be extended with a significantly high majority 
vote in the Legislature. Once again, the removal of, or any tempering with, the 
supermajoritarian escalator would amount to the weakening of the escalating 
cascades model such that it no longer regulates, limits or controls emergency laws 
and powers.  
The State of Siege model can also be weakened to the point that it no longer regulates, 
limits or controls emergency laws or powers. This would happen if, during a state of 
siege, the military is empowered by legislation to exercise unlimited powers which are 
not subject to the rule of law or any of the usual ex ante controls or which are subject 
to some other weak forms of control. Lastly, the model of legality based on 
experiments in institutional design can also be weakened if strict adherence to the rule 
of law is abandoned altogether or if only the formal conception of the rule of law is 
recognised, to the exclusion of the substantive conception.246 
 
3.5.2.2 Militant democracy 
Turning to the theories that restrict the regulation, limitation or control of emergency 
laws or powers, the first of such theories is the militant democracy theory. Established 
in the writings of Karl Loewenstein,247 the theory of militant democracy emerged as a 
theory with a noble goal of equipping the European liberal democracies with tools to 
deal with the threat posed by Fascism and Nazism in the 1930s.248   
Its architect, Karl Loewenstein, observed that the democratic guarantees of the rule of 
law and other similar mechanisms of liberal democracies play into the hands of the 
enemies of democracy who would abuse these democratic guarantees and hide 
behind human rights protections, yet continue advancing their cause to destroy the 
                                                          
246 As to how the formal conception of the rule of law can have the effect of facilitating  a veneer of 
legality for unlimited and uncontrolled emergency powers, refer to the discussion in 3.5.2.5 below. 
 
247 An insightful summary, commentary and citation of the relevant writings of Loewenstein can be found 
in Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 38. 
 
248 Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 38 
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democratic order from within.249 He then resolved that the best way to protect the 
democratic order is to adopt ‘democratic militancy’, in terms of which the will to survive 
and maintain self-preservation may mean that democracies must assume autocratic 
methods.250  Ultimately, the notion of democratic militancy is what enables the present 
theory to restrict the regulation, limitation and control of emergency laws and powers. 
 
3.5.2.3 The theory of the exception 
The most daring of the theories that restrict the regulation, limitation or control of 
emergency laws and powers is Carl Schmitt’s infamous251 ‘theory of the exception’.252 
According to the theory, the exception (i.e. an emergency) is not just a legally created 
black hole253 or a ‘juridically produced void’, but is instead a space that is beyond the 
law or a space in which the law ‘recedes leaving the legally unconstrained state’.254 In 
the envisaged state, the exception, be it real or perceived (depending on how the 
sovereign dictator views the prevailing circumstances), is dealt with by the sovereign 
dictator using unlimited powers.255 The sovereign dictator can suspend or change the 
existing legal order as he/she wishes. In essence, the will of the sovereign dictator is 
always above the law or the Constitution.  
The theory of the exception certainly presented the most radical theory for those legal 
systems which sought unlimited and uncontrolled emergency laws and powers. It is 





251 The theory of the exception is described as such because it was notably developed in order to offer 
a  legal justification for the Nazi government’s rule effectively without law (Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 
162). 
 
252 For a useful summary of the complex content of the theory of the exception and the citation of various 
publications across which this theory is established, see Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 162-168 & 
Dyzenhaus op cit (n155) 35-54.  
 
253 On the notion of ‘black holes’ and ‘grey holes’, see Dyzenhaus op cit (n155) 42. In essence, a ‘black 
hole’ in the emergency context means that emergency laws are not subject to any controls, thus 
becoming a ‘lawless void’ which is not governed by the law. On the other hand, a ‘grey hole’ in an 
emergency context means that emergency laws appear to be subject to some controls, but these 
controls are so weak and insubstantial that they may well permit the government to do as it pleases. 
Grey holes in law can therefore become as equally pernicious as black holes.  
 
254 Dyzenhaus op cit (n155) 39. 
 
255 Gross & Ní Aoláin op cit (n21) 164-166. 
72 
 
most radical not because it gives greater powers than any other theory which facilitates 
the exercise of unlimited and unrestricted emergency powers, but because it openly 
went against the approach of liberal legal theorists of seeking to locate within the 
Constitution or the law the authority for the grant of unlimited and uncontrolled 
emergency powers.256 Since liberal theorists cannot conceive of a space which is 
beyond the law, the grant of unlimited emergency powers requires some veneer of 
legality even though the end result would be to place those emergency powers beyond 
regulation by law. Schmitt therefore established a model that openly and 
unapologetically embraced that emergencies are not constrained by the law, and even 
went as far as to glamourise the sovereign dictator whose will inevitably becomes the 
law.  
An example of a provision which appear to subscribe to the theory of the exception 
can still be found in the Algerian Constitution. Article 96(1) of the Algerian Constitution 
provides that the Constitution is suspended during a period of the state of war and the 
President assumes all power. 257  Another example can be located in Switzerland 
jurisprudence where, during an emergency, the Swiss federal government is 
empowered to act in a way that would otherwise be unconstitutional in the interests of 
security.258 The same also applies in Ireland.259 
 
3.5.2.4 The formal conception of the rule of law 
Turning to the principles and doctrines which have the effect of restricting the 
regulation, limitation or control of security and emergency laws and powers, the first 
applicable doctrine is the formal conception of the rule of law, the operation of which 
is even worse in those jurisdictions where the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy is 
applicable. The rule of law has been considered extensively in the discussion under 
heading 2.2 in chapter 2, as well as in 3.5.1.7 above. However, what is being conveyed 
here is that the total suspension of the rule of law or the removal of the substantive 
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259 Ibid at 61-62. 
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conception from the meaning of the rule of law (leaving only the formal/procedural 
conception) can play a role in restricting the regulation, limitation or control of security 
and emergency laws and powers.  
In amplification, we saw in chapter 2 that the virtually unlimited security and 
emergency powers that were exercised by the apartheid government were facilitated 
by, among other things, the recognition of only the formal/procedural conception of the 
rule of law working alongside the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. Accordingly, 
as long as the due-process requirements were met in the process of making the 
apartheid security and emergency laws, those laws had full legal effect regardless of 
their disregard for human rights and other liberties. It is for this reason that the 
operation of the formal/procedural conception of the rule of law can be argued to have 
the effect of restricting the regulation, limitation or control of security and emergency 
laws and powers.  
 
3.5.2.5 Constitutional/judicial minimalism and judicial deference 
The next principle/doctrine which could also serve to restrict the regulation, limitation 
or control of security and emergency laws and powers is the principle of 
constitutional/judicial minimalism. Coined by Cass Sunstein,260 judicial minimalism 
encourages minimum judicial involvement particularly in resolving controversial 
constitutional questions.261 Ultimately, under judicial minimalism, the judiciary may 
identify problems or constitutional issues, but must leave the applicable democratically 
accountable actor (usually the Legislature) to make a judgment as to how best to 
respond to the problem identified by the court.262 Through the practice of judicial 
minimalism, the far-reaching security and emergency laws and powers are allowed to 
pass through the courts with a stamp of legality despite there being lingering questions 
                                                          
260 The various writings of Sunstein in which the principle of constitutional minimalism is established are 
cited, summarised and critiqued in Dyzenhaus op cit (n155) 43-49. 
 
261 It does this by promoting shallowness over depth, in terms of which the courts are permitted to 
identify problems or contested questions, but must avoid taking a stand on these contested 
constitutional questions, thus leaving those questions unresolved. In addition, minimalism encourages 
narrowness over width as it prefers resolving one case at a time and avoids resolving more than what 
is demanded by the case (Dyzenhaus op cit (n155) 43). 
 
262 Dyzenhaus op cit (n155) 43. 
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of constitutionality.263 In the foregoing sense, judicial minimalism has the effect of 
restricting the regulation, limitation or control of security and emergency laws and 
powers. 
Operating along similar lines as the principle of constitutional minimalism is the 
doctrine of judicial deference. In terms of this doctrine, the courts would hear a matter 
raising a controversial constitutional issue, but find that, in the light of the prevailing 
conditions (i.e. an emergency or whatever security threat so confronted), judgment on 
the questions raised in the matter should be deferred to the Executive.264 Through 
such deference, the courts abdicate the duty to resolve disputes and prefer to defer to 
the Executive, either out of respect (deference as respect) 265  or submission 
(deference as submission).266 As is the case with the practice of judicial minimalism, 
with judicial deference, the far-reaching security and emergency laws and powers are 
also let through the court process with a stamp of legality despite there being lingering 
questions of constitutionality. This way, the judicial deference can have the effect of 
restricting the regulation, limitation or control of security and emergency laws and 
powers.  
 
3.5.2.6  The political question doctrine  
The political question doctrine can also operate to restrict the regulation, limitation or 
control of security and emergency laws and powers. The political question doctrine is 
                                                          
263 Two case law examples serve as evidence of the operation of the minimalist approach. These are 
Korematsu v United States 323 US 214 (1944) (as cited in Dyzenhaus op cit (n155) 45) and Ex Parte 
Endo 323 US 283 (1944) (as cited in Dyzenhaus op cit (n155) 45). In both these cases there was an 
Executive order permitting the evacuation of American citizens of Japanese descent so as to facilitate 
their detention in order for the military to establish who amongst them was loyal. The said Executive 
order was upheld by the court in Korematsu because there was legislative authorisation for the 
evacuation and detention. On the contrary, the court in Endo refused to uphold the detention order 
because there was no statute authorising the detentions, only the evacuations were provided for in the 
applicable statute. Because the courts in these two cases confined themselves to statutory 
interpretation and avoided engaging and resolving any controversial constitutional question, the courts 
in these cases are seen to have decided the matters in a minimalist fashion (see Dyzenhaus op cit 
(n155) 45. 
 
264 Dyzenhaus op cit (n155) 19. 
 
265 Here the court decides for itself if a law violates rights, but has due regard to the weight of the opinion 
of the Executive or the Legislature (see Young op cit (n101) 275).  
 
266 Deference as submission occurs when the court merely submits to the will of the Executive or the 
Legislature without deciding the issue itself (see Young op cit (n101) 275). 
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slightly more radical than the principle of constitutional/judicial minimalism and judicial 
deference in that it allows the courts to declare certain legal questions as ‘so 
quintessentially political that they are not regulated by law’.267 It further holds that 
‘questions that can be labelled as ‘political’ should be authoritatively resolved, not by 
the courts, but rather by one (or both) of the political branches’. 268  The political 
question doctrine was founded in Marbury v Madison269 where Justice Marshall stated: 
‘By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important 
political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable 
only to this country in his political character and to his own conscience… . The acts of 
such an officer can never be examinable by the courts.’ 
The political question doctrine was further developed in Baker v Carr270 where the 
court set out the criteria for a political question as follows: 
‘Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; 
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due to coordinate branches of government; or an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments 
on one question.’ 
Therefore, the political question doctrine has the effect of ousting the court’s 
jurisdiction in matters considered to be politically sensitive. In the security and 
emergency context, the ousting of the court’s jurisdiction occasioned by the 
classification of a security or emergency matter as politically sensitive would indirectly 
                                                          
267 Dyzenhaus op cit (n155) 18. 
 
268 M Swart & T Coggin ‘The road not taken: Separation of powers, interim interdicts, rationality review 
and e-tolling in National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling’ (2013) 5 Constitutional Court Review 
346 at 362.  
 
269 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) at 165-166, as cited by Swart & Coggin op cit (n268) 362-363. 
 
270 369 US 186 (1962) at 217, as cited in Swart & Coggin op cit (n268) 362. 
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271 It is noteworthy that the political question doctrine is seen by some scholars to be on the path to 
extinction (Swart & Coggin op cit (n268) 362-363).  
Further articulation of the origins of the political question doctrine can be found in: MO Mhango 
‘Separation of powers in Ghana: The evolution of the political question doctrine’ (2014) 17 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 2703-2744; DB Dennison ‘The political question doctrine in 
Uganda: A reassessment in the wake of CEHURD’ (2014) 18 Law, Democracy & Development 264-
288; and TJO Musiga ‘The political question doctrine and justiciability of rights in Kenya in the post-





EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN 
SECURITY AND EMERGENCY LAWS 
 
4.1 GENERAL 
Chapter 4 primarily expands from chapter 3 and illustrates the extent of the influence 
that Roman-Dutch and English security and emergency laws has had on the formation 
and development of South Africa’s early common-law security crimes,272 as well as 
South Africa’s common-law emergency measure.273 Later, the chapter visits South 
Africa’s embrace of security and emergency legislation, as well as the significant 
strides taken to ensure that legal challenges to, or based on, such legislation are 
prevented. 274  In essence, the chapter depicts South Africa’s early security and 
emergency order. As to precisely what the contents of this chapter contribute to the 
envisaged interpretation regime will become clear in chapter 7 below when the 
interpretation regime is officially established. 
A recurring theme throughout the sections in the present chapter is that the content in 
these sections not only unpacks the detail of South Africa’s early security and 
emergency laws, but it also proves a fundamental premise of this thesis that is set out 
in the discussion under subheading 1.1.3 in chapter 1 above. This premise entails that 
legal interpretation by the courts (assisted, of course, by academic writings) is the 
preferred method of resolving conflicts in the law, of clearing ambiguities, of 
developing the law and of striking a balance between competing interests.  
 
                                                          
272 These being the crimes of high treason and sedition. 
 
273 This being the notion of martial law. 
 
274 Refer to the discussion under headings 4.4 and 4.5 below. 
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4.2 EARLY SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY LAWS 
Upon the arrival of the Dutch settlers in the year 1652, Roman-Dutch law became the 
common law of the Cape of Good Hope and ultimately South Africa.275 This means 
that, ideally, South Africa ought to have inherited only the Roman-Dutch law version 
of security and emergency laws. However, the United Kingdom seized control of the 
Cape effectively from 1806, but retained Roman-Dutch law as the common law.276 
The clear position that Roman-Dutch law remained the common law did not stop the 
English law influence on South African law. Consequently, the South African legal 
system has as its roots both the Roman-Dutch and English law. Thus, the early 
security and emergency laws of South Africa are sourced mainly from these two legal 
systems. 
In the security and emergency laws context, the fact that the early South African law 
inherited the Roman-Dutch and English law traditions means that the country 
automatically subscribed to the tradition of having two set of laws, one for the time of 
peace and the other for the time of crisis. 277 Chapter 3 revealed that this has been the 
tradition in Roman law, Roman-Dutch law, English law and various other jurisdictions. 
Thus, the crimen laesae majestatis, treason and sedition became South Africa’s 
peacetime or ordinary security laws, whereas martial law was the country’s emergency 
measure. These security and emergency measures are given individual attention 
below. 
 
4.2.1 Crimen laesae majestatis 
Part of South Africa’s inheritance from Roman-Dutch law is the crime known as the 
crimen laesae majestatis. 278  The crucial question concerning this crime is what 
                                                          
275 For a full account of the early developments in South African law, refer to the discussion under 
heading 2.2 in chapter 2 above. 
 
276 See note 74 above. 
 
277 It is also arguable that to subscribe to the tradition of having peacetime and crisis laws serves as 
an indication that the early South African jurisprudence rejected the Business as Usual model  in 
fashioning the country’s emergency system. For the detail of the Business as Usual model, refer to 




remains of it if the crimes of treason and sedition are divorced from the genus crimen 
laesae majestatis and are recognised as independent crimes (as is currently the case). 
The study of Roman-Dutch law reveals that three species of the genus would remain 
if the crimes of treason and sedition are removed from the genus. These species 
are:279 (a) the usurping of imperial prerogatives and public authority; (b) crimen laesae 
venerationis (which covered conduct which impaired the dignity of the emperor, the 
princeps or head of state); and (c) conduct which challenged the authority or safety of 
the state (without constituting high treason or sedition).  
After a careful examination of the relevant authority, eminent South African criminal 
law scholars conclude that there is nothing left of the generic crimen laesae majestatis 
in South African law today if, of course, treason and sedition are removed from the 
genus. The reasons for this position vary between the other species of the genus being 
abrogated by disuse, or being covered by some other common-law and statutory 
crimes, or that the other species were never a crime even in Roman-Dutch law, or that 
the other species of the genus are no longer compatible with the modern-day 
constitutional and governance system.280  It is therefore safe to conclude that only high 
treason and sedition are species of the genus that have survived to constitute 
independent South African common-law security crimes. 
In closure, one observation that merits being made at this point is that the development 
of the crimen laesae majestatis in Roman-Dutch law was largely in the hands of 
academic writers. However, in South Africa, the development of the law is shaped by 
authoritative and binding judicial pronouncements (i.e. case law) following the 
interpretation and application of the law by the courts. Academic writings play a 
supporting role and are merely persuasive, though they may hold same the position 
held in authoritative and binding case law or may hold a position that is subsequently 
confirmed in authoritative case law.281  
                                                          
278 For the background on the crimen laesae majestatis, a generic name for various offences against 
the existence, safety, authority or dignity of the majestas or supreme power, refer to the discussion 
under headings 3.2 and 3.3 in chapter 3 above. 
 
279 Milton op cit (n149) 60-62.  
 
280 Milton op cit (n149) 62-69. See also Hoctor op cit (n143) paras 185-188. 
 
281 See the various cases cited as authority for the academic views on the genus crimen laesae 
majestatis, expressed in Milton op cit (n149) 62-69 and Hoctor op cit (n143) paras 185-188. 
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The above observation thus lends support to the fundamental premise of this thesis, 
as mentioned under 4.1 above. Further proof of the same premise will be provided 
during the course of the discussion in the sections below. 
 
4.2.2 Treason  
The development of South Africa’s treason jurisprudence can also be attributed to 
legal interpretation (as reflected in case law), supported by scholarly writings. To 
illustrate the point, the controversy over whether South Africa adopts the Roman-
Dutch or English law version of treason has been conclusively resolved by case law 
(following the process of legal interpretation) and scholarly writings in favour of 
Roman-Dutch law.282  
Furthermore, one of the earliest definitional difficulties of the crime of treason that had 
to be resolved was the meaning of hostile intent, i.e. whether such intent was restricted 
only to the intent to overthrow the state. The Appellate Division in R v Erasmus283 
resolved the impasse by interpreting the relevant principles and thereafter proceeding 
to authoritatively find that hostile intent exists even where the intent is to coerce the 
state (without the intent to overthrow it). From then onwards, subsequent case law 
cited the foregoing position with approval.284  
Taking their cue from the authoritative and binding Erasmus case, academic writers 
also sought to advance definitions of high treason that are cognisant of the fact that 
the intent required could either be intent to overthrow or to coerce the state. The 
foregoing has culminated in differently phrased, but substantially similar, definitions 
and elements of the crime of high treason. These definitions and elements can be 
                                                          
282 See Milton op cit (n149) 17-20, and the cases cited therein. 
 
283 1923 AD 73 at 81. 
 
284 See R v Leibbrandt 1944 AD 253; and R v Mardon 1947 (2) SA 768 (Sp Ct) at 774. 
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found in Hoctor,285 Burchell, 286 Milton,287 and Snyman.288 These are some of the 
leading criminal law texts in the country. The essential elements which are common 
to all the definitions are:289 (a) an overt act;290 (b) unlawfully committed;291 (c) by a 
                                                          
285 Hoctor (op cit (n143) para 174) defines high treason as consisting in any act committed, either inside 
or outside the borders of the Republic of South Africa by a person who owes allegiance to the Republic, 
with the intention unlawfully to overthrow, coerce, impair or endanger the existence, independence or 
security of the government. 
 
286 Burchell (op cit n132) 838) defines high treason as consisting in any overt act unlawfully committed 
by a person owing allegiance to a state with intent to overthrow, impair, violate, threaten or endanger 
the existence, independence, or security of the state or to overthrow or coerce the government of the 
state or change the constitutional structure of the state. Furthermore, Burchell (ibid at 838) has had the 
privilege of accessing the lengthy judgment of a fairly recent Boeremag Treason trial (Case no CC 
90/03), and notes that the court sought to refashion the definition of treason so as to bring it in line with 
the Constitution. Thus, it was stated that: ‘[t]he acts of treason should have been directed directly and 
indirectly at the Constitution or constitutional structures. It should have been alleged and proven by the 
prosecuting authority. The unlawfulness will stem from the fact that the intention was to replace the 
Constitution as such, in contravention of the provisions of the Constitution itself. The accused persons 
are however charged with an offence that obtained in the old dispensation in accordance with which 
Parliament was sovereign, with a government that exercised that sovereignty’. 
 
287 Milton (op cit (n149) 2) defines treason as consisting in any overt act committed by a person owing 
allegiance to a state possessing majestas with intent unlawfully to overthrow, impair, violate, threaten 
or endanger the existence, independence or security of the state, or to overthrow or coerce the 
government of the state, or change the constitutional structure of the state. 
 
288 Inspired by the definition of high treason provided in the South African Law Commission Report on 
the Codification of the Common Law Relating to the Crimes against the State RP 17/1976 (1976), 
Snyman (op cit (n129) 299) defines high treason as follows: ‘[a] person commits high treason if, owing 
allegiance to the Republic of South Africa, she unlawfully engages in conduct within or outside the 
Republic, with the intention of (a) overthrowing the government of the Republic; (b) coercing the 
government by violence into any action or inaction; (c) violating, threatening or endangering the 
existence, independence or security of the Republic; or (d) changing the constitutional structure of the 
Republic’. 
 
289 See generally Milton op cit (n149) 20. 
 
290 By ‘overt act’, it is meant that there must be some physical manifestation of the (hostile) intent to 
commit treason. Some of the principles applicable to the notion of an ‘overt act’ include the following: 
(a) that the overt act need not be of a violent nature (provided it is committed with hostile intent), (b) an 
act of attempt, conspiracy or incitement qualifies as the overt act for treason purposes, (c) an overt act 
can take the form of speaking or writing words, (d) an overt act can be committed in South Africa or 
abroad, (e) an overt act can be committed in a time of peace and war, (f) there is also an overt act 
where one fails to report treason which is being committed or is to be committed or has been committed 
(see Milton op cit (n149) 20-25).  
 
291 It is the unlawfulness element that protects against the criminalisation of lawful or constitutional 
means of replacing the government and the head of state, as well as the lawful adoption or 
abandonment of policies or legislation by the government. Any recognised ground of justification or 
defence which serves to negate the unlawfulness of the perpetrator’s actions is recognised (Milton op 
cit (n149) 26-27). 
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person owing allegiance to the state; 292  (d) which possess majestas; 293  and (e) 
intention (hostile intent).294 
In 1976, the South African Law Commission, as it was then known, also produced a 
report calling for the codification of the crimes of treason, sedition and public 
violence.295 In that report, The following definition of treason was advanced: 
2.  (1) Any person who, owing allegiance to the Republic, commits an act, within or outside 
the Republic, with the intention of- 
(a) unlawfully impairing, violating, threatening or endangering the existence, 
independence    or security of the Republic; 
(b) unlawfully changing the constitutional structure of the Republic; 
(c) unlawfully overthrowing the government of the Republic; or 
(d) unlawfully coercing by violence the government of the Republic into any action 
or into refraining from any action, 
shall be guilty of high treason… 
(2) Without derogating from the general purport of subsection (1)- 
                                                          
292 Only a person owing allegiance to a state commits treason if he or she endeavours to overthrow or 
coerce the government of the state. The notion of allegiance has roots in the feudal system of 
government in terms of which the subject had a duty to be faithful to the state in return for the state’s 
protection of the subject. Therefore, allegiance is owed by someone who has the duty to be faithful to 
the state, or sometimes any person who is entitled to protection by the state. Thus, in terms of the 
current law, the following persons owe allegiance: (a) South African citizens and subjects; (b) a non-
citizen who has taken up domicile in the Republic; and (c) a non-citizen who is resident in the country, 
but has not taken up domicile (Milton op cit (n149) 28-31). People who do not owe allegiance include: 
(a) foreigners who have never set foot in the Republic, (b) casual tourists from abroad who visit the 
country for a brief period only; (c) foreign business people who visit the Republic for a brief period of 
time for business reasons; and (d) crews of foreign aircrafts or ships who stay in the country for a brief 
period of time while, for instance, they wait for a flight back or while they wait for repairs to the aircraft 
or ship to be completed (Snyman op cit (n129) 302).  
 
293 A majestas remains a vague concept, but it would appear that it denotes some supreme power or 
sovereignty. The government (i.e. the Executive), the Legislature and the Judiciary are all identified with 
the state and it is no longer necessary to specify which body has majestas. Therefore, a hostile intent 
against any organ of state can amount to treason (Milton op cit (n149) 31-32). 
 
294 This is a key element, and it distinguishes treason from other lesser crimes.  Milton approaches the 
process of describing what a hostile intent is by firstly indicating what a hostile intent is not. Thus, he 
points out that that intent and motive are different concepts; that a hostile intent is not to be associated 
only with intent to assist a foreign enemy for treason can be committed even during a time of peace 
when there is no foreign enemy; and that a hostile intent may consist in the intention to overthrow the 
state or in the coercion of the governing authority by force to adopt or abandon a particular policy or 
any action (without the intent to overthrow it). When describing what a hostile intent is, Milton submits 
that a hostile intent does exist if one intends to treat the government as the enemy or when one is 
intentionally antagonistic towards the state. A hostile intent can take the form of actual intent or dolus 
eventualis, without regard to motive. Negligence alone is not sufficient (Milton op cit (n149) 33-37). 
 
295 South African Law Commission Report op cit (n288). 
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(a)  any person referred to in that subsection who within or outside the Republic 
unlawfully and intentionally- 
  (i)  takes up arms against the Republic; 
(ii)  takes part in an armed revolt or rebellion against the Republic or instigates 
such revolt or rebellion; 
(iii) causes any part of the Republic to secede from the Republic or attempts to 
concert with others to cause any part of the Republic to secede; 
(iv) joins or performs service under an enemy that wages war against the 
Republic; 
(v)  assists an enemy at war with the Republic or makes propaganda for such 
enemy or supplies such enemy with information that may be useful to it in its 
war effort against the Republic; 
(vi)  after becoming aware of any act by any other person that constitutes high 
treason in terms of this section, fails to report such act forthwith to the police or 
other authorities, unless he has reason to believe that the police or other 
authorities are already aware thereof; or 
(b) being a citizen of the Republic who, when the Republic is in a state of war, leaves 
the republic and settles in the territory of the enemy of the Republic, 
shall be guilty of the crime of high treason. 
(3) Without restricting the circumstances in which any person owes allegiance to the 
Republic, any person who is a citizen of the Republic or is domiciled or resident in the 
Republic or is the holder of a valid South African passport shall owe allegiance to the 
Republic. 
In the light of the ancient tradition of developing the law, which includes the crime of 
treason, through case law (after the courts have interpreted and applied the law) and 
supporting scholarly writings, 296  the academic views expressed in the discussion 
under subheading 6.2.3.1 in chapter 6 below, pertaining to how the interpretation and 
ultimate development of the impugned provisions of the crime of treason may be 
approached, should be a welcome contribution to the treason jurisprudence, more so 
as these views also have the effect of resolving the constitutional challenges facing 
the crime of treason.297  
                                                          
296 The South African Law Commission report is included within the category of scholarly writings as 
the concept of scholarly writings is meant to embody all secondary sources of law. 
 
297 Notwithstanding the much-celebrated strides in developing the crime of treason to what we know 




The development of the crime of treason to what we know and understand today has 
also been achieved through legal interpretation (in authoritative case law) and 
academic commentary. Take, for instance, the uncertainty as to whether the South 
African version of the crime of sedition was based on the ‘seditious libel’ crime of 
English law298 or the Roman-Dutch law notion of ‘oproer’.299 This uncertainty was 
authoritatively resolved in favour of Roman-Dutch law when the court in R v 
Endemann 300  interpreted the relevant principles and identified the South African 
                                                          
doubt and therefore threaten its very existence started to surface at the beginning of the 1990s. Note 
that the 1990s is the stage in South African history which marked the transition away from apartheid 
rule to a constitutional democracy founded on the rule of law and human rights. These arguments are 
advanced by Labuschagne in JMT Labuschagne ‘Menslike outonomie en staatlike majestas: 
opmerkings oor die dekriminalasie van hoogverraad’ (1992) 5 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 
117-131, an article written in the Afrikaans language but summarised in English by Burchell (op cit 
(n132) 839-840). The first argument is that the crime of treason is unconstitutional because its definition 
is intractably vague so as to violate the rule of law or the principle of legality (Burchell op cit (n132) 840). 
Being so vague, the crime is seen as being susceptible to abuse by the government (ibid). Snyman (op 
cit (n129) 307) further submits that the effect of the vagueness of the crime of treason could, for 
instance, lead to the failure to pay one’s taxes constituting treason because that may show an intention 
to threaten or endanger the independence and security of the state or government. 
Another argument for the abolition of the crime of high treason is that the crime is anachronistic and 
inappropriate for a modern popular democracy as it is based on the notion of allegiance, a concept that 
is outdated and no longer consistent with the modern understanding of the relationship between a state 
and the citizen (Burchell op cit (n132) 839-840). As the law stands, virtually any form of disobedience 
or betrayal of allegiance, whether justified or unjustified, could constitute an act of high treason. This is 
in sharp contrast to the right of citizens to challenge and question the government.  
Another argument is that conduct deemed to be treason is capable of being criminalised as some other 
crime and should therefore be punished as such (Burchell op cit (n132) 840). 
One cannot help but be curious as to why these arguments only surfaced towards the end of apartheid 
and not during apartheid. Why were they not raised before the courts in the many treason trials which 
took place during apartheid? Perhaps one can speculate that the potential unconstitutionality of the 
common-law crime of treason was obscured by the fact that, during apartheid, the focus was on 
developing the crime to what it is today, and so the court cases turned on the interpretation and 
application of the law rather than on questioning its legality or constitutionality. It can also be speculated 
that the unconstitutionality of the crime of treason was obscured by the fact that political activity which 
was taking place in South Africa during apartheid was being dealt with using the specially-designed 
security laws, and so the focus of the litigation and academic writings was on security legislation. One 
can perhaps speculate even further that the onslaught against the rule of law during apartheid is what 
obscured these constitutionality questions. We have already seen in chapter 2 that the effect of 
parliamentary supremacy was that the meaning of the rule of law had to be reduced to a 
formal/procedural conception which amounts to no more than a due-process requirement which is 
devoid of any substantive requirements for the law. Given the foregoing, the success of challenging a 
law for violating the rule of law or the legality principle was in doubt since that argument would have 
gone into the substance of the law. 
 
298 The detail on seditious libel can be found in the discussion under heading 3.4 in chapter 3 above. 
 
299 The detail on the Roman-Dutch law notion of oproer appears in the discussion under heading 3.3 in 
chapter 3 above. 
 
300 1915 TPD 142. 
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version of sedition with the Roman-Dutch law notion of oproer.301 ‘Oproer’ connotes 
an assembly of persons in defiance of authority and is therefore much narrower than 
the English law seditious libel which criminalised any criticism (either written, printed 
or depicted), whether truthful or not, of the government.302  
Even when further uncertainty erupted following the deviation of the court in R v 
Malan303 from the precedent in Endemann to find that the South African crime of 
sedition carried English law connotations, the Appellate Division in R v Viljoen304 
interpreted the relevant principles and authoritatively declared that the South African 
version of sedition was aligned to the Roman-Dutch law oproer. Today, sedition is 
defined as consisting in an unlawful gathering, together with a number of people, with 
the intention of impairing the majestas of the state by defying or subverting the 
authority of its government, but without the intention of overthrowing or coercing that 
government.305  
Similarly, Snyman306 defines sedition as consisting in unlawfully and intentionally: (a) 
taking part in a concourse of people violently or by threats of violence challenging, 
defying, or resisting the authority of the state of the Republic of South Africa; or (b) 
causing such a concourse. Hoctor307 submits that sedition consists in the unlawful and 
intentional gathering of a number of people in order to defy or resist the authority of 
the government of the Republic of South Africa, or the unlawful and intentional causing 
of such a gathering with such a purpose. The essential elements of the crime are: (a) 
                                                          




303 1915 TPD 180. 
 
304 1923 AD 90. 
 
305 Milton op cit (n149) 42. See also Burchell op cit (n132) 825. 
 
306 Snyman op cit (n129) 308. 
 
307 Hoctor op cit (n143) para 181. 
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unlawfully;308 (b) gathering with a number of people;309 (c) the state must possess 
majestas;310 (d) intent (but not hostile intent).311  
Once again, in light of the ancient tradition of developing the law, which includes the 
crime of sedition, through case law and supporting scholarly writings,312 the academic 
views expressed in the discussion under subheading 6.2.3.2 in chapter 6 below, 
pertaining to how the interpretation and ultimate development of the impugned 
provisions of the crime of sedition may be approached, should be a welcome 
contribution to the sedition jurisprudence, more so as these views of academics also 
have the effect of resolving the constitutional challenges facing the crime.313 
 
4.3 EARLY SOUTH AFRICAN EMERGENCY LAWS  
Emergencies that were confronted by South Africa during the colonial or pre-apartheid 
era were dealt with using the common-law notion of martial law.314 The development 
                                                          
308 The gathering must be for some unlawful purpose. This is compounded in the intention element to 
defy or subvert the authority of the government (Milton op cit (n149) 51). 
 
309 Milton argues that there is great emphasis on the requirement of people forming a gathering or 
concourse of people. Thus, the two people in S v Twala 1979 (3) SA 864 (T) could not have constituted 
a gathering or a concourse. The gathering or concourse of people must actually occur, which means 
that those conspiring to defy or subvert authority must be physically gathered either in a public or private 
place (Milton op cit (n149) 51-53). 
 
310 Similar to the crime of high treason, the state must possess majestas and not recognise a superior 
within its own territory. It is the majestas of the state that will be impaired by seditious acts which defy 
or subvert the authority of the government (Milton op cit (n149) 54). 
 
311 The intent required here is not hostile intent as that is required for high treason. Instead, the intention 
must be to defy or subvert the authority of the government of the state (Milton op cit (n149) 54-56). 
 
312 Once again, the South African Law Commission report is included within the category of scholarly 
writings for the same reason expressed in note 296 above. 
 
313 The constitutionality of the crime of sedition is rendered questionable by the possibility that it inhibits 
legitimate gatherings of people who are protesting against the government or are expressing some 
grievance (Milton op cit (n149) 44). The current legal position, as confirmed by the courts S v Twala 
supra (n309) and S v Zwane 1989 (3) SA 253 (W), is that the crime of sedition can be committed through 
violent and non-violent conduct which is intended to defy or subvert the authority of the government of 
a state. The court in Twala gave as examples of non-violent sedition the burning of passbooks with 
seditious intent, as well as the workers’ strike against labour legislation if it (the strike) is accompanied 
by seditious intent (see Milton op cit (n149) 51). The argument by Milton (ibid) is that the criminalisation 
of non-violent gatherings such as those mentioned in Twala would infringe the right to freedom of 
expression and the right to gather and protest, which rights are enshrined in ss 16 and 17 of the South 




of martial law jurisprudence follows a similar approach as that of ordinary security laws 
in that it was also done through authoritative case law (after the courts had interpreted 
and applied the law), supported by academic commentary. The only difference is that, 
while legal literature and case law attempt  to resolve the controversial aspects of 
martial law, in most cases, such controversies have not been conclusively resolved.315   
To illustrate the above point, the lack of unanimity as to whether the South African law 
version of martial law was inherited from Roman-Dutch law or English law has not 
been conclusively resolved by case law and/or academic texts,316 though it seems to 
be generally accepted that both the English and Roman-Dutch law versions of martial 
law have influenced the South African version. To this end, like the Roman-Dutch and 
English law version of martial law, South Africa accepts that martial law is basically a 
‘state of affairs, rather than settled body of rules, although rules and orders will be 
promulgated317 and enforced by the military authorities as they deem fit’.318  
The one qualification that formed part of the Roman-Dutch and English law versions 
of martial law and which was inherited by South African law is that any action taken 
by the Executive (mainly through the military) during martial law had to be objectively 
necessary.319 The objective necessity of Executive conduct could be enquired into by 
the courts according to the Roman-Dutch law and, after some reluctance, even English 
                                                          
314 Thus, martial law was invoked on various occasions in South Africa’s turbulent political history, such 
as during the Anglo-Boer War, the Zulu or Bambata Rebellion of 1906, the 1914 Rebellion which took 
place during the First World War, the 1922 ‘Red Revolt' and the Ossewabrandwag activities during the 
Second World War (Devenish op cit (n167) 350. See also Milton op cit (n149) 19-20).  
 
315 The reason for the inability to resolve the grey areas in respect of martial law is unknown. Perhaps 
one can speculate that the reason is that the events which occasion the need for the invocation of 
martial law occur infrequently and that possibly slows down cases and commentary on the controversial 
aspects of martial law. Another possibility is that the move away from relying on martial law in combating 
emergencies to adopting legislation allowing for the declaration of a state of emergency came before 
the martial law jurisprudence was fully developed. 
 
316 Devenish op cit (n167) 351. 
 
317 A common practice was that, during martial law, the Executive would seek special martial law powers 
from Parliament. Thus, for the first world War, there was the Indemnity and Special Tribunal Act 11 of 
1915.  For World War II, there was the War Measures Act 13 of 1940 (as amended by Act 20 and 32 of 
1940 and Act 30 of 1949). These Acts provided for martial law powers such as that of detention without 
trial and internment (Devenish op cit (n167) 351. See also Mathews op cit (n118) 133). 
 
318 Devenish op cit (167) 350 & 353. 
 
319 Devenish op cit (n167) 352 & 354. 
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law.320 However, in South Africa, the question of whether or not the courts can review 
or test the legality of decisions to invoke martial law has been answered in the 
affirmative in some cases321 and in the negative in others,322 thus plunging the legal 
position into deep uncertainty which has not been resolved even today.323 
Another unresolved controversy concerning martial law is the question of what 
conditions or circumstances justify martial law. The lack of unanimity on this aspect is 
evidenced by the existence of conflicting case law on the issue. In the case of Ex parte 
DF Marais,324 a South African case emanating from the events which took place during 
the Anglo-Boer War and which made it all the way to the Privy Council (thus assuming 
the status of being a case decided by the South African Appellate Division, as it was 
then known),325 the court found that martial law exists ‘where war actually prevails’ 
and ‘where war is actually raging’. Ultimately, the court treated the notion of ‘war 
actually prevails’ as synonymous to ‘war is raging’.  
In Ex parte Kotze,326 the court found that where there is armed conflict between states, 
martial law comes into existence in all the states involved, even if the war is not taking 
place within the borders of all the affected states. This position is endorsed in 
Trümpelmann v Minister of Justice,327 a case which found that martial law was justified 
in South Africa during World War II because war had been declared. This was despite 
there being hardly any prevailing or raging war, rebellion or insurrection in the country. 
However, the finding in the DF Marais case above is contradicted by the finding of the 
court in Dedlow v Minister for Defence,328 which rejects the view that the phrases 
                                                          
320 Ibid. 
 
321 See Q v Bekker 1900 SC 340; Ex Parte Kotze 1914 TPD 564; and Tole v Director of Prisons 1914 
TPD 20. 
 
322 Dedlow v Minister of Defence 1915 TPD 543.  
 
323 The uncertainty in this regard is also confirmed by the court in Krohn v Minister of Defence 1915 AD 
191. See also Devenish op cit (n167) 357. 
 
324 1902 AC 109 
 
325 Devenish op cit (n167) 354. 
 
326 Supra (n321). 
 
327 1940 TPD 242. 
 
328 Supra (n322). 
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‘where war is actually raging’ and ‘where war actually prevails’ are synonymous. The 
court’s reasoning is that to say that war is actually raging means much more than that 
war actually prevails. Also, the case of End Conscription Campaign v Minister of 
Defence329 contradicts the finding in the Ex Parte Kotze case and that of Trümpelmann 
by refusing to recognise that the existence of war (though it was not formally declared) 
between South Africa and its neighbouring country, Namibia, justified martial law in 
the Cape province, South Africa. The court in the End Conscription Campaign330 case 
reasoned that ‘a war, rebellion or civil uprising which does not actually threaten the 
Republic and its constitution is not such as can justify the state in disregarding the 
ordinary law and acting under martial law’. 
Notwithstanding the conflicting authority, Devenish attempts to resolve the present 
impasse by submitting the following points pertaining to the conditions or 
circumstances which justify martial law. First, the geographical proximity to the theatre 
of war or military operations is no longer a decisive factor since modern technology is 
sophisticated to the point that even a state which is far from the war may be 
threatened.331 Second, the absence of disorder and the normal functioning of the 
courts does not always mean that martial law is not justified.332 Third, the fact that 
martial law has been proclaimed does not mean the state of martial law actually 
prevails because the courts can still find otherwise after examining the situation and 
surrounding circumstances.333 Fourth, the fact that war has been declared does not 
necessarily mean the existence of martial law for martial law can exist even in the 
absence of a declared war.334  In all instances, the courts must always be careful and 
not uphold martial law in situations where it would absurd to invoke martial law powers 
or where invoking martial law would be an abuse of power by the authorities.335  
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331 Devenish op cit (n167) 355. 
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334 Ibid at 359. 
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The next unresolved controversy pertaining to martial law is in respect of whether or 
not the courts can review or test the legality of decisions taken by the military once 
martial law is established. The view expressed in Ex parte DF Marais336 is that, during 
martial law occasioned by a state of war, actions of the military are not justiciable.337 
However, the court in Ex parte Kotze338 held that, in cases of rebellion, the decision to 
invoke martial law and the extent of the powers available are justiciable. The court in 
Q v Bekker339 was split on the issue, with the judges giving conflicting judgments.  
In Krohn v Minister of Defence,340 the court distinguished between places where there 
are military operations and where there are none, yet special powers of supervision 
still need to be exercised. It then found the review of military action undesirable in the 
former situation, but did not pronounce on the latter situation. In Dedlow v Minister of 
Defence,341 the court found that where war actually prevails or the fact of the state of 
war is established, the ordinary courts do not have jurisdiction.  
In Halder v Minister of Defence and Provost Marshall of Pretoria,342 after having found 
that what needed to be established in the case was whether war prevailed in South 
Africa and not necessarily that war actually existed or was raging, the court proceeded 
to find that, since war was not prevailing in South Africa, the court had jurisdiction to 
decide whether internment was justified. It would appear that this was the first time 
that the court openly pronounced that the courts have jurisdiction if war is found not to 
be prevailing. This principle is praised by Devenish343 as being the preferred view in 
the circumstances.  
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337 What is unclear is whether this position applies only where war is raging or it applies also in places 
which are not the theatre of war (Devenish op cit (n167) 357). 
 
338 Supra (n321). 
 
339 Supra (n321). 
 
340 Supra (n323). 
 
341 Supra (n322). 
 
342 1915 TPD 622. 
 
343 Devenish op cit (n167) 358. 
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In apparent acquiescence with the principle expressed in Ex Parte DF Marais,344 
Krohn345 and Dedlow346 cases, to the effect that the courts do not have jurisdiction to 
test the legality of actions of the military in situations where war prevails or is raging, 
Devenish347 submits that the only qualification to this principle is that the actions of the 
military will be justiciable if these were undertaken mala fide (in bad faith) and outside 
the scope of the powers of the military. Even if indemnity is granted, that does not stop 
the courts from calling the military officials to account for their actions if they were 
taken mala fide and not for the suppression of war, insurrection or disturbance.348 
The judgments handed down by the courts in attempting to answer the controversial 
questions pertaining to martial law raise a further question as to whether the courts, in 
adjudicating martial law cases, have been inclined to find in favour of the Executive or 
whether they have been prone to uphold and protect human rights and basic 
freedoms. Unfortunately, this question is not answered with certainty given the 
conflicting authority. However, the one positive aspect emanating from the existence 
of such conflicting authority is that some courts were still willing to protect human rights 
and basic freedoms at a time when the political conditions on the ground were such 
that it was a norm or it was becoming a norm, especially in martial law cases (and later 
the security and emergency cases), for the courts to side with the government. Put 
differently, this was a time when some judges of the courts were becoming executive-
minded.349  
The earliest martial law case in which the court demonstrated executive-mindedness 
of the highest order is the Trümpelmann350 judgment. It will be recalled that the court 
in this case found that martial law was justified in South Africa during World War II 
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348 Ibid at 360. 
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because the war had been declared,351 and so the court deprived itself of jurisdiction 
to assess to its satisfaction that martial law was justified by the prevailing conditions 
on the ground. The court also deprived itself of jurisdiction to test the legality of the 
actions of the military. Devenish352 also submits as evidence of executive-mindedness 
the fact that the court in Trümpelmann did not recognise the established principle that 
the actions of the military will be justiciable at least where their actions are taken in 
bad faith and outside the scope of their powers. 
Blatant executive-mindedness on the part of the court in Trümpelmann can be argued 
to have manifested in the form of what is described in chapter 3 as judicial 
minimalism.353 In terms of judicial minimalism, the court approaches legal questions 
in a minimalist fashion, limiting its interference to the minimum extent. It is submitted 
that, as we shall see in 4.5 below, executive-mindedness can also manifest in the form 
of the other principles and doctrines identified chapter 3, such as judicial deference,354 
as well as the non-justiciable political question doctrine. 355  Therefore, though 
unbeknown to the court in Trümpelmann, the judgment was a precursor to the culture 
of executive-mindedness that would characterise and dominate the apartheid-era 
judges, especially those who presided over security and emergency cases. More detail 
on the culture of executive-mindedness that was emerging will follow in the discussion 
in 4.5 below. 
 
4.4 DRACONIAN SECURITY AND EMERGENCY LEGISLATION 
It will be recalled that the discussion under subheading 2.2 in chapter 2 above placed 
the supremacy of Parliament at the centre of South Africa’s legal and political system 
during apartheid. Therefore, although the jurisprudential development in respect of the 
draconian security and emergency legislation continued through legal interpretation in  
                                                          
351 This was despite there being hardly any prevailing or raging war, rebellion or insurrection in the 
country. 
 
352 Devenish op cit (n167) 358. 
 
353 Refer to the discussion under subheading 3.5.2.5 in chapter 3 above. 
 
354 Also refer to the discussion under subheading 3.5.2.5 in chapter 3 above. 
 
355 Refer to the discussion under subheading 3.5.2.6 in chapter 3 above. 
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case law as well as in academic writings, parliamentary supremacy accounts for the 
subjection of this ancient tradition to the whim of Parliament, with the result that 
Parliament could, and actually did, pass laws limiting the freedom of academic 
expression, as well as ousting the courts’ jurisdiction in adjudicating matters 
concerning security and emergency laws.  
Although the restrictions imposed by the operation of parliamentary supremacy 
severely hampered the said ancient tradition, it (the said ancient tradition) was 
nonetheless never dispensed with. This becomes clear in the discussion under 4.5 
below, where it can be deduced from the case law and academic texts cited therein 
that, despite the heavy restrictions, the development of the security and emergency 
jurisprudence was still being conducted through case law and academic writings. 
Parliamentary supremacy also accounts for the shift away from the use of common-
law security and emergency provisions to the introduction and use of draconian356 
security and emergency legislation passed by the then supreme or sovereign 
Parliament. Therefore, instead of relying on the common-law notion of martial law to 
counter the unrest occasioned by the defiance campaign in the 1950s, 357  the 
sovereign Parliament opted to enact the Public Safety Act.358 Section 2(1) of the  Act 
provided that the President 359  could declare by proclamation in the Government 
                                                          
356 The reading of literature and other authority on security and emergency laws reveals that there is no 
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well as the censorship and suppression of information etc.) will not be discussed as part of draconian 
security and emergency laws, though this is not being treated as suggesting that these provisions do 
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357 It is noteworthy that the native South Africans were not oblivious to the political developments which 
began taking place from 1910 and reached their zenith in 1948 when the policy of racial segregation 
(apartheid) was officially ushered in. Indeed, their war efforts had been successfully quashed by the 
white colonial government, but they soon after 1910 changed tactic and organised themselves politically 
under the banner of a political party that became the African Nation Congress (ANC). In the 1950s, the 
ANC led the defiance campaign which promoted peaceful/passive defiance of discriminatory laws, 
mainly the pass laws. 
 




Gazette a state of emergency if, in his ‘opinion’, there was a serious threat to public 
safety or the maintenance of public order and the ordinary law was inadequate to 
enable the government to control the situation. Although the emergency was limited 
to 12 months, it could be extended by another proclamation in the discretion of the 
President.360  
The President was also given a blank cheque when it came to the making of 
emergency regulations in terms of the Public Safety Act, as these were also subject 
to his opinion of what was necessary to overcome the emergency.361 Of course, there 
were a few limitations,362 but these were so insignificant that, in essence, the President 
virtually had unlimited power to make regulations.363 The threatened use of the Public 
Safety Act was enough to bring the defiance campaign to an end without the 
declaration of a state of emergency.   
However, in the early 1960s, a demonstration in the area known as Sharpeville against 
the carrying of passes resulted in the police opening live ammunition at the protesters, 
thereby killing 71 and injuring 180. A state of emergency was declared in terms of the 
Public Safety Act, and the emergency regulations, which notably went as far as to 
make provision for arrest without warrant and detention without trial, were proclaimed 
by the President.364 In a variety of ways, the regulations effectively rendered the courts 
powerless,365 they provided no right of appeal to an independent and objective body 
especially for those detained without trial,366 and not a single body had the power to 
                                                          
359 The Minister of Justice could also exercise the same powers that the President had during an 
emergency if he (the Minister) was of the opinion that it is urgently necessary to do so (s 4).  
 
360 Section 2(2). Also, the President could, in his discretion, withdraw the state of emergency (s2(3)). 
 
361 Section 3(1).  
 
362 See Mathews op cit (n118) 222-223 
 
363 The court in in R v Maphumulo 1960 (3) SA 793 (N) even remarked that the legislative powers of 
the President were equal to those of Parliament. 
 
364 For a discussion of these regulations, see Mathews op cit (n118) 225-226. 
 
365 This was achieved through methods such as the explicit exclusion of the courts’ competency to hear 
certain emergency matters, the promulgation of regulations permitting certain officials to exercise 
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Parliament (the Indemnity Act 61 of 1961) indemnifying officials from civil and criminal liability which 




objectively assess whether the material conditions justified the declaration of the state 
of emergency.367  
The Public Safety Act became South Africa’s first post-Union emergency law which 
was not based on the common-law notion of martial law.368 The Act applied throughout 
the apartheid era, and was invoked in 1960 and again in 1985 and in 1986.369 The 
emergency system established by the Act was based on the Roman dictator model.370 
The series of ex ante controls on emergency power371 coupled with the unrestricted 
power of the President to make regulations indeed suggest that the emergency system 
envisaged by the Public Safety Act was modelled on the Roman dictator model.372 
The Act also confirmed the continued rejection of the Business as Usual Model in 
South African law since there existed ordinary security laws (both common law and 
statutory) for ordinary security threats, and there also existed in the Public Safety Act 
a special emergency order for the time of crisis.  
                                                          
366 Where such bodies were appointed, these were under the full control of the Minister who appointed 
the members of that body. 
 
367 Dugard op cit (n15) 111.  
 
368 There also existed certain regional legal instruments that empowered the government to declare a 
state of emergency. For instance, Dugard (op cit (n15) 110-111) submits that in the 1960s the 
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369 AS Mathews Freedom state security and the rule of law – Dilemmas of the apartheid society (1986) 
195. 
 
370 On the characteristics of the Roman dictator model, refer to the discussion under heading 3.2 in 
chapter 3 above. In view of the autocratic nature of the apartheid government, it is surprising that it did 
not opt for an extreme emergency system which places emergencies beyond the law or the Constitution, 
such as that which is based on the ‘theory of the exception’ (discussed fully in 3.5.2.3 in chapter 3 
above). Even though the apartheid government may have fancied such a system (judging from the fact 
that it utilised all sorts of techniques to achieve virtually unlimited security and emergency powers), 
perhaps the reason for modelling the emergency system on the less extreme Roman dictator model is 
that the government wanted to maintain its democratic character based on the Constitution and the law. 
Indeed, that may have been the case but, at best, the democracy under apartheid was a ‘militant 
democracy’ (on this concept, refer to the discussion under subheading 3.5.2.2 in chapter 3 above) given 
that the supposedly democratic apartheid government did assume autocratic methods. 
 
371 Such as, inter alia, the restriction of a declaration of a state of emergency to no more than 12 months, 
and that Parliament had the power to nullify the declaration by rejecting the emergency regulations 
(s3(6)). See generally Mathews op cit (n118) 222.  
 
372  There are, however, some borrowings from English law traditions as well. For instance, the 
promulgation of regulations and legislation (the Indemnity Act (supra n365)) indemnifying government 
officials from liability for acts done during an emergency is an emergency tradition borrowed from 
English law, as reflected in the discussion under heading 3.4 in chapter 3 above. 
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What ensued after the use of the Public Safety Act following the Sharpeville massacre 
was the birth of emergency-type or draconian security legislation. The preference of 
draconian security legislation resulted from the adverse economic repercussions 
which came after the state of emergency of 1960.373 Foreign investor confidence on 
South Africa’s political stability was at an all-time low.374 Government therefore sought 
alternative means to deal with political opposition without compromising economic 
stability, hence the draconian security legislation was resorted to.  
The introduction of draconian security legislation happened gradually, with the 
government sort of testing the water by first introducing less drastic security measures 
and becoming  bolder as time went by. For instance, following the acts of sporadic 
violence by Poqo, the militant wing of a political party called the Pan-Africanist 
Congress, the very first draconian security legislation was passed. This was section 
17 of the General Law Amendment Act.375 This Act, which was to remain in force for 
only a year subject to an extension by Parliament for no longer than 12 months at a 
time, 376 made provision for the 90-day detention without trial of those who were 
suspected on reasonable grounds to have committed or to have information about the 
commission of offences under the Suppression of Communism Act377 or the Unlawful 
Organisations Act.378  
The detainee was held in detention for purposes of interrogation for 90 days or until 
he/she had, in the ‘opinion’ of the Commissioner of the South African Police, replied 
satisfactorily to the questions.379 The detainee was not allowed visitors, except by a 
magistrate and only on a weekly basis.380 No court had jurisdiction to order the release 
                                                          




375 37 of 1963. 
 
376 Section 17(4)(a). The Act ended up remaining in the law books for five years (Dugard op cit (n15) 
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of such detainee.381 The Act was also notorious for what became known as the 
‘Sobukwe clause’, in terms of which the apartheid government justified the continued 
incarceration of one of the leaders of the 1960 Sharpeville defiance, Robert Sobukwe, 
even after completing his sentence of three years.382 The Act therefore introduced 
what is known as a ‘bill of attainder’, a legislative provision imposing punishment 
without a judicial trial.383  
After the withdrawal of the 90-day detention law, Parliament inserted section 215bis 
into the Criminal Procedure Act.384 This section introduced a provision for the 180-day 
detention of any person who was likely to give evidence for the state in connection 
with certain political and common-law offences. Such detention could occur whenever 
the Attorney-General was of the ‘opinion’ that the witness in question might be 
intimidated, or might abscond, or that it was in the interests of such detainee or the 
administration of justice that he/she be detained. Only a state official could have 
access to the detainee, and the courts could not order the release from custody of the 
detainee.385 The Act also gave the Attorney-General the power to withhold bail for 12 
days after arrest in cases where he/she was of the view that public safety was 
threatened.386 Unlike the 90-day detention law which was temporary and required 
extension by Parliament, this time the government was bolder and the 180-day 
detention provision was made permanent.  
As per the foregoing, it is clear that South Africa was on a trajectory towards a 
permanent state of emergency. Despite the Public Safety Act387 being modelled on 
the Roman dictator model, the country was no longer loyal to the essence of the 
Roman dictator model, which is that emergency measures must be of a temporary 
nature and must be aimed at returning the state to its normal order. To put the final 
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nail in the coffin, the Terrorism Act388 made provision for the indefinite detention 
without trial of suspects of political crimes if the commissioned officer had ‘reason to 
believe’ that the suspect was a terrorist.389 This was a step further than the 14-day 
detention of those suspected of terrorism before the Act was introduced. 390  The 
Terrorism Act also allowed the withholding of information pertaining to the identity of 
the detainee, the visits by a magistrate were no longer compulsory but discretionary, 
and this was a permanent piece of legislation in South African law.391 
The Internal Security Act 392 was another draconian security law of the apartheid 
government. Although it mainly replaced the Suppression of Communism Act,393 the 
180-day witness detention provision of the Criminal Procedure Act394 was notably 
transferred from that Act to the present Internal Security Act in respect of political 
offences.395 In 1982, following the Rabie Commission Report into security laws and its 
recommendation to consolidate all security laws under one legislation,396 the Internal 
Security Act397 was passed.  
There are a number of draconian provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1982. The 
first is section 28, which empowered the Minister of Law and Order to order the 
detention of any person if the Minister is of the ‘opinion’ that there are reasons to 
apprehend that such person will commit the offence of terrorism, subversion or 
sabotage; or if he (the Minister) is ‘satisfied’ that this person engages in activities which 
endanger or which are calculated to endanger the security of the state or the 
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maintenance of law and order. The detainee was detained for the period stipulated in 
the order and, while so detained, no one was allowed to access the detainee unless 
the necessary consent was obtained. This detention provision therefore constitutes an 
example of preventive detention.398 
Another form of preventive detention was introduced in section 50 of the Internal 
Security Act of 1982. This time it was detention for 48 hours, which could be extended 
to 14 days if there was a magisterial warrant to that effect. The basis for the detention 
was any police officer being of the ‘opinion’ that the actions of the person in question 
contribute to the state of public disturbance, disorder, riot or public violence, and that 
the detention would help combat or terminate  such a state of affairs. Another basis 
was any police officer forming an ‘opinion’ that the detention will assist in the 
prevention or resumption of the aforementioned state of affairs.  
The last preventive detention provision was section 50A of the Internal Security Act of 
1982. It was introduced through an amendment of the Act effected in 1986, and made 
provision for 180-day detention. The basis for the detention was the senior police 
officer’s forming of an opinion that the arrest and detention of any person will help 
combat, prevent or terminate various forms of unrest.  
The detention provision in section 29 of the Internal Security Act of 1982 is an example 
of pre-trial detention.399 It made provision for indefinite detention for purposes of 
interrogation, if the designated police officer had ‘reason to believe’ that certain acts 
(such as engaging in terrorist acts or withholding information from the police pertaining 
to the person who has committed or intends committing the offence of terrorism) have 
been committed by the individual to be so detained. The detainee was held in 
accordance with the directions issued by the Commissioner of Police until the 
Commissioner ordered his/her release after being satisfied that the detainee has 
replied satisfactorily to all questions and that the continued detention will serve no 
further purpose. Section 29(6) ousted the courts’ jurisdiction in matters concerning the 
indefinite detention in section 29. Only certain state officials (i.e. the Minister of Law 
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and Order or any persons acting under the authority of the Minister, the Inspector of 
Detainees, the magistrate and state district surgeon) were allowed access to the 
detainee and the official information obtained from such detainee. 
Another pre-trial detention provision was section 30 of the Internal Security Act. Similar 
to the ‘no bail’ clause in section 215bis of the Criminal Procedure Act,400 section 30 
empowered the Attorney-General to issue an order preventing the courts from granting 
bail to a person arrested on a charge of having committed an offence in Schedule 3 of 
the Internal Security Act. The basis for issuing such an order was whether the 
Attorney-General considered the order necessary in the interests of state security or 
the maintenance of law and order. 
The third and last form of pre-trial detention was section 31. It reintroduced the 
Criminal Procedure Act’s 401  180-day detention of potential state witnesses in 
connection with security crimes. The basis for the detention still remained the opinion 
of the Attorney-General that the detainee who is likely to give material evidence for the 
state in criminal proceedings relating to certain specified security offences may be 
tampered with or be intimidated or may abscond or that the Attorney-General deemed 
the detention to be in the interests of such a person or the administration of justice. 
Visits to section 31 detainees were subject to the consent of certain state officials, and 
the courts did not have jurisdiction to order the release of the detainee or adjudicate 
on incidental matters.  
  
4.5 PREVENTION OF LEGAL CHALLENGES TO, OR BASED ON, THE 
APARTHEID SECURITY AND EMERGENCY LEGISLATION 
This section considers what wittingly or unwittingly became the techniques or methods 
that were employed in order to prevent legal challenges to, or  based on, the draconian 
apartheid security and emergency legislation, as well as the accompanying 
regulations. 402  This section also considers all that which aided or enhanced the 
                                                          






operation of the said techniques or methods. Lastly, as is the case with the other 
sections in this chapter, the contents of the present section coincidentally prove the 
centrality of legal interpretation in legal development, a fundamental premise of this 
thesis.  
In no particular order, the first technique for preventing legal challenges to, or based 
on, the security and emergency legislation, as well as the regulations, was the use of 
statutory language that placed the exercise of security and emergency powers in the 
subjective opinion or discretion of particular designated official(s). Indeed, this was the 
strategy of the Public Safety Act, 403  the Criminal Procedure Act, 404  the Internal 
Security Act, 405  as well as the numerous regulations that accompanied the 
aforementioned Acts.  
The above technique bore the result that there was no requirement of the production 
of objective evidence or facts that informed the government official’s exercise of 
security and emergency powers granted in legislation and in the regulations. Thus, in 
Stanton v Minister of Justice,406 the court held that it was not open to Miss Stanton to 
prove that an emergency was not objectively justified in her area as it was the opinion 
of the Minister, the magistrate or the commissioned officer that mattered. Owing to this 
technique, potential legal challenges based on some of the draconian provisions of 
security and emergency legislation were frustrated and ultimately prevented.  
The second technique was the outright ousting of the courts’ jurisdiction in certain 
matters concerning state security and emergency laws. This technique went a step 
further than the first in that it explicitly denied the courts any role in certain security 
and emergency matters. The 90-day detention law, 407  180-day detention law, 408 
                                                          
402 The discussion under subheading 3.5.2.1 in chapter 3 above alludes to these techniques as well as 
that which aided or enhanced the operation of these techniques, but the detailed discussion of the 
foregoing was deferred to the present chapter.  
 
403 Supra (n358). 
 
404 Supra (n384). 
 
405 Supra (n397). 
 
406 1960 (3) SA 354 (T). 
 
407 Supra (n375). 
 
408 Supra (n384). 
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Internal Security Act409 and numerous regulations, had provisions ousting the courts’ 
jurisdiction, thus preventing legal challenges.  
What aided or enhanced the two techniques mentioned above was notably the grant 
of indemnity from criminal and civil liability in favour of government officials who 
exercised power in terms of security and emergency laws.410 This must have helped 
to restrict legal challenges concerning those who exercised power in terms of security 
and emergency laws. What also aided or enhanced the two techniques mentioned 
above was the operation of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. It will be recalled 
that the operation of parliamentary supremacy had the effect of restricting rule of law 
to the formal/procedural conception.411 This meant that the courts’ power of judicial 
review could not be extended to testing the substance or content of legislation and 
regulations, as the courts were restricted only to testing whether the correct procedure 
was complied with in the making of legislation as well as the regulations.  
Therefore, the operation of parliamentary supremacy shielded the draconian security 
and emergency legislation and regulations from legal challenges that would lead to 
proper and objective judicial scrutiny and which considered the substance of the 
legislation and regulations. The undesirability of a justiciable Bill of Rights was also an 
essential tenet of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. As a result, this tenet of 
parliamentary supremacy shielded the draconian security and emergency legislation 
and regulations from legal challenges and from being interpreted and tested in light of 
human rights.  
In addition, what further aided or enhanced the techniques mentioned above is the 
notion of executive-mindedness on the part of the judges of the courts.412 This is most 
unfortunate because even in the very limited instances where judges could intervene 
and interpret the far-reaching security and emergency provisions in a manner that 
upholds the rule of law, human rights and basic freedoms, they did not take up that 
                                                          
409 Supra (n397). 
 
410 See note 372 above. 
 
411 For a full account of parliamentary supremacy and its effect on the rule of law and human rights, 
refer to the discussion under heading 2.2 in chapter 2 above. 
 
412 For a description of ‘executive-mindedness’, see note 349 above. Others refer to the phenomenon 
of executive-mindedness as ‘conservative judicial positivism’. 
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opportunity. Instead, the judges preferred to stretch the interpretation of legal 
provisions and find in favour of the Executive.413  
Executive-mindedness reflected in the judgments of the then top court, the Appellate 
Division, and was therefore propagated by the most senior judges.414 Because the 
South African legal system works on a precedent system (stare decisis), in terms of 
which the higher courts hand down judgments which are binding and must be followed 
by the lower courts, it was conceivably easier for the culture of executive-mindedness 
to filter down to the lower courts. This way, executive-mindedness also shielded the 
security and emergency laws from proper judicial scrutiny and interpretation in light of 
the rule of law and human rights.  
The earliest case in which the presiding officer has been observed to have been 
executive-minded is the martial law case of Trümpelmann v Minister of Justice.415 The 
court in this case found that martial law was justified in South Africa during World War 
II because the war had been declared. This was despite there being hardly any 
prevailing or raging war, rebellion or insurrection in the country. The court then 
deprived itself of jurisdiction to assess to its satisfaction that martial law was objectively 
justified by the prevailing conditions on the ground. The court also deprived itself of 
jurisdiction to test the legality of the actions of the Executive (acting through the 
military).  
In the context of security laws, executive-mindedness reflected for the first time in the 
case of Rossouw v Sachs.416 This case concerned the question of whether a detainee 
                                                          
413 The culture of executive-mindedness on the part of the judges during the apartheid era may be 
explained, and even be excused, on the basis that it (executive-mindedness) was a result of the 
subservience of the courts to the political branch of government (i.e. the Legislature). The subservience 
of the courts was enforced by the operation of parliamentary supremacy, which meant that the courts 
must apply whatever laws made by Parliament, and not question these laws. Indeed, a sovereign 
Parliament like that of apartheid South Africa preferred judges who enforced its will, not those who 
questioned it. As such, the apartheid government appointed pliable judges to the bench. However, the 
blame for the extremes to which judges took the subservience to the will of Parliament as expressed in 
legislation (and subordinate legislation i.e. regulations) has to be placed solely on the judges. 
 
414 For a critique of the performance of the courts, mainly the Appellate Division under each of the Chief 
Justices of that court, see Dugard op cit (n15) 325-360; E Cameron ‘Legal chauvinism, executive-
mindedness and justice – LC Steyn’s impact on South African law’ (1982) 99 South African Law Journal 
38-75; and AS Mathews ‘The South African judiciary and the security system’ (1985) 1 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 199-209.  
 
415 Supra (n327). 
 
416 1964 (2) SA 551 (A). 
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under the 90-day detention law417 was entitled to reading and writing material. The 
legislation in question was silent on the matter, and so the intention of the Legislature 
had to be ascertained. Far from interpreting the impugned statutory provisions 
restrictively and in favour of liberty, the court opted for an unconvincing and strained 
interpretation imposing intent upon the Legislature which it (the Legislature) could 
have stated clearly if it so wished.418 The strained interpretation in the present case 
operated in favour of the Executive. 
When the question as to whether the court jurisdiction’s ouster clause in the 90-day 
detention law419 prevented the court from ordering the detainee to appear personally 
before court to give evidence as to the methods of interrogation used by the police, 
the majority of the Appellate Division in Schermbrucker v Klindt N.O.420 adopted an 
interpretation which favoured the court’s deprivation of jurisdiction from making such 
an order. This was in spite of the fact that the court could, and ought to, have held 
otherwise.  
Also confirming executive-mindedness on the part of the judges of the court is the 
case of Loza v Police Station Commander, Durbanville.421 This case overruled a 
convincing judgment in Mbele v Minister of Justice,422 to the effect that the authorised 
officer in terms of the General Law Amendment Act423 could not renew the detention 
of a suspect for a further period after the expiry of 90 days, except if such detention 
was in respect of a different offence or the possession of different information. The 
court in Loza inserted criteria such as that a further detention could be justified ‘by a 
                                                          
417 The General Law Amendment Act supra (n375). 
 
418 See Dugard op cit (n15) 333-336. For further commentary on this judgment, see Mathews & Albino 
op cit (n31) 22-29. This judgment is also comparable to the majority finding in R v Halliday, Ex Parte 
Zadig [1917] AC 260, in which the majority of the House of Lords interpreted an otherwise silent statute 
to empower the relevant authority to make detention (without trial) regulations. 
 
419 Supra (n375). 
 
420 1965 (4) SA 606 (A). 
 
421 1964 (2) SA 545 (A). 
 
422 1963 (4) SA 606 (D). 
 
423 Supra (n375). 
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change in the situation upon which the suspicion or opinion is based’ or by a ‘change 
in respect of the particular offence’.424 
Furthermore, the court in S v Hlekani 425  refused to uphold the principle that the 
admission obtained following the 90-day detention of a suspect was not admissible, 
though the court in S v Ismail426 eventually did. It is therefore arguable that the court 
in Hlekani continued the culture of executive-mindedness. Even when there was 
authority 427  for the principle that the 180-day detention provision in the Criminal 
Procedure Act428 permitted a generous interpretation in favour of individual rights 
because the Act did not deal exclusively with state security, some executive-minded 
judges of the courts still moved away from this position.429  
Executive-mindedness also reflected in the judgments in cases concerning the 
Terrorism Act.430 A significant change that had come with the Terrorism Act was that 
the basis for the indefinite detention of a person was no longer the subjective opinion 
of a designated official, but a designated official having ‘reason to believe’ that the 
suspect was a terrorist. Section 29 of the Internal Security Act,431 as well as the various 
regulations in terms of that Act, used similar wording in respect of some of the 
provisions.  
In non-security cases, provisions which turned on being ‘satisfied’ or having ‘reason 
to believe’ had long been authoritatively found to allow the courts to seek objective 
evidence for such satisfaction or belief.432 However, for a while, the courts did not take 
up this invitation in security cases, and they either kept to the rhetoric of executive-
                                                          
424 Mathews op cit (n118) 136. 
 
425 1964 (4) SA 429 (E). 
 
426 1965 (1) SA 446 (N). 
 
427 See S v Heyman 1966 (4) 598 (A). 
 
428 Supra (n384). 
 
429 See Gosschalk v Rossouw 1966 (2) SA 476 (C); and Singh v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1967 (2) 
SA 1 (T). 
 
430 Supra (n388). 
 
431 Supra (n397). 
 
432 See Brits Town Council v Pienaar NO 1949 (1) SA 1n004 (T); and London Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nair 
1957 (3) SA 591 (D).  See also Mathews op cit (n369) 64; and Mathews op cit (n118) 147. 
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mindedness433 or at least opted to interpret these phrases to mean that the official had 
discretion which could be set aside only if that official acted dishonestly, mindlessly or 
for improper purposes.434 It is only in Minister of Law and Order v Hurley435 that the 
court finally recognised even in security cases that the phrase ‘has reason to believe’ 
requires objective grounds for the belief, which grounds are justiciable.436  
The cases discussed above are just some of the examples of executive-minded 
interpretations of security and emergency provisions. Therefore, the plethora of cases 
in which the provisions of security and emergency laws are challenged are not 
discussed in full here, albeit executive-mindedness can also be witnessed in these 
other cases.437  
While the culture of executive-mindedness prevailed at the height of apartheid during 
the 1970s and the 1980s, judicial activism (in terms of which the courts did not only 
                                                          
433 See Mnyani v Minister of Justice 1980 (4) SA 528 (Tk); Mbane v Minister of Police 1982 (1) SA 223 
(Tk); and Matroos v Coetzee NO 1985 (3) SA 474 (SEC). The position adopted in these judgments is 
comparable to the majority finding in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206. In this case, the court was 
confronted with the issue of whether to adopt a subjective or objective construction of a statutory 
provision that permitted the Minister to detain whoever he had reasonable cause to believe is a security 
threat. The majority of the court opted for a subjective construction which accepted the Minister’s say-
so, and justified this on the basis of the wartime emergency.  
For a commentary on the above cases, see MY Cassim ‘Detention and torture without trial: Section 29 
of the Internal Security Act’ (1987) 10 National Black Law Journal 200 at 206-207; and LJ Boulle 
‘Detainees and courts: New beginnings (1985) 1 South African Journal on Human Rights 251 at 253. 
 
434  Mathews op cit (n414) 204. This line of interpretation was in the same spirit as the principle that the 
basis for challenging legislative provisions and regulations which made the exercise of certain powers 
subject to the subjective opinion or discretion of a certain official, was that the official did not apply 
his/her mind or, that he/she acted mala fide or in bad faith (see Nkwinti v Minister of Police 1976 (2) SA 
421 (E); Dempsey v Minister of Law and Order 1986 (4) (SA) 530 (C); and Radebe v Minister of Law 
and order 1987 (1) SA 586 (W)). The line of interpretation in question was also in the same spirit as the 
principle that the courts were bound by legislative provisions and regulations which ousted the courts’ 
jurisdiction only if the non-justiciable act was done lawfully or intra vires, such as when the detention of 
suspects was undertaken lawfully in terms of legislation or the regulations (see Minister of Law and 
Order v Hurley 1986 (3) SA 568 (A); Radebe v Minister of Law and Order supra; and Dempsey v Minister 
of Law and Order supra. See also D Basson ‘Judicial activism in a state of emergency: An examination 
of recent decisions of the South African Courts’ (1987) 3 South African Journal on Human Rights 28 at 
29-31; and Mathews op cit (n369) 63-64).  
 
435 1985 (4) SA 709 (D). This case was upheld on appeal in Minister of Law and Order v Hurley supra 
(n434) 
 
436 Other security cases in which this line of interpretation was invoked include Katofa v Administrator-
General for South West Africa 1985 (4) SA 211 (SWA); Dempsey v Minister of Law and Order supra 
(n434); and Radebe v Minister of Law and Order supra (n434). For further commentary, see Boulle op 
cit (n433) 252-253.  
 
437 For an account of these cases, see N Haysom and C Plasket ‘The war against law: Judicial activism 
and the Appellate Division’ (1988) 4 South African Journal on Human Rights 303-333. 
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accept what the law was but also imagined what the law should be) gained momentum, 
and the courts started showing signs of slowly moving away from executive-
mindedness, though there is no consistency in this regard.438  
The last submission to make on executive-mindedness is that it (executive-
mindedness) can manifest in a number of ways, and these keep evolving.439 After all, 
even the criteria for executive-mindedness (i.e. the conscious or subconscious desire 
to reduce to a bare minimum the limits on government powers),440 is in and of itself 
flexible. The obvious form in which executive-mindedness can manifest is the courts’ 
resort to a strained interpretation of the law in favour of the Executive, as reflected in 
the cases cited above. Other forms could conceivably include judicial deference, 
judicial minimalism and a declaration of certain legal questions as non-justiciable 
political questions. 
South African security and emergency case law does not make explicit references to 
judicial minimalism, judicial deference and the political question doctrine. Although that 
is the case, it does not mean that traces or remnants of these cannot be located at all 
in South African jurisprudence. Take, for instance, the judgment in Trümpelmann v 
Minister of Justice.441 The point was made towards the end of the discussion in 4.3 
above that executive-mindedness in this case can be argued to have manifested in 
the form of judicial minimalism because, after the court had found that war was 
prevailing as it had been declared, it limited its interference to the minimum extent (i.e. 
it deprived itself of jurisdiction to assess to its satisfaction that martial law was 
objectively justified and also deprived itself of jurisdiction to test the legality of the 
actions of the military).  
                                                          
438 For a compilation and overview of judgments in which judicial activism or the gradual shift of the 
courts away from executive-minded behaviour can be observed, see Dugard op cit (n15) 344-360; 
Basson op cit (n434) 28-43; Haysom & Plasket op cit (n437) 303-333; Cassim op cit (n433) 200-223; 
W. Le R. De Vos ‘The role of the South African judiciary in crisis periods’ (1987) 1 Journal of South 
African Law 63-74; and L Baxter ‘A judicial declaration of martial law’ (1987) 3 South African Journal of 
Human Rights 317-322. 
 
439 For a new form of executive-mindedness taking shape in South Africa, see Lewis op cit (n349) 130. 
 
440 Lewis op cit (n349) 130.  
 
441 Supra (n327). 
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Furthermore, the courts’ adoption of a minimalist stance automatically means that the 
legal questions that the court was expected to resolve are effectively deferred to 
another branch, usually the Executive. By so deferring, these legal questions are 
indirectly rendered non-justiciable political questions which must be dealt with by the 
political branches of government. This concludes the discussion on the early 
development of South African security and emergency laws. The next chapter is 























THE DELINEATION OF SOUTH AFRICA’S POST-
APARTHEID EMERGENCY JURISPRUDENCE 
 
5.1 GENERAL 
Now that chapter 4 has visited the early development of security and emergency laws, 
chapter 5 is then concerned with delineating and providing a comprehensive 
breakdown of the prevailing emergency jurisprudence. The main purpose of the 
delineation is to set out the content of the post-apartheid emergency jurisprudence so 
that it can be studied and analysed in order to unearth the detail that contributes to the 
establishment of the envisaged interpretation regime. As to precisely what the 
delineation in this chapter contributes to the envisaged interpretation regime will 
become clear in chapter 7 below when the interpretation regime is officially 
established.  
 
5.2 DELINEATION OF THE EMERGENCY JURISPRUDENCE 
5.2.1 Background 
As can be imagined, the transition from apartheid to democracy came with significant 
changes to the legal system of South Africa. Chief amongst these was the abandoning 
of parliamentary supremacy in favour of constitutional supremacy. From the triumph 
of the doctrine of constitutional supremacy emerges South Africa’s sovereign 
Constitution, which has  a justiciable Bill of Rights and which is built on the foundation 
of the rule of law. Security and emergency laws must have ranked very high on the list 
of laws that required reform. This is made obvious by the fact that South Africa was 
transitioning from decades of draconian security and emergency laws which restricted 
the rule of law and human rights in the most extreme manner. The drafters of the 
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country’s post-apartheid Constitution therefore had to confront the question of how 
security and emergency laws were to be regulated in the new South Africa.442  
Guidance as to the regulation of emergencies was provided in advance notably by 
Ellman443 and Haysom.444 Ellman suggested that the drafters of the new Constitution 
had the option either to say nothing at all about emergencies in the Constitution (the 
‘textual silence’ approach),445 or have a provision explicitly dealing with emergencies 
(the ‘textual explicitness’ approach).446 Eventually, the drafters opted for the explicit 
regulation of emergencies in the Constitution.  
Having chosen to expressly regulate emergencies, the next question concerned the 
kinds of constitutional safeguards or standards that can be put in place in order to 
regulate derogations from human rights during an emergency. Once again, the 
eminent writers of the time advanced guidelines for the benefit of the drafters of the 
Constitution. Haysom 447 drew from the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  and 
put forth the following guiding principles:  
(a) ‘Derogations from political and civil rights must be concerned with maintaining the 
rights, freedoms, and institutions of a democratic society;  
                                                          
442 The developments in respect of security laws will be discussed in chapter 6 below. 
 
443  S Ellman ‘A constitution for all seasons: Providing against emergencies in a post-apartheid 
constitution’ (1989) 21 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 163-192. 
 
444 N Haysom ‘States of emergency in a post-apartheid South Africa (1989) 21 Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review 139-162.                
 
445  Ellman op cit (n443) 171-179. There are two potential consequences for remaining silent on 
emergencies. Firstly, having opted to remain silent would have meant that, faced with the ever-present 
possibility of an emergency, derogations from rights in times of emergency would occur outside the law 
and without legal regulation and/or formal proclamation (Haysom op cit (n444) 143). Another possibility, 
however, is that the textual silence approach would have operated in the same manner as it does in the 
United States where there is no explicit provision for martial law or a state of emergency, but there are 
a few provisions in the Constitution which indirectly allow the use of martial law or emergency powers. 
The US Constitution is silent on emergencies or martial law in the hope that this will predicate or restrain 
the use of emergency powers (Ellman op cit (n443) 172). As Ellman (ibid) asserts, ‘the meaning of the 
United States Constitution, after all, emerges only from its interpretation, and the silence of the text may 
have shaped that interpretation in ways that help engender a tradition of control of governmental 
authority’. For further justifications for why the textual silence methodology works, see Ellman op cit 
(n443) 174-179. 
 
446 Ellman op cit (n443) 179-182. 
 
447 Haysom op cit (n444) 151-159. 
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(b) Derogations from political and civil rights should take place only where there is an 
exceptional and imminent danger to the society, and the normal law of the land is 
inadequate for the purposes of dealing with the danger or securing the interest to 
be protected;  
(c) Any derogation measures must be strictly necessary, and the necessity for such 
measures must be assessed on an objective basis;  
(d) The derogations from civil and political rights should be constantly reviewed, 
especially by the legislature, in order to assess their continued necessity;  
(e) Derogations should be duly enacted in a form in which they can be understood by 
ordinary citizens;  
(f) A derogation from existing civil or political rights should not be capable of capricious 
application; nor shall it allow for discrimination solely on the grounds of race, colour, 
sex, language or social origins;  
(g) The powers exercised under the limitation provisions must be compatible with the 
objects of derogation and strictly necessary to achieve the derogation;  
(h) Derogation provisions should be strictly interpreted in favour of the rights upon 
which they seek to infringe;  
(i) Every derogation shall be subject to the possibility of a challenge to and a remedy 
against its abusive application or imposition;  
(j) Strict regulation of detention without trial;  
(k) Derogation provisions should not infringe on non-derogable rights such as the right 
to life and freedom from torture;  
(l) The parties relying on a state of emergency must take special precautions to 
ensure that neither official nor semi-official groups engage in a practice of arbitrary 
or extra-judicial killings or involuntary disappearances.  
(m) In addition to these guidelines, emphasis is on the importance of the properly 
functioning courts during the emergency’. 
Ellman’s suggested guidelines can be summarised under three headings: 
(a) Rules to be followed by the legislative and executive branches wielding 
emergency authority.448  
Under this heading, Ellman suggests:  
                                                          
448 Ellman op cit (n443) 182-184. 
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(i) ‘A sunset provision specifying that any existing proclamation of a state of 
emergency, and any existing legislation providing for emergency powers to 
abridge normal rights, lose all effect with the adoption of the new constitution; 
(ii) A prohibition on invasion of rights except pursuant to statutory authorization; 
(iii) A requirement that any declaration of a state of emergency lapse unless it is 
specifically approved by the legislature within a stated short period (such as 
fourteen days) after its proclamation. There can be a similar requirement for 
legislative approval of any emergency regulations adopted by the executive;  
(iv) A requirement that legislative approval of the use of emergency powers be by 
super-majority vote; 
(v) A requirement that any declaration of a state of emergency or emergency 
regulations lapse after a limited period of time (perhaps six months), subject 
to renewal by the executive and re-approval by the legislature; and 
(vi) A further sunset provision for new emergency legislation, such that this 
legislation would have to be reconsidered and re-enacted on a periodic basis’. 
 
(b) Substantive limits on the extent of the emergency powers available to the 
government.449  
What is suggested under this heading are safeguards: 
(i) ‘Permitting invasion of rights only in time of war or other public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation;  
(ii) Permitting invasion of rights only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies 
of the situation; and  
(iii) Forbidding derogation from certain rights’. 
 
(c) Provisions for judicial review to enforce some or all of the foregoing 
requirements.450 
  
The drafters of the South African Constitution embraced virtually all of Haysom and 
Ellman’s recommendations, and the end result was the enactment of section or clause 
37 of the Constitution, which is the country’s emergency regime. 
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5.2.2 The state of emergency section or clause 
As already indicated, South Africa has section or clause 37 in the Constitution for 
dealing with emergencies. Thus, the most drastic action in an emergency would be to 
invoke section 37 and declare a state of emergency. The less drastic response would 
be to simply rely on the state security apparatus of the country.  
A few deductions can be made from the existence of section or clause 37 of the 
Constitution. Firstly, it suggests that, at the inception of democracy (like in the pre-
apartheid or colonial era, as well as during the apartheid era), South Africa retained 
the Roman, Roman-Dutch and English law approach of having two sets of laws, one 
for the time of peace and the other for crisis situations.451 Secondly, because the 
emergency section or clause entrenches a new legal order applicable during an 
emergency, this can be seen as the continued relegation of the obscure notion of 
martial law to the common law, as was the case even under apartheid.452 Thirdly, the 
emergency section or clause also confirms South Africa’s continued rejection of the 
Business as Usual model in South African law, as was the case during the pre-
apartheid or colonial era, as well as during apartheid.453  
Furthermore, it appears from the reading of section 37 that South Africa’s prevailing 
emergency system, like that of apartheid (as indicated under heading 4.4. in chapter 
4 above), is modelled on the Roman dictator model,454 subject to some modifications 
which are identified below. The main characteristic of the Roman emergency system 
that is visible within South Africa’s current emergency system is the existence of ex 
ante requirements for the exercise of emergency power, though these requirements 
are no longer exactly identical to those ex ante requirements of Roman law.455 Thus, 
                                                          
451 For a discussion on the formation of South Africa’s colonial and apartheid security and emergency 
laws, refer to the discussion under headings 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 in chapter 4 above. The detail on the 
Roman, Roman-Dutch and English law security and emergency laws that came to influence the South 
African law is set out in chapter 3 under headings 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. 
 
452 See further discussion under heading 4.4 in chapter 4 above. 
 
453 Once again, see further the discussion under headings 4.2 and 4.4 in chapter 4 above. On the 
Business and Usual model, refer to the discussion under subheading 3.5.1.1 in chapter 3 above. 
 
454 The detail of the Roman emergency system is set in the discussion under heading 3.2 in chapter 3 
above.  
 
455  One notable difference which proves the point that the Roman and South African ex ante 
requirements are not identical  is that, in terms of the apartheid and current South African emergency 
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there are ex ante requirements pertaining to the circumstances under which an 
emergency may be declared,456 as well as the duration of an emergency.457   
The modifications to the Roman emergency system which are now incorporated into 
the South African emergency system are as follows. Firstly, the South African 
emergency system does not strictly adhere to the Roman emergency model, but also 
incorporates other models, such as the Legislative Accommodation model.458 This is 
clear from section 37(3)(c) of the Constitution which empowers the courts to decide 
on, inter alia, the validity of the emergency legislation enacted in consequence of a 
declaration of a state of emergency. Section 37(4) and (5) goes on further to regulate 
such emergency legislation.   
Secondly, that the South African emergency system also borrows from Bruce 
Ackerman’s escalating cascades of supermajorities model459 is clear from the reading 
of section 37(2)(b) of the Constitution, thus adding another modification to the Roman 
emergency model seen in South African law. Subsection 2(b) of section 37 permits 
the National Assembly (i.e. Parliament) to extend the declaration of a state of 
emergency beyond the mandated 21 days for no more than three months at a time. 
The first extension must be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of the 
                                                          
jurisprudence, the President recognises an emergency and also assumes the emergency powers. 
However, in Roman law, the Consuls recognised an emergency and the dictator exercised the 
emergency power. Thus, the body which recognised the emergency was separate from the body which 
exercised the emergency powers. Other ex ante requirements are still very much similar. 
 
456 According to s 37(1) of the Constitution, a state of emergency may be declared in terms of an Act of 
Parliament (presently the State of Emergency Act 64 of 1997), and only when: (a) the life of the nation 
is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public 
emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to restore peace and order.  
More ex ante requirements are provided in s 1(1) of the State of Emergency Act. One such ex ante 
requirement is that it is the President who may declare by proclamation in the Government Gazette a 
state of emergency in the Republic (of South Africa) or in any area within the Republic. The reasons for 
the declaration shall be stated briefly in the proclamation, and the President may at any time withdraw 
the proclamation by like proclamation in the Government Gazette. 
 
457 In terms of s 37(2)(a) & (b) of the Constitution, a declaration of a state of emergency and any 
legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of that declaration, may be effective only 
prospectively and for no more than 21 days from the date of the declaration, unless the National 
Assembly resolves to extend the declaration. 
 
458 For the content and other detail of the Legislative Accommodation model, refer to the discussion 
under subheading 3.5.1.2 in chapter 3 above. 
 
459 For the content and other detail of the escalating cascades of supermajorities model, refer to the 
discussion under subheading 3.5.1.5 in chapter 3 above. The supermajoritarian escalator is the only 
aspect of the escalating cascades of supermajorities model that is borrowed and incorporated into the 
South African emergency system. The rest of the features of this model are omitted. 
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majority of the members of the National Assembly. Any subsequent extension must 
be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least 60% of the members of 
the National Assembly. A resolution to extend the declaration may be adopted 
following a public debate in the National Assembly.  
Another notable modification to the Roman emergency system is that, unlike in the 
case of the Roman model where the dictator exercised unlimited emergency powers, 
the powers exercised by the South African President (the equivalent of the Roman 
dictator) in lieu of an emergency are circumscribed in both section 37 of the 
Constitution and in the State of emergency Act.460  Circumscribing the powers of the 
Executive in this fashion is a feature of the state of siege model, in terms of which the 
powers of the military were observed to have been determined in advance, and 
thereby circumscribed, by Parliament through legislation.461  
There is also a further deduction to be made from the existence of the emergency 
section or clause in the South African Constitution. That deduction is that the section 
or clause reflects the continued importance of legal interpretation, thus also proving  
correct the fundamental premise of this thesis as stated in the discussion under 
subheading 1.1.3 in chapter 1 above. The argument here is that the mere 
establishment of the emergency regime in section or clause 37 of the Constitution 
provides an interpretative framework against which emergency laws and powers are 
to be read and interpreted. This line of reasoning is enunciated in the words of 
Woolman462 to the effect that ‘[t]he language and structure of FC 37 must be read as 
a rejection of South Africa’s emergency past’.  
Indeed, it is possible for section 37 to be read in the sense envisaged by Woolman 
because, in its entirety, the regime is an embodiment of the legal principles, values, 
doctrines and dogmas held dearly by the society, and which should never be 
abandoned even in an emergency. Section or clause 37 is an expression of the South 
                                                          
460 Supra (n456).  
 
461 For the content and detail of the state of siege model, refer to the discussion under subheading 
3.5.1.3 in chapter 3 above. 
 
462 Woolman op cit (n66) 61-10 
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African society’s views, as informed by the past political and legal experiences, on 
how it (society) and future generations would like to be governed in an emergency.  
In the final analysis, a recognised emergency regime like section 37 becomes, in the 
emergency context, some sort of higher power or authority to which all emergency-
related laws, powers, systems and procedures appeal for legitimacy. The regime is 
also the standard or yardstick against which the constitutionality of emergency laws is 
judged or measured. It further shapes the interpretation and ultimately the 
jurisprudential direction the judiciary must take in respect of emergency laws. Given 
the foregoing, it stands to reason that section 37 does indeed provide an interpretative 
framework for emergency laws.  
 
5.2.3 The role of all the three arms of state 
Continuing with the delineation of South Africa’s post-apartheid emergency 
jurisprudence, it is noteworthy that South Africa’s emergency system envisages there 
being a role played by each of the three arms of state during an emergency. The role 
of each arm of state is ventilated below. 
 
5.2.3.1 The Executive 
The roles of the Executive during an emergency appear in various provisions within 
the State of Emergency Act.463 Section 1(1) of the Act vests in the President the power 
to declare, by proclamation in the Government Gazette, a state of emergency in the 
Republic or any area within the Republic. The declaration may also be withdrawn by 
the President by proclamation published in the Government Gazette.464 Furthermore, 
in terms of section 2(1)(a) of the Act, the President may make such regulations as are 
necessary or expedient to restore peace and order. Section 2(1)(b) further provides 
that, in addition to the publication of the regulations in the Gazette, the President must 
attend to making the contents of the regulations known to the public by appropriate 
means. 
                                                          
463 Supra (n456). 
 
464 Section 1(3) of the State of Emergency Act. 
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Without derogating from the generality of the power to make regulations, the 
regulations may make provision for: (a) the empowering of specified persons or bodies 
to make orders, rules and bylaws for any of the purposes for which the President is 
authorised to make regulations, and to prescribe penalties for any contravention of or 
failure to comply with the provisions of such orders, rules or bylaws; and (b) the 
imposition of such penalties for any contravention of or failure to comply with the 
provisions of the regulations, which penalties may include the confiscation of any 
goods, property or instruments by means of which or in connection with which the 
offence has been committed.465 
Furthermore, no provision of the regulations shall: (a) authorise the making of any 
regulations which are inconsistent with the State of Emergency Act or section 37 of 
the Constitution; (b) authorise the making of any regulations whereby: (i) provision is 
made for the imposition of imprisonment for a period exceeding three years, (ii) any 
duty to render military service other than that provided for in the Defence Act466 is 
imposed, and (iii) any law relating to the qualifications; nomination; election or tenure 
of office of members of Parliament or a Provincial Legislature; the sittings of 
Parliament or a Provincial Legislature; or the powers, privileges or immunities of 
Parliament or a Provincial Legislature or of the members or committees thereof; is 
amended or suspended.467 
To comment briefly, it transpires from the foregoing that gone are the days when the 
Executive used to enjoy unlimited emergency powers. Today, clear limits on 
emergency powers are set throughout section 37 of the Constitution and throughout 
the relevant sections of the State of Emergency Act. Also, the existence of the roles 
for each arm of state in an emergency contributes to dispensing with the subjective 
exercise of emergency powers468 by Executive officials, in favour of objectivity and 
oversight over the exercise of such powers. The requirement that various decisions 
be publicised by appropriate means, including publication in the Government Gazette, 
                                                          
465 Section 2(a) & (b) of the State of Emergency Act. 
 
466 44 of 1957, now Act 42 of 2002. 
 
467 Section 2(3)(a) and (b) of the State of Emergency Act. 
 
468 Placing the exercise of emergency power in the subjective discretion of certain officials was a 
common feature of the apartheid security and emergency apparatus, as indicated in the discussion 
under headings 4.4 and 4.5 in chapter 4 above. 
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certainly bodes well for objectivity and transparency in the exercise of emergency 
powers.  
 
5.2.3.2 The Legislature 
The roles of the Legislature can be observed from various provisions within section 37 
of the Constitution and the State of Emergency Act.469 To begin with, section 37(1)(a) 
of the Constitution requires that the declaration of a state of emergency be done in 
terms of an Act passed by Parliament470 in the event of the occurrence of certain 
specified conditions.471 The Legislature is also enjoined to ensure that, if the state of 
emergency needs to be sustained longer than the first 21 days from the date of the 
declaration of a state of emergency, an extension must be granted by Parliament for 
no more than three months at a time.472 The first extension beyond the stipulated 21 
days requires a simple majority vote in Parliament, while any subsequent extension 
requires a 60% majority. 473  Extensions must also follow a public debate in the 
Legislature.474  
Furthermore, section 3 of the State of Emergency Act provides for the supervision of 
the emergency regulations by Parliament. Section 3(1) of the Act requires that a copy 
of any proclamation declaring a state of emergency and of any regulation, order, rule 
or bylaw made in pursuance of any such declaration be laid upon the table in 
Parliament by the President as soon as possible after the publication thereof. The 
Legislature may disapprove or make any recommendation to the President in 
connection with any such proclamation, regulation, order, rule, bylaw or provision.475 
                                                          
469 Supra (n456). 
 
470 Presently the State of Emergency Act supra (n456). 
 
471 These conditions are set out in s 37(1) of the Constitution. In terms of this section, a state of 
emergency may be declared in terms of an Act of Parliament (presently the State of Emergency Act 
supra (n456)), and only when: (a) the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general 
insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary 
to restore peace and order. 
 








It goes without saying that the foregoing checks and balances the emergency powers 
exercised by the Executive, thereby upholding  objectivity, transparency and oversight 
over the exercise of emergency powers. 
 
5.2.3.3 The Judiciary   
The judiciary is also afforded specific roles and powers in an emergency. To begin 
with, the courts are empowered to test the validity of the declaration of a state of 
emergency,476 the extension thereof, as well as any legislation enacted or other action 
taken in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.477 Section 37(5)(a) of 
the Constitution further enhances the courts’ jurisdiction in emergency matters as it 
provides that no legislation is authorised to indemnify the state or any person in respect 
of any unlawful act committed during a state of emergency.478  
The role of the courts stated thus far, properly understood, render inappropriate and 
unconstitutional any practice, principle or doctrine which has the effect of hindering the 
courts from properly exercising jurisdiction in emergency matters. It therefore follows 
that, unlike during apartheid, the jurisdiction of the courts in respect of emergency 
matters may never be dispensed with or ousted through ouster clauses in emergency 
legislation or regulations. 479  Also, the legislative wording placing the exercise of 
emergency powers in the subjective discretion of particular designated officials can 
                                                          
475 Section 3(2)(a) and (b) of the State of Emergency Act. The powers of Parliament in connection with 
emergencies are also protected from interference, especially emanating from the regulations which the 
President is empowered to make in view of an emergency. Section 3(b)(iii) of the State of Emergency 
Act makes it clear that the regulations cannot amend or suspend any law relating to the sittings, powers, 
privileges or immunities of Parliament or a Provincial Legislature. The section also prohibits regulations 
from amending or suspending any law relating to the qualifications, nomination, election, or tenure of 
members of Parliament or a Provincial Legislature. 
 
476 To enhance this provision, s 1(2) of the State of Emergency Act supra (n456) requires that the 
reasons for the declaration of a state of emergency be briefly stated in the proclamation in which the 
President declares the state of emergency. These reasons must therefore be objective, and the courts 
are allowed to test their validity.  
 
477 Section 37(3)(a)-(c) of the Constitution. 
 
478 Contrast this legal position with the position regarding Acts of Indemnity during apartheid (which 
legal position is articulated in the discussion under headings 4.4 and 4.5 in chapter 4 above). 
 
479 Contrast the current legal position regarding court jurisdiction ouster clauses with the position on the 




never be countenanced in modern South African emergency jurisprudence. Executive-
mindedness in whatever form or shape (i.e. whether in the form of judicial minimalism, 
judicial deference and/or the political question doctrine) is also frowned upon.  
The courts are also anticipated to play a prominent role in the interpretation480 and 
ultimate enforcement of the provisions in section 37 of the Constitution and in the State 
of Emergency Act. One obvious constitutional provision that would require 
interpretation and enforcement by the courts is section 37(5)(b). This section provides 
that any legislation enacted in consequence of an emergency may not permit or 
authorise any derogation from the whole of section 37, as well from the non-derogable 
rights mentioned in the Table in section 37(5)(c). Whether or not legislation derogates 
as envisaged in section 37(5)(b) will undoubtedly be interpreted and determined by 
the courts.  
Another provision that would require interpretation by the courts is that which reads 
‘any legislation enacted in consequence of the emergency may derogate from the Bill 
of Rights to the extent that the derogation is strictly required by the emergency’.481 
The same applies to the provision that the legislation envisaged in the preceding 
sentence must be ‘consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international 
law’.482  
                                                          
480 The anticipation that the courts will have to interpret and enforce the emergency provisions further 
confirms that legal interpretation is still recognised as the preferred method of resolving conflicts in the 
law, of clearing ambiguities, of developing the law and of striking a balance between competing 
interests. This is a fundamental premise of this thesis as stated under subheading 1.1.3 in chapter 1 
above.  
The instances where interpretation is anticipated to play a significant role can be seen to be embracing 
one of the models of accommodation, i.e. the Interpretative Accommodation model (for the detail on the 
models of accommodation, refer to the discussion under subheading 3.5.1.2 in chapter 3 above). 
Indeed, the embrace of the interpretative accommodation model is visible from the provisions of s 37 
of the Constitution that would undoubtedly require an emergency-sensitive interpretation by the courts. 
One should hasten to point out that, strictly speaking, the scope of the Interpretative Accommodation 
model is much greater than that which is probably envisaged by its founder, Oren Gross. Gross submits 
that the interpretative accommodation model operates by giving the ‘ordinary law’ an ‘emergency-
sensitive’ interpretation for such law to be used effectively during an emergency. This description  does 
not reflect that the functionality of virtually all the models of emergency systems and all the laws 
applicable in an emergency (not just the ordinary law) is dependent upon an emergency-sensitive 
interpretation by the courts. Therefore, the Interpretative Accommodation model underpins all the laws 
and models applicable during an emergency. As a result, it should be afforded such recognition or 
status. 
 
481 Section 37(4)(a) of the Constitution. 
 
482 Section 37(4)(b)(i) of the Constitution. 
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The courts’ interpretative prowess will also be required in interpreting and enforcing 
the provisions applicable to those detained without trial. This is clear from the provision 
that a court must review the detention as soon as reasonably possible, but no later 
than 10 days after the date on which the person was detained,483 and that the court 
must release the detainee unless it is necessary to continue the detention to restore 
peace and order.484 Once again, it goes without saying that subjecting the exercise of 
emergency power to interpretation and scrutiny by the courts bodes well for upholding 
objectivity, transparency and oversight over the exercise of emergency powers.  
 
5.2.4 Regulation of derogations from the Bill of Rights 
While derogation from human rights is permitted during an emergency, there are, 
however, certain limitations. 485  For instance, in terms of section 37(4)(a) of the 
Constitution, legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of 
emergency may derogate from the Bill of Rights only to the extent that the derogation 
is strictly required by the emergency.486 Section 37(5)(c) of the Constitution is more 
explicit about which rights are non-derogable and the extent to which these rights are 
protected. The provisions of this section can be summarised as follows:  
 
5.2.4.1 The right to life; dignity; equality; slavery, servitude and forced labour; 
and freedom and security of the person 
                                                          
483 Section 37(6)(e) of the Constitution. 
 
484 Ibid. Section 37(6)(f) of the Constitution goes on further to provide that a detainee who is not released 
in terms of section 37(6)(e) and (f) may apply to a court for a further review of the detention at any time 
after 10 days have passed since the previous review, and the court must release the detainee unless it 
is still necessary to continue the detention to restore peace and order. Section 37(6)(g) enjoins the state 
to present written reasons to the court to justify the continued detention of a detainee, and must give a 
copy of those reasons to the detainee at least two days before the court reviews his/her detention. 
 
485 Contrast this to the apartheid legislation which gave the authorities unlimited security and emergency 
powers, which could be exercised without regard for human rights and freedoms (refer to the discussion 
under headings 4.4 in chapter 4 above. 
 
486 Other requirements with which the legislation must comply appear under s37(4)(b)(i)-(iii) of the 
Constitution. These include that the legislation must be consistent with South Africa’s obligations under 
international law applicable to states of emergency; that it conforms with the further conditions in s 37(5) 
of the Constitution; and that the legislation is published in the national Government Gazette as soon as 
reasonably possible after being enacted.  
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The rights to life 487  and  dignity 488  are notably non-derogable in their entirety. 
However, the right to equality489 is non-derogable insofar as it prohibits, even during 
an emergency, any unfair discrimination based on the ground of race, colour, ethnic 
or social origin, sex, religion or language. Insofar as the prohibition against slavery, 
servitude and forced labour490 is concerned, only slavery and torture is non-derogable 
in its entirety, and not forced labour. The right to freedom and security of the person491 
is non-derogable insofar as it prohibits torture; treatment or punishment that is cruel, 
inhuman and degrading; and/or being subjected to medical or scientific experiments 
without informed consent.  
 
5.2.4.2 Children 
Regarding the rights of children,492 the non-derogable aspects include every child’s 
right: (i) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation;493 (ii) to be 
protected from exploitative labour practices;494 (iii) not to be detained except as a 
measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period (in which case the child 
has the additional rights to be kept separately from detained persons over the age or 
18, and  to be treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take into account the 
child’s age);495 and (iv) not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in 
times of armed conflict496 (this provision is made applicable only in the case of children 
of 15 years and younger).   
                                                          
487 Provided for in s 11 of the Constitution. 
 
488 Provided for in s 10 of the Constitution. 
 
489 Provided for in s 9 of the Constitution. 
 
490 Provided for in s 13 of the Constitution. 
 
491 Provided for in s 12 of the Constitution. 
 
492 Section 28 of the Constitution. 
 
493 Section 28(1)(d) of the Constitution. 
 
494 Section 28(1)(e) of the Constitution. 
 
495 Section 28(1)(g)(i)-(ii) of the Constitution. 
 
496 Section 28(1)(i) of the Constitution. 
123 
 
5.2.4.3 Arrested, detained and accused persons 
There are also some non-derogable aspects of the rights of arrested, detained and 
accused persons. 497  These include the right of every arrested person to remain 
silent;498 to be informed promptly of this right and the consequences thereof;499 and 
not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in 
evidence against that person.500 Regarding the rights of detained persons (including 
sentenced prisoners), the right to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person 
before a court and, if the detention is unlawful, to be released, remains non-
derogable.501  
The non-derogable aspects of the rights of accused persons include the right to a fair 
trial, which includes the right: to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to 
answer it; to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence; to a public trial 
before an ordinary court; to be present when being tried; to choose, and be 
represented by, a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right promptly; to have 
a legal practitioner assigned by the state and at state expense, if substantial injustice 
would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly; to be presumed 
innocent; to remain silent, and not to testify during proceedings; to adduce and 
challenge evidence; not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence; to be tried 
in a language that the accused person understands, or if that is not practicable, to 
have the proceedings interpreted in that language; not to be convicted for an act or 
omission that was not an offence under either national or international law at the time 
it was committed or omitted; not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or 
omission for which that accused person has previously been either acquitted or 
convicted; to the benefit of the least severe of the prescribed punishments if the 
prescribed punishment for the offence has been changed between the time that the 
                                                          
497 Provided for in s 35 of the Constitution. 
 
498 Section 35(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
 
499 Section 35(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
 
500 Section 35(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
 
501 Section 35(2(d) of the Constitution. 
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offence was committed and the time of sentencing, and of appeal to, or review by, a 
higher court.502 
A further non-derogable aspect is section 35(4) of the Constitution, which requires that 
whenever section 35 of the Constitution (this being the section in the Constitution that 
provides for the rights of arrested, detained and accused persons) calls for information 
to be given to a person, that information must be given in a language that the person 
understands. Furthermore, the last non-derogable aspect is section 35(5) of the 
Constitution, which provides that the evidence obtained in a manner that violates any 
right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would 
render the trial unfair. 
 
5.2.5 Regulation of detention without trial 
It is evident from the preceding section that the non-derogable nature of the right to 
freedom and security of the person does not extend to prohibiting detention without 
trial. Section 37(6) of the Constitution then deals comprehensively with detention 
without trial. The section puts forth the following as conditions for such detention. One, 
an adult family member or friend of the detainee must be contacted as soon as 
reasonably possible, and informed that the person has been detained. Two, a notice 
must be published in the national government gazette within five days of the person 
being detained, stating the detainee’s name and place of detention and referring to 
the emergency measure in terms of which that person has been detained. Three, the 
detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time by, a 
medical practitioner.  
Four, the detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time 
by, a legal representative. Five, a court must review the detention as soon as 
reasonably possible, but not later than 10 days after the date the person was detained, 
and the court must release the detainee unless it is necessary to continue the 
detention to restore peace and order. Six, a detainee who is not released in terms of 
a review under the previous point, or who is not released in terms of the present 
review, may apply to a court for a further review of the detention at any time after 10 
                                                          
502 Section 35(3)(a)-(o) of the Constitution, excluding (d). 
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days have passed since the previous review, and the court must release the detainee 
unless it is necessary to continue the detention to restore peace and order. Seven, 
the detainee must be allowed to appear in person before any court considering the 
detention, to be represented by a legal practitioner at those hearings, and to make 
representations against continued detention. The eighth and last condition is that the 
state must present written reasons to the court to justify the continued detention of 
the detainee, and must give a copy of those reasons to the detainee at least two days 
before the court reviews the detention. 
Section 37(7) of the Constitution goes on further to provide that if a court releases a 
detainee, that person may not be detained again on the same grounds unless the state 
first shows a court good cause for re-detaining that person. 503  That the above 
regulatory provisions in respect of detention without trial endorse the ethos of 
transparency cannot be disputed. These provisions dispense with the exercise of 
emergency powers in secret, and without oversight or supervision.  Section 2(4) of the 
State of Emergency Act504 further embraces transparency by making provision for 
international humanitarian organisations recognised in the country to visit detainees 
held without trial. These organisations can also monitor the conditions under which 
such detainees are detained. Furthermore, section 2(5) of the State of Emergency Act 
requires the detainee to be held in the same area in respect of which an emergency 
is declared, unless no suitable place is available within that area or the detention 
outside that area is reasonably necessary to restore peace and order. 
 
5.2.6 Commitment to uphold and protect the rule of law and human rights 
The study of the emergency jurisprudence also reveals certain indications of the 
commitment to uphold and protect the rule of law and human rights. To begin with, the 
mere fact that the entire section 37 is made up of procedural and substantive 
requirements which must be observed during an emergency translates into the 
                                                          
503 Compare these new provisions dealing with detention without trial against the detention without trial 
provisions in the draconian apartheid security and emergency laws, as well as against the interpretation 
of those draconian provisions in the case law in point (refer to the discussion under headings 4.4 and 
4.5 in chapter 4 above). 
 
504 Supra (n456). 
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recognition of the formal/procedural and substantive conception of the rule of law 
respectively.505 Section 37(5)(b) of the Constitution then cements the recognition of 
the rule of law by prohibiting any derogation from section 37, which can be seen as 
the prohibition against the derogation from the rule of law itself. 
An indication of the commitment to uphold and protect human rights can be observed 
from various provisions in section 37 of the Constitution. The first provision is section 
37(4)(a) of the Constitution, which allows the emergency legislation to derogate from 
the Bill of Rights only to the extent that the derogation is strictly required by the 
emergency, among other things.506 Another provision which highlights the protection 
of human rights is section 37(5)(c) of the Constitution which provides that rights such 
as the right to human dignity and life, among others, are completely non-derogable, 
whereas other rights, such as the right to equality and the rights of arrested, detained 
and arrested persons, are protected to varying degrees.507 The provisions in section 
37(6) of the Constitution relating to persons detained without trial provide further 
protection for the rights of those held in detention.508 This concludes the discussion on 
the delineation of South Africa’s post-apartheid emergency jurisprudence. The 
next chapter delineates South Africa’s post-apartheid state security jurisprudence. 
505 On the formal/procedural and substantive conception of the rule of law, refer to the discussion under 
heading 2.2. in chapter 2 above. 
506 Other conditions for the emergency legislation to derogate from the Bill of Rights are set out in 
s37(4)(b)(i)-(iii) of the Constitution. 
507 For a detailed discussion on the extent of the derogations from human rights, refer to the discussion 
under 5.2.4 above. 





THE DELINEATION OF SOUTH AFRICA’S POST-
APARTHEID STATE SECURITY JURISPRUDENCE 
 
6.1 GENERAL 
Continuing with the delineation of South Africa’s post-apartheid jurisprudence which 
started in chapter 5, this chapter delineates the post-apartheid state security 
jurisprudence. The main purpose of the delineation is to set out the content of the post-
apartheid security jurisprudence so that it can be studied and analysed and eventually 
contribute to the establishment of the envisaged interpretation regime. As to precisely 
what the delineation in this chapter contributes to the envisaged interpretation regime 
will become clear in chapter 7 below when the interpretation regime is officially 
established. 
 
6.2 DELINEATION OF THE STATE SECURITY JURISPRUDENCE 
6.2.1  Background 
The manner in which the apartheid government abused both security and emergency 
laws created an expectation that both would receive attention in the build-up towards 
the new Constitution. To the surprise of many, emergency laws received significant 
attention509 in comparison to the security laws.510 One development in respect of 
security laws that took place during the transitional period from apartheid to democracy 
                                                          
509 For an account of the development of the post-apartheid emergency jurisprudence, refer to the 
discussion under subheading 5.2.1 in chapter 5 above. 
 
510 On a deeper analysis, the explanation for the apparent neglect of security laws could be that it was 
probably convenient to not delve into the security space as this was a very sensitive area of the law at 
the time. Thus, the discourse on security laws was being postponed to another time, while all the energy  
was perhaps being channelled towards the development of the emergency jurisprudence. Another 
explanation could be that the development of the then existing state security laws was simply left in the 
hands of the courts, without any intervention from political branches. 
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is the publication of an article by Labuschagne calling for the abolition of the crime of 
treason.511 In the early days of democracy, the Justice Laws Rationalisation Act512 
was passed, and it had the effect of either extending, amending or repealing the then 
remaining apartheid security legislation. One previously draconian piece of security 
legislation the operation of which continued in post-apartheid South Africa was section 
54(1) and (3) of the Internal Security Act,513 which created the offences of terrorism 
and sabotage. The Internal Security Act was finally repealed in its entirety by the new 
holistic security legislation, the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against 
Terrorist and Related Activities Act.514  
Another noteworthy development in respect of security laws is that the period 1994 to 
1998 was characterised by a series of bombing incidents,515 and there also emerged 
organised terrorist groups such as PAGAD and the Boeremag. 516  Given these 
occurrences, it came as no surprise that shortly thereafter the South African Law 
Commission, as it was then known, was tasked with exploring the possibility of 
establishing one holistic piece of legislation which would be the country’s security 
legislation.517 The process culminating in the passing of this legislation was very 
turbulent. It was heavily opposed by many on the ground that there were sufficient 
security laws already in force.518 The proponents of the legislation argued that it was 
necessary because the security laws of that time were not sufficient to proscribe all 
forms of terrorism.519  
The passing of the comprehensive security legislation was finally enhanced by 
Resolution 1373 of the United Nations Security Council, which compelled member 
                                                          
511 Refer to note 297 above. 
 
512 18 of 1996.  
 
513 Supra (n397). 
 
514 Supra (n22). 
 
515 Refer to the South African Law Commission Discussion Paper op cit (n24) para 1.5.  
 
516 For a description of PAGAD and Boeremag, refer to note 25 and 26 respectively. 
 
517 Refer South African Law Commission Discussion Paper in note 24 above, as well as the South 
African Law Commission Final Report in note 72 above. 
 
518 South African Law Commission Report op cit (n72) 524-583. 
 
519 Ibid at 75. 
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states to put in place anti-terrorism laws following the 9/11 bombings in the United 
States. Eventually, South Africa’s first post-apartheid security legislation, the 
Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act520 
(hereinafter referred to as the POCDATARA), was passed.  
The POCDATARA was therefore added to the country’s mix of ordinary security laws 
alongside the common-law crimes of treason and sedition.521 Similar to these two 
crimes, the offence of terrorism created in the POCDATARA is also fraught with 
constitutionally suspect provisions which arguably violate the rule of law and some 
fundamental rights. It is at this point that it becomes prudent for the delineation in this 
chapter to consider the position regarding the courts’ power of interpretation in post-
apartheid security jurisprudence. Bear in mind that legal interpretation by the courts, 
supported by scholarly writings, has historically been regarded as the best measure 
for resolving conflicts in the law, for clearing ambiguities, for developing the law and 
for striking a balance between competing interests. This has also been the recurring 
theme from the discussion in 1.1.3 above and throughout this thesis.  
 
6.2.2 The position regarding the courts’ power of interpretation 
In the context of state security laws, the courts’ power of interpretation remains the 
ideal method for harmonising the relationship between security laws, on the one hand, 
and the rule of law as well as human rights, on the other. Even the significant 
improvements required to render the security laws compliant with the Constitution are 
ideally effected through legal interpretation and development by the courts.522  
                                                          
520 Supra (n22). 
 
521 For the detail on these crimes, refer to the discussion under subheadings 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 respectively 
in chapter 4 above. 
 
522  This is evident from the discussion under heading 6.2.3 below whereby the approaches to 
interpreting and developing the common-law and statutory security laws are considered. 
Note that the use of the terms ‘interpreting’ and ‘developing’ in the present chapter is informed by s 
39(2) of the Constitution, which reads: ‘[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights’. Therefore, it is clear that s 39(2) is directing that the term interpretation be 
used with reference to legislation only, and that when it comes to the common law, the appropriate 
terminology is to say that it is being developed. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is arguable that, upon 
careful scrutiny, developing the law inevitably involves interpreting the law and vice versa. To enhance 
the point, in so interpreting and developing the law, the courts are bound by the same constitutional 
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Therefore, the centrality of legal interpretation, which is an incident of the operation of 
the separation of powers doctrine and has been observed in South African 
jurisprudence throughout the colonial and apartheid era, remains intact even today.  
Notwithstanding the centrality of legal interpretation, there are shortcomings on the 
part of the courts in using the power of legal interpretation. These are however 
explored in 6.2.4 below. The discussion that follows next builds on the centrality of 
legal interpretation as a tool for bringing about harmony between security laws and the 
rule of law as well as human rights. 
 
6.2.3 Approaches to interpreting and developing the security laws 
 
6.2.3.1 Approaching the interpretation and development of the crime of treason 
Towards the end of the discussion under subheading 4.2.2 in chapter 4 above, it was 
indicated that there have since arisen certain constitutionality concerns which threaten 
the very existence of the crime of treason. In short, these entail that the crime of 
treason is intractably vague so as to violate the rule of law or the principle of legality, 
and that the crime is anachronistic and inappropriate for a modern popular democracy 
as it is based on the notion of allegiance, a concept that is outdated and no longer 
consistent with the modern understanding of the relationship between the state and 
the citizen.523  
For the above reasons, Labuschagne524 submits that the crime of treason must be 
abolished. However, while the other writers concur with Labuschagne on the fact that 
the crime of treason is vague, they do not hold the view that the crime must be 
abolished altogether. Instead, they consider other possible methods of developing the 
                                                          
requirements. For instance, in interpreting and developing the law, the courts must observe the 
requirement in s 39(2) of the Constitution, which section is to the effect that the interpretation and/or 
development of the law must render the law consistent with the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of 
Rights. The courts must also be wary of the limits imposed by the principle of legality, most importantly 
that they (the courts) must not effectively make new law, as that is the role reserved exclusively for the 
Legislature. Therefore, to say legislation is being interpreted or the common law is being developed, is 
a mere difference of terminology, but actually means the same thing. We shall also see below that the 
techniques for interpreting legislation and for effecting the development of the common law actually 
overlap. 
 
523 Refer to note 297 above. 
 
524 Labuschagne op cit (n297). 
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crime in line with the Constitution. For instance, Snyman525 agrees with the view that 
certain aspects of the crime of treason are vague, but still maintains that this does not 
mean that the crime no longer has a right of existence. He then suggests a certain 
change to the definition of the crime of treason.526  
Currently, the definition of high treason as advanced by Snyman527 is that: ‘[a] person 
commits high treason if, owing allegiance to the Republic of South Africa, she 
unlawfully engages in conduct within or outside the Republic, with the intention of (a) 
overthrowing the government of the Republic; (b) coercing the government by violence 
into any action or inaction; (c) violating, threatening or endangering the existence, 
independence or security of the Republic; or (d) changing the constitutional structure 
of the Republic’. Snyman then suggests that factor (c) in the definition be qualified by 
adding a proviso to the effect that violating, threatening or endangering the existence, 
independence or security of the Republic is treasonable only if ‘…the conduct is of 
such a nature that there is a real possibility that it will seriously violate, threaten or 
endanger the existence, independence or security of the Republic’.528  
Burchell529 also joins the debate and suggests that another approach to developing 
the crime of treason could be to establish a post-medieval form of the crime of treason 
that distinguishes between internal and external treason. Internal treason would 
encompass conduct that is equally punishable as sedition or public violence (and is 
perhaps better regarded as such in a democratic state in which the rights to freedom 
of expression and assembly envisage there being opposition to the government and 
the staging of protests to advance grievances or to advocate for change and 
reform).530 External treason would arise in the event that the country is in a state of 
                                                          
525 Snyman op cit (n129) 307. 
 
526 Ibid.  
 
527 Ibid at 299. 
 
528 Ibid at 308. 
 
529 Burchell op cit (n132) 840-841. 
 
530 Ibid at 841. 
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war or is invaded by alien forces and the perpetrator betrays his/her country to its 
enemies.531  
It is submitted that developing the crime of treason in the manner proposed by Snyman 
and Burchell is analogous to invoking three techniques that are widely used in 
statutory interpretation. Therefore, since the suggested developmental approaches 
actually limit the wide scope of the crime of treason, it can be argued that  this is 
analogous to invoking the technique of restrictive interpretation.532 Furthermore, since 
the suggested developmental approaches also prevent the crime of treason from 
being declared unconstitutional (by enabling the interpretation of otherwise 
unconstitutional aspects of the crime in a manner that is consistent with the 
Constitution), the suggested developmental approaches are analogous to invoking the 
technique of reading-down. 533 Lastly, since the suggested developmental approaches 
entail adding words or conditions which, as part of remedying potential 
                                                          
531 Ibid. 
 
532 Restrictive interpretation has its origins in the case of Venter v R 1907 TS 910 (see G Devenish 
‘Restrictive interpretation’ (1992) 17 Journal for Juridical Science / Tydskrif vir Regswetenskap 1 at 12-
13). It is often applied in view of the maxim cum lex plus scripcit, minus voluit, which means, ‘when the 
law enacted more but intended less’ (Devenish op cit 11) or when ‘the words of a particular provision 
embrace more than its purpose’ (C Botha Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students 5 ed 
(2016) 167).  
A further consideration which justifies the invocation of restrictive interpretation is the principle from the 
much-celebrated judgment of Innes CJ in Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugerdorp Municipal Council  1920 
AD 530 at 552, to the effect that: ‘[i]t is a wholesome rule of our law which requires a strict construction 
to be placed on statutory provisions which interfere with elementary rights…’. The meritorious judgment 
of Friedman J in S v Ramgobin 1985 (4) SA 130 (N) provides an excellent example of the application 
of the principle in the Dadoo case. In this case, Friedman J effectively found that, despite the 
unequivocal intention of the Legislature in incorporating the no-bail clause into the Internal Security Act 
(supra (n397)), the clause ought to have been interpreted restrictively because it interfered significantly 
with elementary rights.  
There are various ways of effecting restrictive interpretation. The main way is through invoking maxims 
such as  iusdem generis and cessante legis, cessat ipsa lex (on these maxims and how they operate 
see Devenish op cit 2). However, restrictive interpretation is not limited to these maxims as ‘[a]ny 
interpretation which restricts the broader ordinary meaning of the text in light of the purpose of the 
legislation is, by definition, restrictive interpretation’ (A Singh The impact of the Constitution on 
transforming the process of statutory interpretation in South Africa (Unpublished PhD thesis, University 
of KwaZulu-Natal, 2014) 170). 
 
533  Reading-down is applicable in statutory interpretation, and it essentially entails interpreting an 
otherwise unconstitutional statutory provision in a manner that conforms with the Constitution (P De 
Vos, W Freedman, D Brand, C Gevers, K Govender, P Lenaghan, D Mailula, N Ntlama, S Sibanda, and 
L Stone South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 395). An important principle to be observed 
is that reading-down is limited to what the applicable text of the enactment is reasonably capable of 
meaning (Moyo v Minister of Police 2020 (1) SACR 373 (CC) at para 56). Furthermore, strictly speaking, 
unlike the techniques of reading-in and that of severance (which both constitute remedies after the 
courts have declared a statutory provision unconstitutional), reading-down is not a remedy but is rather 
a mandatory rule of interpretation which altogether prevents the potential unconstitutionality of a 
statutory provision (Singh op cit (n532) 81-82).  
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unconstitutionality, alter the existing treason principles, this can be seen as effectively 
invoking the technique of reading-in.534 
 
6.2.3.2 Approaching the interpretation and development of the crime of sedition 
One aspect of the crime of sedition that is constitutionally suspect is the principle that 
sedition can be committed by means of violent and non-violent conduct of a group of 
people, which is accompanied by the intention to defy or subvert the authority of the 
government. 535  This principle is potentially unconstitutional because the 
criminalisation of non-violent gatherings might infringe the right to freedom of 
expression and the right to gather and protest.536  
Milton’s suggested solution is to develop the crime of sedition by effectively 
interpreting non-violent gatherings as not constituting sedition.537 This would mean 
that only the use of violence or the intention to use violence qualifies the gathering as 
seditious, whereas the absence of violence would mean that the gathering is not 
seditious.538 Such a stance would also be consistent with the position in Roman law, 
which entailed that sedition is committed by the assembly of a mob that creates tumult 
and/or violence.539  
                                                          
534 Reading-in entails the insertion of words that alter the meaning of an impugned statutory provision, 
thus subsequently rendering the impugned provision consistent with the Constitution (Botha op cit 
(n532) 197. See also Currie & de Waal op cit (n66) 187). Put differently, reading-in is used where a 
legislative provision is unconstitutional because some words and phrases are omitted or if the words so 
inserted serve the purpose of narrowing the reach of a particular provision (De Vos et al op cit (n533) 
398-399).  It is therefore noteworthy that, as a general rule, reading-in is only effected after an impugned 
provision is found to be constitutionally invalid (see Moyo v Minister of Police supra (n533) at para 56. 
See also De Vos op cit (n533) 395). After all, reading-in is a remedy applicable in constitutional litigation 
after a legislative provision has been found to be unconstitutional (Currie & de Waal op cit (n66) 187-
189).  
 












Milton’s developmental suggestion in respect of the crime of sedition is another 
example of the use of restrictive interpretation,540 as this suggestion limits the wide 
scope of the crime of sedition. The same suggestion can also be seen as being 
tantamount to the technique of reading-down, 541 more so as the suggested manner 
of development actually amounts to interpreting an otherwise unconstitutional aspect 
of the crime in a manner that conforms with the Constitution. 
 
6.2.3.3 Approaching the interpretation of the offence of terrorism 
(a) A lenient or rigid interpretation 
The interpretation of the offence of terrorism in the POCDATARA542 can conceivably 
be approached by the courts either with a lenient or rigid attitude, depending on 
whether or not what is proscribed is a scourge in society. Such an approach is adopted 
from the practice in the area of organised crime. What creates a relationship between 
organised crime and terrorism, such that the practices in the context of organised 
crime may be extended into the anti-terrorism space, is the fact that, in addition to 
Resolution 1373 (2001) of the United Nations Security Council instructing all member 
states to put in place anti-terrorism measures, it also recognised a connection between 
international terrorism and transnational organised crime, and so organised crime had 
to be criminalised alongside terrorism.543  
South Africa’s legislation against organised crime (the Prevention of Organised Crime 
Act544 (POCA)), like South Africa’s anti-terrorism legislation (the POCDATARA),545 
faces various constitutional challenges the resolution of which can be through 
interpretation by the courts. For instance, the POCA is notorious for creating offences 
                                                          
540 For a description of restrictive interpretation, refer to note 532 above. 
 
541 For what reading-down entails, refer to note 533 above. 
 
542 Supra (n22). 
 
543 Powell op cit (n23) 105. 
 
544 121 of 1998. 
 




which only require negligence instead of intention, thus reducing the fault standard.546 
Despite the low fault requirement, the offences in the POCA carry severe penalties.547 
The elevation of negligence to being the sufficient form of fault yet the penalty being 
so severe gives rise to the argument that the offences in the POCA violate the right 
not be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause.548 Another argument is 
that the offences in the POCA comprise definitions that are so wide in scope that they 
are unconstitutional.549 Another constitutionally suspect feature of the POCA is the 
provision for the forfeiture of assets connected to crime,550 which is argued to infringe 
the right to silence in section 35(1) of the Constitution, the presumption of innocence 
in section 35(3)(h), the right not to be deprived of one’s property in section 25, the right 
to privacy in section 14, and the right to dignity in section 10.551 
In those cases where the courts have, directly and indirectly, dealt with the 
constitutional challenges to the provisions of the POCA, they have notably approached 
the interpretation of the impugned provisions with a lenient or sympathetic attitude.552 
So doing is justified by the courts on the basis of the important reasons for the Act’s 
limitation of rights.553 One reason as to why POCA is accepted as justifiably limiting 
                                                          




548 Ibid at 108. The reasons for this argument will be explored in full when dealing with the low fault 
requirement in the context of the offence of terrorism under subheading (b) below. 
 
549 Powell op cit (n23) 107-108. 
 
550 Ibid at 108. 
 
551 Ibid at 110. 
 
552 Ibid at 111. See also C Oxtoby & CH Powell ‘Terrorism and governance in South Africa and Eastern 
Africa’ in VV Ramraj, M Hor, K Roach & G Williams Global Anti-terrorism Law and Policy 2 ed (2012) 
578-579. 
 
553 The point is articulated clearly in CH Powell ‘Anti-terrorism measures in Africa, the Middle East and 
Argentina’ in VV Ramraj, M Hor and K Roach(eds) Global Anti-terrorism Law and Policy 1 ed (2005) 
568-569. Further elaboration on the point can be found in Powell op cit (n23) 111-112, and in Oxtoby & 
Powell op cit (n552) 578-580. The cases in which the lenient or sympathetic interpretation can be 
observed include, in chronological order, Director of Public Prosecutions, Cape of Good Hope v 
Bathgate 2000 (2) SA 560 (C); National Director of Public Prosecutions  v Phillips 2002 (4) SA 260 (W); 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Rebuzzi 2002 (1) SACR 128 (SCA); National Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Mohamed 2003 (2) SACR 258 (T); Prophet v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions 2007 (6) SA 169 (CC); Mohunram v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (4) SA 
222 (CC); S v Shaik 2008 (5) SA 354 (CC).  
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constitutional rights is, as pointed out by Powell,554 that organised crime is a particular 
scourge especially in South Africa and internationally.555  
When it comes to the POCDATARA, it is difficult to say with certainty whether or not 
the interpretation of the impugned provisions will be approached leniently or rigidly.556 
Accepting that the criteria for a lenient or sympathetic interpretation is whether or not 
what is proscribed is a prevailing problem locally and internationally, it is submitted 
that it might well be that, since terrorism is, as recognised in the preamble to the 
POCDATARA, currently an international problem requiring international cooperation, 
the courts will most likely approach the interpretation of security laws dealing with 
terrorism sympathetically. After all, terrorism is a scourge from which no country is 
immune. 
Whether or not a lenient or rigid interpretation is justified is, however, not final and 
definitive, for the courts still have to interpret the impugned provisions. The attitude of 
the courts towards the Act is but one of the factors playing a role in the process of 
reading and interpreting the security provisions in the POCDATARA. I now turn to 
explore the suggested approaches to interpreting the impugned aspects of the offence 
of terrorism in the POCDATARA. 
 
(b)  Interpreting the offence of terrorism 
A leading point of attack on the constitutional validity of the offence of terrorism in the 
POCDATARA is that it is characterised by a sweepingly broad and vague definition, 
compounded by the reduced fault standard. To illustrate, section 2 of the 
POCDATARA creates the offence of terrorism. It provides that ‘any person who 
                                                          
554 Powell op cit (n553) 569. Powell’s view is also supported by the various statistics pertaining to 
organised crime (see Powell op cit (n23) 106), as well as various case law. For instance, in National 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Mahomed 2002 (4) SA 483 (CC), Ackerman J remarked that ‘the rapid 
growth of organized crime, money laundering, criminal gang activities and racketeering has become a 
serious international problem and security threat, from which South Africa has not been immune’. In 
Mohunram v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (4) SA 222 (CC) at para 118, the court 
described as ‘worthy and noble’ the objective of curbing serious crime served by the civil forfeiture of 
assets. 
 
555 In many cases on the POCA, the courts often point to the preamble to the Act to justify the extent to 
which organised crime is recognised as a significant scourge in South Africa and throughout the world. 
 
556 Powell op cit (n553) 569. 
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engages in a terrorist activity is guilty of terrorism’.557  Terrorist activity is defined 
broadly in section 1(1)(xxv) to mean: 
(a) any act committed in or outside the Republic, which – 
(i) involves the systematic, repeated or arbitrary use of violence by any 
means or method; 
(ii) involves the systematic, repeated or arbitrary release into the 
environment or any part of it or distributing of exposing the public or 
any part of it to –  
(aa) any dangerous, hazardous, radioactive or harmful substance or 
organism; 
(bb) any toxic chemical; or 
(cc) any microbial or other biological agent or toxin; 
(iii) endangers the life, or violates the physical integrity or physical 
freedom of, or causes serious bodily injury to or the death of, any 
person, or any number of persons; 
(iv) causes serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any segment 
of the public; 
(v) causes the destruction of or substantial damage to any property, 
natural resource, or the environment or cultural heritage, whether 
public or private; 
(vi) is designed or calculated to cause serious interference with or serious 
disruption of an essential service, facility or system, or the delivery of 
any such service, facility or system, whether public or private, 
including, but not limited to –  
(aa) a system used for, or by, an electronic system, including an 
information system; 
(bb) a telecommunication service or system; 
(cc) a banking or financial service or financial system; 
(dd) a system used for the delivery of essential government services; 
(ee) a system used for, or by, an essential public utility or transport 
provider; 
(ff) an essential infrastructure facility; or 
                                                          
557 The maximum penalty which the High Court can impose for terrorism is a fine or life imprisonment, 
the Regional Magistrates’ Court can impose a fine or the maximum of 18 years’ imprisonment, and the 
District Magistrates’ Court can impose a fine or the maximum of five years imprisonment (see 
s18(1)(a)(i) to (iii) of the POCDATARA). 
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(gg) any essential emergency services, such as police, medical or civil 
defence services; 
(vii) causes any major economic loss or extensive destabilisation of an 
economic system or substantial devastation of the national economy 
of a country; or 
(viii) creates a serious public emergency situation or a general insurrection 
in the Republic, 
whether the harm contemplated in paragraphs (a)(i) to (vii) is or may be 
suffered in or outside the Republic, and whether the activity referred to in 
subparagraphs (ii) to (vii) was committed by way of any means or method; 
and  
(b) which is intended, or by its nature and context, can reasonably be regarded 
as being intended, in whole or in part, directly and indirectly, to –  
(i) threaten the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic; 
(ii) intimidate, or to induce or cause feelings of insecurity within, the 
public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including 
its economic security, or to induce, cause or spread feelings of terror, 
fear or panic in a civilian population; or 
(iii) unduly compel, intimidate, force, coerce, induce or cause a person, a 
government, the general public or a segment of the public, or a 
domestic or international organisation or body, to do or to abstain or 
refrain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular 
standpoint, or to act in accordance with certain principles, 
whether the public or the person, government, body, or organisation or 
institution referred to in subparagraphs (ii) or (iii), as the case may be, is inside 
or outside the Republic; and 
(c) which is committed, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the purpose 
of the advancement of an individual or collective political, religious, 
ideological or philosophical motive, objective, cause or undertaking.   
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The above definition can be broken down into three elements: 558  (a) the acts 
constituting terrorism; (b) the intent required; and (c) the motivation of the perpetrator.  
 
(i) The interpretation of the first element 
The first element (that of an act constituting terrorism) is covered under section 
1(1)(xxv)(a)(i)-(viii) of the POCDATARA. The language employed in respect of the first 
element makes it clear that the contemplated act can either be violent or non-violent. 
The requisite act is also not limited to the typical acts associated with terrorism, such 
as those that endanger human life, bodily integrity as well as the health and safety of 
the public. Instead, the requisite act also includes the causing of substantial damage 
to public and private property,559 the disruption of an essential service,560 the causing 
of major economic loss 561  and the creation of any public emergency or general 
insurrection.562 
The above-named acts broaden the scope of the offence of terrorism in the 
POCDATARA, especially in comparison to: (a) the offence of terrorism in the 
apartheid’s Internal Security Act, 563  which notably required violence for the 
commission of terrorism; (b) the  United States’ offence of terrorism, which requires 
‘violent acts or acts dangerous to human life’ in order for terrorism to be committed, 
and (c) the Canadian version of terrorism, which requires violent acts that must 
‘intentionally cause death or serious bodily injury’.564  
                                                          
558 See J Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 4 ed (2011) 166. See also A Cachalia 
‘Counter-terrorism and international cooperation against terrorism – an elusive goal: a South African 
perspective’ (2010) 26(3) South African Journal on Human Rights 510 at 513. 
 
559 Section 1(1)(xxv)(a)(v). 
 
560 Section 1(1)(xxv)(a)(vi). 
 
561 Section 1(1)(xxv)(a)(vii). 
 
562 Section 1(1)(xxv)(a)(viii). 
 
563 Supra (n397). 
 
564 Cachalia op cit (n558) 513. See also K Roach ‘A comparison of South African and Canadian anti-
terrorism legislation’ (2005) 18 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 127 at 133. 
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A challenge to the constitutional validity of the acts which constitute terrorism could be 
based on the principle of fair labelling of offenders, as well as the principle in the law 
of sentencing that punishment must fit the crime. This is because these acts can also 
be criminalised and punished as assault, murder, attempted murder, public violence, 
arson, malicious damage to property, intimidation, kidnapping, sedition and treason.565 
As such, the principle of fair labelling would not be adhered to should people be 
stigmatised as terrorists when the ordinary laws of the land could have been equally, 
if not more, appropriate.566 Furthermore, it would not bode well for the imposition of 
punishment that fits the crime should the severe penalties prescribed for terrorism be 
imposed when there are other more appropriate crimes.567  
Paragraph (a)(i) to (v) of section 1(1)(xxv) is even more extensive and far-reaching 
considering that the exemption from classification as terrorist activity granted to acts 
committed in pursuance of any advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action, is not 
applicable if such advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action causes the harmful 
results mentioned in paragraph a(i) to (v).568  
The adverse effects of the rather broad acts constituting terrorism, as well as the 
possible constitutional challenges to these acts, can be addressed through requiring 
that these acts be committed intentionally.569 Thus, what would reduce the wide scope 
of terrorist acts, set terrorism apart from other crimes, and also address the issue of 
fair labelling and that of appropriate punishment, is the requirement that the acts that 
amount to the offence of terrorism must have been committed intentionally. Put 
differently, the perpetrators must know and intend that their actions directly constitute 
terrorist acts. This is undoubtedly a much higher standard yet it is appropriate for the 
offence that is as serious as that of terrorism.  
                                                          






568 Section 1(3) reads: ‘[f]or the purposes of paragraph (a)(vi) of the definition of “terrorist activity”, 
any act which is committed in pursuance of any advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action and which 
does not intend the harm contemplated in paragraph (a)(i) to (v) of that definition, shall not be regarded 
as a terrorist activity within the meaning of that definition’.   
 
569 See Roach op cit (n564) 134. 
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Even though the acts contemplated in section 1(1)(xxv)(a) can be interpreted 
restrictively or be read-down to require that they be engaged intentionally, for some 
reason, Roach570 sees it best to suggest that the requirement of intent must be read-
in.571 Roach572 also goes as far as to suggest that the phrase ‘designed or calculated’ 
in paragraph (vi) of section 1(1)(xxv)(a) should be read restrictively to require that the 
acts contemplated therein be engaged intentionally.  
The requirement of intention as contemplated above can even be understood to be 
referring only to intention in the form of dolus directus (a form of intention that is 
applicable where the wrongdoer desires a particular result), to the exclusion of dolus 
eventualis (a form of intention where harm is not intended but is at least foreseen by 
the wrongdoer). 573  Support for this line of reasoning can also be found in the 
apartheid-era case of sabotage574 in which dolus eventualis was excluded from the 
offence, as well as in Canadian jurisprudence on certain constitutional requirements 
of subjective fault.575  
Regarding the broad and vague provision in paragraph (viii) of section 1(1)(xxv)(a), to 
the effect that the creation of a serious public emergency or a general insurrection 
amounts to a terrorist activity, Roach576 further suggests as a solution the reading-
down of this provision to require that its invocation follow a declaration of a state of 
emergency in terms of section 37 of the Constitution. 
                                                          
570 Roach op cit (n564) 134. 
 
571 What baffles the mind is why did Roach ignore the fact that a restrictive interpretation or the reading-
down of s 1(1)(xxv)(a) to require intention could have been more appropriate compared to reading-in 
the same requirement? What makes a restrictive interpretation and reading-down more appropriate is 
that it altogether avoids having to declare the impugned provision as unconstitutional, whereas reading-
in is a remedy applicable after the declaration of unconstitutionality (for explanations as to what 
restrictive interpretation, reading-down and reading-in entails, refer to notes 532, 533 and 534 above). 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that adding the requirement of intention (either by means of a restrictive 
interpretation, reading-down or reading-in) is definitely appropriate because the offence of terrorism is 
a serious offence which, in s 18 of the POCDATARA, even attracts a sentence of life imprisonment. 
 
572 Roach op cit (n564) 135. 
 
573 Roach op cit (n564) 135. 
 
574 S v Nel 1989 (4) SA 845 (A). 
 
575 Roach op cit (n564) 135. 
 
576 Ibid at 136. 
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(ii) The interpretation of the second element 
The second element concerns the intent required for the offence of terrorism. While 
the wording of section 1(1)(xxv)(b) partly captures subjective intent as the form of fault 
required for the offence, the phrase ‘by its nature and context, can reasonably be 
regarded as being intended’ seems to suggest that a low fault standard (including that 
of negligence) also suffices for the commission of terrorism. This marks a departure 
from the subjective intent requirement in the case of apartheid’s draconian Internal 
Security Act,577 and from the requirement of subjective intent in the case of the law in 
Canada.578  
By way of a solution, Roach579 argues that, where the Legislature sought to create a 
negligence-based fault standard, it has done so by employing the phrase ‘ought 
reasonably to have known or suspected’.580 Therefore, only this phrase can be read 
by the courts to capture negligence as the sufficient form of fault. This opens way for 
the courts to reject the interpretation of the phrase ‘by its nature and context, can 
reasonably be regarded as being intended’ as referring to negligence-based fault. 
Instead, this phrase may be interpreted restrictively to require subjective intent in the 
form of dolus eventualis, at the very least.581  
Certain provisions in section 1(1)(xxv)(b)(ii) and (iii) are also noted by Roach582 to be 
so intractably broad and vague that he even questions if they should be forming part 
of an offence as serious as that of terrorism. Examples in point include references to 
‘feelings of insecurity’, ‘economic security’ and others. One gets a sense that, had 
                                                          
577 Supra (n397). 
 
578 Cachalia op cit (n558) 514. 
 
579 Roach op cit (n564) 136-137. 
 
580 In terms of s 1(7) of the POCDATARA, ‘a person ought reasonably to have known or suspected a 
fact if the conclusions that he or she ought to have reached, are those which would have been reached 
by a reasonably diligent and vigilant person having both –  
(a) the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that may reasonably be expected of a 
person in his or her position; and 
(b) the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that he or she in fact has’. 
Roach (op cit (n564) 14) further observes that the fault standard contemplated above creates an 
expectation of a standard of behaviour which is above that of the common-law reasonable person, if 
the person has certain knowledge, skill and training. 
 





Roach developed this argument further, he would effectively have suggested that, 
since the offence of terrorism can do without the impugned provisions, these can 
effectively be severed583 from the rest of the Act. 
 
(iii) The interpretation of the third element 
The third element of the offence of terrorism is, as per section 1(1)(xxv)(c), the 
motivation of the perpetrator. 584  Thus, terrorist  acts must be committed in 
advancement of the political, religious, ideological or philosophical motive. The 
unfortunate result of the existence of the third element is that the police will have to 
investigate the politics and religions of suspects, and it may encourage the targeting 
of people based on their political and religious associations and beliefs. 585 
Furthermore, people’s motives are notably ‘too complex and obscure to determine 
criminal liability’, and would thus create unnecessary prosecutorial difficulties and 
complicate terrorism trials. 586 Ultimately, the motive element infringes the right to 
                                                          
583 Severance is the opposite of reading-in (on which, see note 534 above), and it entails the court 
attempting to rescue a provision from potential unconstitutionality by ‘cutting out’ the offending parts of 
that provision while leaving the rest of the (constitutional) text intact (Botha op cit (n532) 197). Two 
requirements must be met: (a) it must be possible to separate (sever or cut out) the unconstitutional (or 
bad) part of the provision from the rest (the good); and (b) what remains of the provision must still be 
able to give effect to the purpose of the legislation (Botha op cit (n532) 197). It is submitted that, just as 
Botha (op cit (n532) 196) submits that reading-down gives effect to the common-law presumption that 
‘legislation does not contain futile or meaningless provisions’, the same can be argued in the case of 
severance.  
 
584 The motive element must be read subject to s 1(5) of the POCDATARA, which provides that 
‘[n]otwithstanding any provision in any other law, and subject to subsection (4), a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any similar motive, shall not be considered for any reason, 
including for purposes of prosecution or extradition, to be a justifiable defence in respect of an offence 
of which the definition of terrorist activity forms an integral part’. 
Section 1(4), which s 1(5) is made subject to, provides that ‘[n]otwithstanding any provision of this Act 
or any other law, any act committed during a struggle waged by peoples, including any action during 
an armed struggle, in the exercise or furtherance of their legitimate right to national liberation, self-
determination and independence against colonialism, or occupation or aggression or domination by 
alien or foreign forces, in accordance with the principles of international law, especially international 
humanitarian law, including the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among 
States in accordance with the said Charter, shall not, for any reason, including for purposes of 
prosecution or extradition, be considered as a terrorist activity, as defined in subsection (1)’. 
 
585  Roach op cit (n564) 138. 
 
586 Cachalia op cit (n558) 518; and Roach op cit (n564) 139. 
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freedom of religion, belief and opinion; freedom of expression; freedom of association; 
and the political right to campaign for any political cause.587  
Even though the motive requirement is justified on the basis that it seeks to separate 
terrorism from other ordinary crimes, Roach588 is of the view that the separation could 
have been achieved by simply stipulating that the offence of terrorism be intended to 
intimidate the civilian population or to compel the government and any organisation to 
act. Therefore, according to Roach589 the third element should not even be forming 
part of the offence of terrorism or that the offence could do without the motive 
requirement. 590  It might also happen that the courts in South Africa will, as has 
happened in Canada, have to strike down the motive requirement as 
unconstitutional.591 
 
(c) Interpreting the offences associated or connected with terrorist activities 
The problem of overbreadth and vagueness is not limited to the offence of terrorism in 
section 2 of the POCDATARA. Various other offences related to terrorism suffer the 
same criticism. For instance, section 3 of the POCDATARA creates offences 
associated or connected with terrorist activities.592 The section reads as follows: 
(1) Any person who -  
(a) does anything which will, or is likely to, enhance the ability of any entity to 
engage in a terrorist activity, including to provide or offering to provide a skill 
or an expertise; 
(b) enters or remains in any country; or 
                                                          
587 Cachalia op cit (n558) 518-519. 
 
588 Roach op cit (n564) 138. 
 
589 Ibid at 139. 
 
590 By making this suggestion, Roach came short of proposing that the third element be struck down as 
unconstitutional or at least be severed from the rest of the POCDATARA. For the detail on severance, 
see note 583 above. 
 
591 Cachalia op cit (n558) 519. 
 
592 Terrorist and related activities are defined in section 1(1)(xxvi) of the POCDATARA to mean ‘any act 
or activity associated or connected with the commission of the offence of terrorism, or an offence 
associated or connected with a terrorist activity, or a Convention offence, or an offence referred to in 
sections 11 to 14’. 
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(c) makes himself or herself available, 
for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any entity engaging in 
a terrorist activity, and who knows or ought reasonably to have known or 
suspected, that such act was done for the purpose of enhancing the ability of 
such entity to engage in a terrorist activity, is guilty of the offence associated with 
a terrorist activity. 
(2) Any person who –  
(a) provides or offers to provide any weapon to any other person for use by or for 
the benefit of an entity; 
(b) solicits support for or gives support to an entity; 
(c) provides, receives or participates in training or instruction, or recruits an entity 
to receive training or instruction; 
(d) recruits any entity; 
(e) collects or makes a document; or 
(f) possesses a thing, 
connected with the engagement in a terrorist activity, and who knows or ought 
reasonably to have known or suspected that such weapons, soliciting, training, 
recruitment, document or thing is so connected, is guilty of an offence connected 
with terrorist activities. 
Evidence of the broadness and vagueness of section 3 is glaring. A person may be 
guilty of an offence in the event that he/she intentionally and/or negligently assists 
those engaging in a terrorist activity. The use of the phrase ‘knows 593  or ought 
reasonably to have known or suspected’594 in section 3 offences is a clear indication 
that the fault standard for these offences is both intent and negligence. 
The concern here is that it is unfair, and even unconstitutional, to punish595 and label 
as terrorists those who negligently partook in terrorist activities, ultimately treating 
                                                          
593 In terms of section 1(6) of the POCDATARA, ‘a person has knowledge of a fact if –  
(a) the person has actual knowledge of that fact; or  
(b) the court is satisfied that –  
(i) the person believes that there is a reasonable possibility of the existence of that fact; 
and 
(ii) he or she fails to obtain information to confirm the existence of that fact’. 
 




these individuals in the same manner as those who intentionally engage in terrorist 
activities.596 It is also noteworthy that the courts have interpreted the right in section 12 
of the Constitution (the right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just 
cause) to have a substantive component such that this right is violated if a person is 
imprisoned for negligence and the reason for which the state is depriving an individual 
of his or her liberty is insufficient.597 
One solution to the foregoing might be to restrictively interpret the section and require 
a ‘sufficiently substantial relationship between the assistance provided and the 
prohibited criminal activity’. 598  Furthermore, notwithstanding there being a clear 
reference to negligence as a sufficient form of fault, it might be necessary for the courts, 
in interpreting the provisions of section 3 of the POCDATARA, to strike down as 
unconstitutional the requirement of objective fault, or sever the requirement of objective 
fault and leave only subjective fault intact.599  
Support for abandoning objective fault in section 3 offences may also be located in the 
judgment of O’Regan J in S v Coetzee600 in which she suggests that ‘[i]t is only when 
the Legislature has clearly abandoned any requirement of culpability, or when it has 
established a level of culpability manifestly inappropriate to the unlawful conduct or 
potential sentence in question, that a provision may be subject to successful 
constitutional challenge’. Roach 601  also advances two strands of Canadian 
constitutional law which, if adopted and incorporated into South African law, would be 
used to justify the courts’ departure from the objective fault requirement. 
The first strand comprises those principles of fundamental justice which require 
subjective fault for certain offences, owing to their stigma and the extent of punishment 
                                                          
595 In terms of s 18(1)(b)(i) of the POCDATARA, punishment for s 3 offences is up to 15 years in the 
High Court as well as in the Regional Magistrates’ Court. In the case of a District Magistrates’ Court, 
the sentence is any penalty which a District Court may lawfully impose (see s18(1)(b)(ii)). 
 
596 Roach op cit (n564) 142. 
 
597 Powell op cit (n553) 570. 
 
598 Cachalia op cit (n558) 517. 
 
599 Roach op cit (n564) 143. For the detail on severance, see note 583 above. 
 
600 1997 (1) SACR 379 (CC) at 443C-D. 
 
601 Roach op cit (n564) 142. 
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for those offences.602 The second strand is also another principle of fundamental 
justice which states that those who cause harm intentionally should be punished more 
severely than those who cause harm unintentionally.603 Ultimately, the restriction of 
the fault requirement in section 3 offences only to subjective fault ‘preserves the intent 
of the legislation to criminalise terrorism offences insofar as that intent is consistent 
with the higher law of the Constitution’.604   
Objective or negligence-based fault is prevalent not just in section 3 offences, but also 
in the offences provided for in section 4 of the POCDATARA (which concerns the 
financing of terrorism).  Section 4 reads: 
(1) Any person who, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, and by any means or 
method –  
(a) acquires property; 
(b) collects property; 
(c) uses property; 
(d) possesses property; 
(e) owns property; 
(f) provides or makes available, or invites a person to provide or make available 
property; 
(g) provides or makes available, or invites a person to provide or make available 
any financial or other service; 
(h) provides or makes available, or invites a person to provide or make available 
economic support; or 
(i) facilitates the acquisition, collection, use or provision of property, or the 
provision of any financial or other service, or the provision of economic 
support, 
intending that the property, financial or other service or economic support, as the 
case may be, be used, or while such person knows or ought reasonably to have 
known or suspected that the property, service or support concerned will be used, 
directly or indirectly, in whole or in part- 





604 Ibid at 143. 
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 (i) to commit or facilitate the commission of a specified offence; 
(ii) for the benefit of, or on behalf of, or at the direction of, or under the 
control of an entity which commits or attempts to commit or facilitates the 
commission of a specified offence; or 
(iii) for the benefit of a specific entity identified in a notice issued by the 
President under section 25, 
is guilty of an offence. 
(2) Any person who, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, and by any means or 
method –  
(a) deals with, enters into or facilitates any transaction or performs any other act 
in connection with property which such person knows or ought reasonably to 
have known or suspected to have been acquired, collected, used, possessed, 
owned or provided –  
(i) to commit of facilitate the commission of a specified offence; 
(ii) for the benefit of, or on behalf of, or at the direction of, or under the control 
of an entity which commits or attempts to commit or facilitates the commission 
of a specified offence; or 
(iii) for the benefit of a specific entity identified in a notice issued by the 
President under section 25; or 
(b) provides financial or other services in respect of property referred to in 
paragraph (a),  
is guilty of an offence. 
(3) Any person who knows or ought reasonably to have known or suspected that 
property is property referred to in subsection (2)(a) and enters into, or becomes 
concerned in, an arrangement which in any way has or is likely to have the effect 
of –  
(a) Facilitating the retention or control of such property by or on behalf of–  
(i) an entity which commits or attempts to commit or facilitates the commission 
of a specified offence; or 
(ii) a specific entity identified in a notice issued by the President under section 
25; 
(b) converting such property; 
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(c) concealing or disguising the nature, source, location disposition or movement 
of such property, the ownership thereof or any interest anyone may have 
therein; 
(d) removing such property from a jurisdiction; or  
(e) transferring such property to a nominee, 
is guilty of an offence. 
 
Objective or negligence-based fault is also prevalent in the section 11 offence of 
harbouring terrorists, as well as the section 13(1)(b) offence relating to hoaxes. 
Section 11 reads:  
‘Any person who harbours or conceals any person, whom he or she knows, or ought 
reasonably to have known or suspected, to be a person who has committed a 
specified offence, as referred to in paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘specified offence’, 
or who is likely to commit such an offence, is guilty of an offence’. 
 
Section 13 reads: 
(1) (a) Any person who, with the intention of inducing in a person anywhere in the 
world a false belief that a substance, thing or device is, or contains, or is likely 
to be, or contains a noxious substance or thing or an explosive or other lethal 
device- 
  (i) places that substance, thing or device in any place; or  
(ii) sends that substance, thing or device from one place to another, by 
post, rail or any other means whatsoever, 
 is guilty of an offence. 
(b) Any person who, directly or indirectly, communicates any information, 
which he or she knows, or ought reasonably to have known or suspected, or 
believes to be false, with the intention of inducing in a person anywhere in 
the world a belief that a noxious substance or thing or an explosive or other 
lethal device is likely to be present (whether at the time the information is 
communicated or later) in or at any place, is guilty of an offence. 
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(2) For the purposes of this section ‘substance’ includes any biological agent 
and any other natural or artificial substance (whatever its form, origin, or method 
of production). 
It would thus be well advised that, similar to the section 3 offences, the objective or 
negligence-based fault be struck down as unconstitutional and/or be severed such that 
only subjective fault is retained in respect of the offences in sections 4, 11 and 13. The 
requirement of only subjective fault becomes even more necessary given the 
prescribed sentences for each of these offences. For instance, for a section 4 offence, 
the High Court and Regional Magistrates’ Court can impose a fine not exceeding R100 
million or a maximum imprisonment term of 15 years, whereas the District Magistrates’ 
Court can impose a fine not exceeding R250,000 or a maximum imprisonment term of 
five years.605   
Section 11 offences are punished in the same manner as the section 3 offences.606 
Lastly, for the offence in section 13(1)(a) and (b), the High Court and Regional 
Magistrates’ Court can impose a fine or a maximum imprisonment term of 10 years, 
whereas the District Magistrates’ Court can impose any penalty which it may lawfully 
impose.607 In addition to the foregoing penalty, section 18(2) of the POCDATARA 
empowers a court that is imposing a sentence for a section 13 offence to also order 
that the offender reimburse ‘any party incurring expenses incidental to any emergency 
or investigative response to that conduct’. 
The other offences in sections 5 to 10 of the POCDATARA correctly require subjective 
intent, which is certainly apt for the penalty that these offences attract.608 Thus, section 
5 deals with offences relating to explosive or other lethal devices, and provides that:  
Any person who intentionally delivers, places, discharges, or detonates an explosive 
or other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a state or government 
                                                          
605 Section 18(1)(c)(i) and (ii) of the POCDATARA. 
 
606 Refer to note 595 above. 
 
607 S18(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the POCDATARA. 
 
608 These offences are punished in the same manner as the offence of terrorism established in s 2 of 
the POCDATARA. See note 557 above. 
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facility, a public transport facility, a public transportation system, or an infrastructure 
facility, with the purpose, amongst others, of causing- 
(a) death or serious bodily injury 
(b) extensive damage to, or destruction of such a place, facility or system, where 
such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss, 
is guilty of an offence relating to explosive or other lethal devices. 
 
Section 6 is concerned with offences relating to hijacking, destroying or 
endangering the safety of a fixed platform, and reads: 
Any person who intentionally –  
(a) seizes or exercises control over a fixed platform by force or any other form of 
intimidation; 
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a fixed platform, which 
act is likely to endanger the safety of that fixed platform; 
(c) (i) destroys such a fixed platform; or 
(ii) causes damage to it, which damage is likely to endanger the safety of that 
fixed platform; 
(d) places or causes to be placed on a fixed platform, by any means whatsoever, 
a device or substance, which is likely to destroy that fixed platform or likely to 
endanger its safety; or 
(e) injures or kills any person in connection with the commission of any of the 
acts referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d), 
is guilty of an offence relating to the hijacking, destroying or endangering of a fixed 
platform. 
 
Section 7 is concerned with offences relating to taking a hostage, and reads: 
Any person who intentionally –  
(a) seizes or detains; and 
(b) threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain, 
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any other person (hereinafter referred to as a hostage), in order to compel a third 
party, namely a State, an intergovernmental organisation, a natural or juridical 
person, or a group of persons to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or 
implicit condition for the release of the hostage, is guilty of an offence of taking a 
hostage. 
 
Section 8 is concerned with offences relating to causing harm to internationally 
protected persons, and reads: 
Any person who, knowing that a person is an internationally protected person, 
intentionally–  
(a) murders or kidnaps or otherwise violently attacks the person or liberty of that 
person; or 
(b) executes a violent attack upon the official premises, the private 
accommodation or the means of transport of that person, which attack is likely 
to endanger his or her person or liberty, 
is guilty of an offence relating to causing harm to an internationally protected 
person. 
 
Section 9 is concerned with offences relating to hijacking an aircraft, and provides 
that: 
Any person who intentionally, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of 
intimidation, seizes or exercises control of an aircraft and with the purpose of –  
(a) causing any person on board the aircraft to be detained against his or her will; 
(b) causing any person on board the aircraft to be transported against his or her 
will to any other place other than the next scheduled place of landing of the 
aircraft; 
(c) holding any person on board the aircraft for ransom or to service against his 
or her will; or 
(d) causing that aircraft to deviate from its flight plan, 
is guilty of an offence of hijacking an aircraft. 
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Lastly, section 10 is concerned with offences relating to hijacking a ship or 
endangering safety of maritime navigation, and it provides that:  
Any person who intentionally –  
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other 
form of intimidation; 
(b) performs any act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is 
likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; 
(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to 
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; 
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device 
or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or causes damage to that 
ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation 
of that ship; 
(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously 
interferes with their operation, if such acts are likely to endanger the safe 
navigation of a ship; 
(f) communicates information, knowing the information to be false and under 
circumstances in which such information may reasonably be believed, 
thereby endangering the safe navigation of a ship; or 
(g) injures or kills a person, in connection with the commission of any of the acts 
set forth in paragraphs (a) to (f), 
is guilty of an offence relating to hijacking a ship or endangering the safety of 
maritime navigation. 
 
(d) Interpreting the provisions of the POCDATARA concerning the duplication 
of accomplice liability 
Another problem in the POCDATARA is the duplication of accomplice liability. In this 
regard, Powell,609 though commenting on the draft Bill which subsequently became 
the POCDATARA, argues that: 
‘The offences in clauses 4 to 10 fit comfortably into the main crime of terrorism, and the 
definition of terrorism incorporates the already existing South African crimes of murder, 
                                                          
609 Powell op cit (n553) 566-567. 
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culpable homicide, assault, arson and malicious damage to property. However, it is in 
the area of accomplice liability that the duplication reaches ludicrous levels. Accomplice 
liability is provided for more than four times. To the extent that the offences are 
consequence and not circumstance crimes, the various forms of terrorism cover principal 
and accomplice liability already. Secondly, facilitation, participation, assistance, 
contribution and planning are expressly included within the crime of terrorism itself. 
Thirdly, clause 3 separately criminalises enhancing the ability of another to engage in 
terrorist activity, providing or offering a skill and providing weapons or other logistical 
support. The distinction between this form of accomplice liability and that contained 
within terrorism itself is that clause 3610 creates liability for assistance negligently given. 
Fourthly, clause 14611 creates the separate offence of conspiracy and inducing another 
to commit an offence. Fifthly, the offence of failing to report a suspected terrorist crime 
or person may be seen as another form of accomplice liability.612 Finally, the convention 
crimes of financing613 and harbouring614 also codify forms of accomplice liability’. 
Cachalia615 also notes the problem with the establishment of ‘guilt by association’ or 
accomplice liability in sections 3, 4 and 11 of the POCDATARA. Concerned about the 
fact that a person can be found guilty of terrorism regardless of his/her intention, 
Cachalia616 submits as a solution to the overbreadth of accomplice liability provisions, 
that the courts might have to construe the accomplice liability provisions narrowly to 
require a ‘sufficiently substantial relationship between the assistance provided and the 
                                                          
610 Clause 3 remains clause or section 3 in the POCDATARA. The detail of this clause or section is set 
out under subheading (c) above. 
 
611 Clause 14 remains clause or section 14 in the POCDATARA, and it reads:  
‘Any person who –  
(a) threatens; 
(b) attempts; 
(c) conspires with any other person; or aids, abets, induces, incites, instigates, instructs or 
commands, counsels or procures another person,  
to commit an offence in terms of this Chapter, is guilty of an offence’. 
 
The chapter being referred to is Chapter 2 of the POCDATARA, which sets out the various offences in 
the Act.   
 
612 This offence is now established in s 12 of the POCDATARA. For more detail, refer to the discussion 
under subheading (e) below. 
 
613 This offence is now established in s 4 of the POCDATARA. 
 
614 This offence is now found in s 11 of the POCDATARA. 
 
615 Cachalia op cit (n558) 517-518. 
 
616 Ibid at 517. 
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prohibited criminal activity’. This speaks to restrictive interpretation being the 
appropriate remedy in the circumstances.  
 
(e) Interpreting the provisions of the POCDATARA concerning the duty to 
report acts of terrorism  
Section 12 of the POCDATARA provides for the duty to report acts of terrorism. 
It reads: 
(1) Any person who –  
(a) has reason to suspect that any other person intends to commit or has 
committed an offence referred to in this Chapter; or  
(b) is aware of the presence at any place of any other person who is so suspected 
of intending to commit or having committed such an offence, 
must report as soon as reasonably possible such suspicion or presence, as the 
case may be, or cause such suspicion or presence to be reported to any police 
official. 
(2) Any person who fails to comply with the provisions of subsection (1)(a) or (b), is 
guilty of an offence. 
(3) Upon receipt of a report referred to in subsection (1), the police official involved, 
must take down the report in the manner directed by the National Commissioner, 
and forthwith provide the person who made the report with an acknowledgement 
of receipt of such report. 
(4) (a) The National Commissioner must, at the commencement of this Act, publish 
the direction contemplated in subsection (3) in the Gazette.  
(b) Any direction issued under subsection (3) must be tabled in Parliament. 
(5) A person required to make a report in terms of subsection (1) concerning a 
suspicion that any other person intends to commit or has committed an offence 
referred to in section 4, may continue with and carry out any transaction to which 
such suspicion relates, unless directed in terms of subsection (6) not to proceed 
with such a transaction. 
(6) If a police official authorised thereto by the National Commissioner, after 
consulting with a person required to make a report contemplated in subsection 
(5), has reasonable grounds to suspect that a transaction referred to in that 
subsection may constitute an offence contemplated in section 4, that police 
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official may direct that person, in writing, not to proceed with the carrying out of 
that transaction or any other transaction in respect of the property affected by 
that transaction for a period as may be determined by that official, which may not 
be more than five days. 
(7) For the purposes of calculating the period of five days in subsection (6), 
Saturdays, Sundays and proclaimed public holidays must not be taken into 
account. 
(8) Subsection (6) does not apply to the carrying out of a transaction to which the 
rules of an exchange licensed in terms of the Stock Exchange Control Act, 1985 
(Act No. 1 of 1985), or the Financial Markets Control Act, 1989 (Act No. 55 of 
1989), apply. 
The duty envisaged in section 12 is very broad as it is triggered by mere suspicion (not 
actual knowledge) of the intended commission of acts of terrorism or the location of 
the person who is suspected of intending to commit acts of terrorism or has committed 
the acts of terrorism. Such a duty effectively forces individuals to be informers, and its 
criminalisation provides the police with a powerful tool to effectively blackmail into 
submission any reluctant witness they are interviewing during terrorism 
investigations.617 There is also no immunity from criminal and civil liability especially 
for those who bona fide report suspicions which turn out to be false, thus constituting 
a terrorism hoax (which is an offence under section 13(1)(b) of the POCDATARA).618 
There is also nothing in section 12 that protects against self-incrimination should a 
person make a report and that same report is used against the person to prosecute 
him/her for terrorism-related offences.619  
The suggested solution to the foregoing is to read-in of the ‘use indemnity’ provision, 
in terms of which the information provided may not be used against the person who 
gave that information.620 It is also open to the courts to read-down the duty to report, 
such that it does not apply if its operation would lead to self-incrimination.621  
                                                          






620 Powell op cit (n553) 569. 
 
621 Roach op cit (n564) 146. 
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(f) Interpreting the provisions of the POCDATARA dealing with the listing of 
terrorist groups 
The provisions dealing with the listing of terrorist groups emanates from chapter 5 of 
the POCDATARA. Chapter 5 contains section 25 which envisages the Executive622 
declaration of certain groups as terrorist groups. There are numerous problems with 
the listing provision.623 The most pertinent of these is that there appears to be no 
provision for challenging or reviewing the decision to list a particular group as a terrorist 
group.624  
Thus, when, for instance, a person is charged with a section 4 offence of financing a 
terrorist group, his/her right to presumption of innocence may be violated because 
section 4 accepts the mere listing by the Executive as proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the group being financed is indeed a terrorist group.625 Likewise, in the case of 
freezing orders under section 23 of the POCDATARA,626 a court may make an order 
                                                          
 
622 Section 25 reads: ‘[t]he President must, by Proclamation in the Gazette, and other appropriate 
means of publication, give notice that the Security Council of the United Nations, under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, has identified a specific entity as being –  
(a) an entity who commits, or attempts to commit, any terrorist and related activity or participates 
in or facilitates the commission of any terrorist and related activity; or 
(b) an entity against whom the Member States of the United Nations must take the actions specified 
in Resolutions of the said Security Council, in order to combat or prevent terrorist and related 
activities. 
 
Section 26 goes on further to provide that: ‘[e]very Proclamation issued under section 25 shall be tabled 
in Parliament for its consideration and decision and Parliament may thereupon take such steps as it 
may consider necessary. 
 
623 See Roach op cit (n564) 148-149. 
 
624 Roach op cit (n564) 148. It is not possible to take the listing decisions on review before a court of 
law or on review by the Executive. It seems that much of the listing is envisaged to take place by means 
of the Proclamation published by the President in the Government Gazette when the United Nations 
Security Council has listed a terrorist group. 
 
625 Roach op cit (n564) 143-144.  
 
626 Section 23 reads: 
(1) A High Court may, on ex parte application by the National Director to a judge in chambers, 
make an order prohibiting any person from engaging in any conduct, or obliging any person to 
cease any conduct, concerning property in respect of which there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the property is owned or controlled by or on behalf of, or at the direction of –  
(a) any entity which has committed, attempted to commit, participated in or facilitated the 
commission of a specified offence; or  
(b) a specific entity identified in a notice issued by the President under section 25. 
(2) An order made under subsection (1) may include an order to freeze any such property. 
(3) A High Court may make an interim order under subsection (1) pending its final determination 
of an application for such an order. 
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freezing property which is believed on reasonable grounds to be controlled by an entity 
identified as a terrorist group, yet it is not possible to challenge the listing of that entity 
as a terrorist group.627  
Executive determinations of terrorist groups also violate the separation of powers 
doctrine because the making of decisions as to the guilt or otherwise of any person or 
group vests in an independent judiciary after a rigorous and fair adversarial process.628 
Furthermore, the adoption of the United Nations Security Council’s list of terrorist 
organisations could amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by 
Parliament. 629  It is even more unacceptable that such power is delegated to an 
international body with no democratic mandate from South Africans.630 A solution to 
the foregoing might well be to read-in the right to challenge the categorisation by the 
Security Council of an organisation as a terrorist group.631 
 
(g) Interpreting the provisions of the POCDATARA dealing with wide investigative 
powers 
Another cause for concern are the wide investigative powers which are not subject to 
judicial authorisation. Section 22 of the POCDATARA makes provision for such 
investigative powers, and it reads: 
(1) Whenever the National Director has reason to believe that –  
(a) any person may be in possession of information relevant to -  
(i) the commission or intended commission of an alleged offence under chapter 2; 
or 
(ii) any property which –  
(aa) may have been used in the commission, or for the purpose of or in 
connection with the commission, of an offence under this Act; 
                                                          
627 See Powell op cit (n553) 564-565. 
 
628 Roach op cit (n564) 144. 
 




631 Ibid at 569. 
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(bb) may have facilitated the commission of an offence under this Act, or 
enabled any entity to commit such an offence, or provided financial or economic 
support to an entity in the commission of such an offence; or 
(cc) may afford evidence of the commission or intended commission of an 
offence referred to in subparagraph (i); 
(b) there may be in any building, receptacle or place, or in the possession, custody or 
control of any entity any property referred to in paragraph (a)(ii); or 
(c) any entity may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material 
relevant–  
(i) to an alleged offence referred to in paragraph (a)(i); or 
(ii) in respect of any property referred to in paragraph (a)(ii) or (b), 
he or she may, prior to the institution of any civil or criminal proceeding, under 
written authority direct that a Director of Public Prosecutions shall have, in respect 
of a specific investigation, the power to institute an investigation in terms of the 
provisions of Chapter 5 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998 (Act No. 32 
of 1998), relating to the commission or intended commission of an alleged offence 
referred to in paragraph (a)(i) or any property contemplated in paragraph (a)(ii), or 
to any property referred to in paragraph (b), or to the possession, custody or control 
of any documentary material referred to in paragraph (c). 
(2) For purposes of subsection (1), a reference in the said chapter 5 to –  
(a) the “head of the Directorate of Special Operations” or an “Investigating Director” 
shall be construed as a reference to a Director of Public Prosecutions authorised 
under subsection 1; Provided that for purposes of section 28(2)(a) of the said Act, 
a Director of Public Prosecutions may only designate a Deputy Director of Public 
Prosecutions; 
(b) a “special investigator” shall be construed as to include a “police official”. 
(3) If any property, contemplated in subsection (1)(a)(ii), seized under any power 
exercised under subsection (1), consists of cash or funds standing to the credit of a 
bank account, the Director of Public Prosecutions who has instituted the investigation 
under that subsection, shall cause the cash or funds to be paid into a banking account 
which shall be opened with any bank as defined in section 1 of the Banks Act, 1990 
(Act No. 94 of 1990), and the Director of Public Prosecutions shall forthwith report to 
the Financial Intelligence Centre established in terms of section 2(1) of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 (Act No.38 of 2001), the fact of the seizure of the cash 
or funds and the opening of the account. 
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As already mentioned, the exercise of the investigative powers in section 22632 of the 
POCDATARA is not subject to prior judicial authorisation.633 This is despite section 23 
(which deals with freezing orders)634 and section 24 (which deals with cordoning off, 
stop and search of vehicles and persons)635 introducing the tradition of such prior 
judicial authorisation. There is however hope that, since section 22 incorporates 
Chapter 5 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act636 (the NPA Act), which does 
require prior judicial authorisation for the exercise of the investigative powers provided 
in the Act, this might translate to the exercise of section 22 powers subject to prior 
judicial authorisation.637 
                                                          
632 It is noteworthy that South Africa parted with the detention-without-trial provision which was initially 
mooted in the draft Bill before the POCDATARA was enacted into law. This left s 22 the sole 
investigative mechanism available to the South African authorities. For a commentary and critique 
particularly on the detention-without-trial provision in the draft Bill, see E Steyn ‘The draft anti-terrorism 
Bill of 2000: The lobster pot of the South African criminal justice system’ (2001) 14 South African Journal 
of Criminal Justice 179-194; and M Cowling ‘The return of detention without trial – some thoughts and 
comments on the draft anti-terrorism Bill and the Law Commission Report’ (2000) 13 South African 
Journal of Criminal Justice 344-359. 
 
633 See also Roach (op cit (n564) 146) who makes the same observation. 
 
634 The provisions of s 23 are quoted in full in note 626 above. 
 
635 Section 24 reads:  
(1) If, on written request under oath to a judge in chambers by a police official of or above the rank 
of director, it appears to the judge that it is necessary in order to prevent any terrorist or related 
activity, the judge may issue a warrant for the cordoning off, and stopping and searching of  
vehicles and persons with a view to preventing such terrorist or related activity, in a specified 
area, and such warrant applies for the period specified therein, which period may not exceed 
10 days. 
(2) Under such warrant any police official who identifies himself or herself as such, may cordon off 
the specified area for the period specified and stop and search any vehicle or person in that 
area, for articles or things which could be used or have been used for or in connection with the 
preparation for or the commission or instigation of any terrorist or related activity. 
(3) The police official may seize any article or thing contemplated in subsection (2), and Chapter 2 
of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977), applies with the necessary changes 
required by the context in respect of any such article or thing. 
(4) Section 29 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977), applies in respect of the 
powers conferred upon police officials in terms of this section. 
(5) The provisions of this section shall not be construed as affecting the rights of any police official 
or law enforcement officer to use any other power in any other law in respect of cordoning off, 
search or seizure. 
 
636 32 of 1998. 
 
637 The advantage brought about by the invocation of chapter 5 of the NPA Act is the expanded power 
of search and seizure in that, while investigators do need to apply for a court order to search a suspect’s 
property, they, however, need not specify the items they hope to find (Powell op cit (n553) 564). 
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Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the investigative hearings envisaged in section 22 
of the POCDATARA can be conducted in private before a judicial officer.638 Whether 
or not  the courts will have the appetite to read-in a requirement that these hearings 
take place in public and be made subject to prior judicial authorisation is yet to be 
seen.639 Roach is however of the view that the courts will most likely  side with the 
state in such cases given the fact that these wide investigative powers are 
incorporated into legislation dealing with the serious scourge of organised crime.640 
 
6.2.4 Shortcomings of the courts in using the power of legal interpretation 
The last question which needs to be answered as part of the delineation of the post-
apartheid security jurisprudence is whether the shortcomings of the courts in properly 
applying the power of interpretation still persist in post-apartheid South Africa. The first 
point to make in answering this question is that many of the factors which contributed 
to the courts’ failure to properly utilise the power of legal interpretation have been done 
away with in the South African legal system.  
As indicated in the discussion under subheading 5.2.3.3 in chapter 5 above, any 
practice, principle or doctrine which has the effect of hindering the role of the courts in 
an emergency (and, by implication, in security cases) is frowned upon. 641 
Furthermore, gone are the days of using legislative wording that restricts the courts’ 
power of interpretation with impunity. 642  The inclusion of court jurisdiction ouster 
clauses is also a thing of the past, and so is the operation of the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy, as well as the grant of blanket indemnity for any unlawful 
acts committed during an emergency and, by implication, during instances of a 
security breach.643  
                                                          
638 Roach op cit (n564) 146. 
 




641 For reasons as to why it is appropriate and justified to borrow principles from the emergency 
jurisprudence and extend their application to the ordinary security laws context, refer to note 64 above. 
 





The path for the proper application of the power of legal interpretation seems clear in 
post-apartheid South Africa until one is reminded of the fact that there is always a 
lingering threat of the ‘difficult to cure’ condition of executive-mindedness on the part 
of the judges presiding over security matters.644 Executive-mindedness may no longer 
be at the same level as it was under apartheid, but the problem is that it has a tendency 
to manifest when difficult security and emergency cases arise. The establishment of 
the interpretation regime proposed in this thesis becomes even more important in light 
of the ever-present likelihood of the rise of executive-mindedness. The interpretation 
regime provides indispensable principles which would ensure the proper use of the 
courts’ power of interpretation, i.e. the interpretation of security laws in a manner that 
upholds and protects the rule of law and human rights.  
There can be no doubt that, amid the exigency of a security breach in which the safety 
of the public, including judges, is not guaranteed, the demands of the rule of law and 
the protection of human rights are easily forgotten or ignored. The default outcome 
then tends to be deference to the Executive or Executive-friendly interpretations of the 
law, all to the detriment of the rule of law and human rights. The proposed 
interpretation regime will, amid the exigency of a security breach, serve to always 
remind the courts what they should do in order to always to uphold and protect the 








                                                          
643 We also observed this happening a lot during apartheid. Refer to the discussion under heading 4.5 
in chapter 4 above. 
 









From the beginning up to the present point, this thesis has been engaged in the 
process of setting out the content underlying the South African security and 
emergency laws. A careful study and analysis of this content reveals that there are 
two broad techniques which are crucial for securing the interpretation of security laws 
in a manner that upholds and protects the rule of law and human rights. These two 
techniques together form what in this thesis is called the security laws’ interpretation 
regime.  
For what could be the first technique of the interpretation regime, one has to turn 
particularly to the discussion under heading 4.5 in chapter 4 above. 645  In that 
discussion, the techniques used to prevent legal challenges to, or based on, the 
draconian apartheid security and emergency laws are set out. There is also an in-
depth discussion of all that enabled these techniques to thrive. These techniques and 
its enablers therefore operated to exempt security and emergency laws from proper 
judicial scrutiny and ultimate interpretation in light of the rule of law and human rights. 
It is submitted that this gives rise to the first technique of the interpretation regime, 
which entails ensuring the proper and full enjoyment of the right of access to the courts 
in respect of security matters. The detail of this technique follows in the discussion 
under heading 7.2 below. 
For what could be the second technique of the interpretation regime, regard must be 
had especially to the discussion under subheading 6.2.3 in chapter 6 above. That 
                                                          
645 This point marks the beginning of the careful study and critical analysis of the content set out in the 
first six chapters of this thesis. Going forward, we shall see what the content in the first six chapters 
contributes to the interpretation regime that is being established. 
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discussion dealt with the suggested approaches to interpreting the impugned 
provisions of security laws. From these suggested approaches emerges the second 
technique of the interpretation regime, which entails the use of restrictive 
interpretation, severance, reading-down and reading-in. The detail of the second 
technique follows in the discussion under heading 7.3 below. I now turn to provide the 
detail of each of the techniques of the interpretation regime. 
 
7.2 TECHNIQUE 1: ENSURING THE PROPER AND FULL ENJOYMENT OF THE 
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS IN RESPECT OF SECURITY 
MATTERS 
Apart from being a logical starting point in having any law interpreted by the courts in 
light of the rule of law and human rights, the first technique of the interpretation is 
actually a lesson from apartheid history. As already mentioned, certain techniques and 
the enablers thereof operated to frustrate access to the courts and the rendering of 
justice in security and emergency matters.646 To illustrate, the apartheid government’s 
strategy of passing of security and emergency legislation and regulations which 
effectively deprived the courts of jurisdiction to hear and pronounce on certain security 
and emergency matters, frustrated the enjoyment of the right of access to the courts 
to have any matter adjudicated upon.  
Furthermore, the technique of using legislative language that placed the exercise of 
security and emergency powers in the subjective discretion of various officials, left the 
courts with no jurisdiction to objectively assess the exercise of such powers, thus 
making a mockery of the little that remained of the right of access to the courts of 
justice at the time. As if the foregoing was not enough in making a mockery of access 
to the courts, the grant of indemnity from civil and criminal liability in favour of 
government officials who exercised power in terms of security and emergency laws 
added insult to injury, so to speak. Thus, where there might have been some appetite 
to exercise the right of access to the courts and bring criminal and/or civil lawsuits 
                                                          
646 The techniques and enablers thereof are discussed in full in the discussion under heading 4.5 in 
chapter 4 above. 
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against those officials who exercised power in terms of security and emergency laws, 
the outcome was a foregone conclusion before a matter even began. 
While access to the courts was being frustrated in the manner described above, the 
courts were at the same time obliged to implement the will of Parliament as per the 
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.647 The operation of parliamentary supremacy 
meant that the courts could not question the substance of the laws made by 
Parliament, especially through testing them against the rule of law and human 
rights. 648  As a result, accessing the courts and challenging the security and 
emergency legislation was a futile exercise as the courts’ testing power was 
significantly constrained. This detracted significantly from the full enjoyment of the right 
of access to the courts. A further detraction from the full enjoyment of access to the 
courts was facilitated by executive-mindedness on the part of the judges of the courts 
during apartheid. Such executive-mindedness reflected in the judges’ preference of 
strained interpretations of legal provisions which favour the Executive. 
Given the foregoing, ensuring the proper and full enjoyment of the right of access to 
the courts in respect of security matters has an obvious starting point, which is to 
dispense with the aforementioned techniques and that which enabled these to operate 
effectively.649 These techniques and its enablers are effectively barriers to the proper 
and full enjoyment of the right of access to the courts. Dispensing with them would 
create an enabling environment for the full realisation and enjoyment of the right of 
access to the courts, which is now guaranteed in section 34 of the South African 
Constitution.650  
It is submitted that South Africa is on the correct path to eradicating the 
abovementioned barriers to the full enjoyment of the right of access to the courts. This 
                                                          
647 For the detail on parliamentary supremacy in South Africa, refer to the discussion under heading 2.2 
in chapter 2 above. Also see the discussion under heading 4.5 in chapter 4 above. 
 
648 On the impact of parliamentary supremacy on the rule of law and human rights, reference can once 
more be made to the discussion under heading 2.2 in chapter 2 above. A brief summary in point is 
located in the discussion under heading 4.5 in chapter 4 above. 
 
649 This, of course, is in addition to eradicating various other obvious factors which constitute a barrier 
to accessing the courts. Such other factors include, but are not limited to, socio-economic factors. 
 
650 Section 34 of the Constitution provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to have any dispute that can be 
resolved by the application of the law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum’. 
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can be observed from: (a) the developments taking place in the emergency context, 
(b) the treatment of doctrines that typically restrict access to the courts, and (c) the 
other developments that enhance access to the courts. Each of these are considered 
in detail below. 
 
7.2.1 Developments taking place in the emergency context 
The delineation of the post-apartheid emergency jurisprudence in chapter 5 above 
shows that the South African emergency jurisprudence (and, by implication, the state 
security jurisprudence)651 no longer subscribes to the techniques which restrict access 
to the courts, as well as that which enabled the operation of these techniques. For 
instance, the ousting of the courts’ jurisdiction can no longer be countenanced in 
modern South African emergency jurisprudence because so doing would be at odds 
with section 37(3) of the Constitution. Section 37(3) empowers the courts to test the 
validity of a declaration of a state of emergency, the extension thereof, as well as any 
legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of a declaration of a state of 
emergency.652 Furthermore, the provision in section 37(5)(a) of the Constitution, to the 
effect that no legislation is authorised to indemnify the state or any person in respect 
of any unlawful act committed during a state of emergency, confirms that the 
jurisdiction of the courts may not in any way be limited or ousted.  
The whole of section 37 of the Constitution (which is South Africa’s emergency 
regime), properly interpreted, extends to render inappropriate and unconstitutional any 
practice, principle or doctrine which has the effect of hindering access to the courts or 
which has the effect of hindering the courts from properly exercising jurisdiction in 
emergency and, by implication, security matters. 653 It therefore follows that legislative 
wording placing the exercise of emergency powers in the subjective discretion of 
particular designated officials cannot be permitted in modern South African 
jurisprudence. Executive-mindedness on the part of the judiciary, which can permeate 
                                                          
651 For reasons as to why it is appropriate and justified to extrapolate from developments taking place 
in the emergency context the lessons which can be extended and applied in the context of the ordinary 
security laws, refer to note 64 above. 
 
652 For a full analysis, refer to the discussion under subheading 5.2.3.3 in chapter 5 above. 
 
653 Once more, refer to the discussion under subheading 5.2.3.3 in chapter 5 above for a full analysis. 
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in various forms or shape (such as judicial deference, judicial minimalism and/or the 
political question doctrine), is also frowned upon.654 The foregoing can only bolster the 
proper and full enjoyment of the right of access to the courts. 
 
7.2.2 The treatment of doctrines that typically restrict access to the courts  
It is submitted that there are three main doctrines the operation of which typically 
restricts the proper and full enjoyment of the right of access to the courts. These 
include judicial deference, judicial minimalism and the political question doctrine.655 
On judicial deference, it is noteworthy that, even though deference is still being 
exercised by South African courts, since compliance with the separation of powers 
doctrine is sometimes achieved by deferring to the political branches of government, 
the operation of the doctrine of deference is nowadays significantly constrained. Gone 
are the days where South African courts would defer to other branches of government 
without merit. Today, deference is exercised only in limited constitutional and 
administrative law cases.656 Suffice then to say that the doctrine of deference is 
circumscribed to the point that it does not mean total submission to the other branches 
of government. The point is clearly made by Hoexter657 who submits that:  
‘Whatever deference means…it ought not to imply abstentionism or total submissiveness 
to the other branches of government, evoking old South African nightmares of judicial 
prostration to the dictates of the executive. Rather, the sort of deference we should be 
aspiring to consists of a judicial willingness to appreciate the legitimate and 
constitutionally-ordained province of administrative agencies; to admit the expertise of 
those agencies in policy-laden or polycentric issues; to accord their interpretations of fact 
                                                          
654 For an explanation as to how executive-mindedness on the part of the judges can manifest in the 
form of judicial minimalism, judicial deference, and/or the political question doctrine, refer to the 
discussion under heading 4.5 in chapter 4 above. 
 
655 More detail on these doctrines can be found in the discussion under subheadings 3.5.2.5 and 3.5.2.6 
in chapter 3 above. 
 
656 See D Brand ‘Judicial deference and democracy in socio-economic rights cases in South Africa’ 
(2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review  614-615. See also C Hoexter ‘Judicial policy revisited: 
Transformative adjudication in administrative law (2008) 24 South African Journal on Human Rights 
281 at 293. 
 
657 Hoexter ‘The future of judicial review in South African administrative law’ (2000) 117 South African 




and law due respect; and to be sensitive in general to the interests legitimately pursued 
by administrative bodies and the practical and financial constraints under which they 
operate. This type of deference is perfectly consistent with a concern for individual rights 
and a refusal to tolerate corruption and maladministration. It ought to be shaped not by 
an unwillingness to scrutinize administrative action, but by a careful weighing up of the 
need for - and the consequences of - judicial intervention. Above all, it ought to be shaped 
by a conscious determination not to usurp the functions of administrative agencies; not 
to cross over from review to appeal’ (footnotes omitted). 
A very important point to remember in applying the deference doctrine is that it should 
not be done in a ‘formalistic, heavy-handed or mechanical way’.658 This means that 
there should be no fixed rules as to when deference is certain to be undertaken. Every 
matter must be decided on its own merits. As such, it cannot be said with certainty that 
there is or there is no possibility that the need for deference might arise in the context 
of security laws. However, given the wide right of access to the courts envisaged in 
the interpretation regime which is presently being established, there appears to be a 
very limited space for the possibility of any sort of deference on the part of the courts. 
Limiting deference as much as possible translates into the proper and full enjoyment 
of the right of access to the courts. 
Turning to the doctrine of judicial minimalism, it is also noteworthy that the minimalist 
style of adjudication which South African courts do sometimes adopt is so 
circumscribed that South Africans can rest assured that it would never be at such a 
scale that the courts simply avoid politically-sensitive matters.659 One example where 
South African courts are observed to be adhering to the doctrine of minimalism is when 
they prefer, as they usually do, incremental and theoretically modest legal 
development, which allows jurisprudence to grow on a case-by-case basis and with 
judgments being limited to nothing more than what needs to be said to decide a matter 
(and leave as much as possible undecided).660  
                                                          
658 Ibid at 503. 
 
659 See I Currie ‘Judicious avoidance’ (1999) 15 South African Journal on Human Rights 138-165. 
 
660 Ibid at 147-148. This is also known as ‘decisional minimalism’. 
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Also, the ‘avoidance’ doctrines such as that of ripeness and mootness are all 
associated with minimalism, 661 as they can operate to limit the extent of judicial 
intervention. Also included in the list of the various forms in terms of which minimalism 
can manifest is the requirement that a party to litigation must have a ‘sufficient interest 
in the outcome’ (locus standi), as well as the principle that a court can choose not to 
hear a matter on the basis that it is not in the ‘interests of justice’ that the matter be 
heard.662  
The foregoing examples constitute the few instances where modern South African 
courts justifiably exercise judicial minimalism. In any event, it is not always possible 
for South African judges to strive to be what in legal theory is referred to as a 
‘herculean judge’.663 Visualised as a herculean judge is a mythical figure of a judge 
who has the time and talent to always produce comprehensive and substantive 
judgments which do not only answer specific cases, but also explain all the past and 
future cases.664 This justifies the limited scope for judicial minimalism in any legal 
system. 
Once again, there can be no fixed rule(s) as to when the exercise of minimalism in 
security matters is justified. However, what seems clear is that the rather wide right of 
access to the courts envisaged by the interpretation regime cannot be effected by a 
judge with a minimalist mind-set.  
Lastly, on the political question doctrine, it is noteworthy that the denunciation of this 
doctrine is evident from the fact that the South African Constitution mandates the 
courts to review the exercises of public power and not hide behind what has become 
                                                          
661 Ibid at 147. 
 
662 Ibid. The operation of the interests of justice criterion can be observed in a number of instances in 
South African law, such as when superior courts decide whether to exercise their inherent power (in 
terms of s 173 of the Constitution) to set their own procedures and develop the common law, as well as  
when an appeal or direct access to the Constitutional Court (being the highest court in the land) is 
sought in terms of s 67(6)(a) and (b) of the Constitution.  
The foregoing is in sharp contrast to the position in the United States where the United States’ Supreme 
Court has the prerogative (i.e. ‘control over its own docket’ -  to use the appropriate terminology) to 
choose the cases it wishes to hear (Ellman op cit (n40) 68). A case requires four of the nine members 
of the court to vote in favour of hearing the matter (ibid). Failing this criteria, the matter will not be heard. 
 
663 See Currie op cit (n659) 145-147, who cites Ronald Dworkin’s conception of a Herculean judge. 
 
664 Currie op cit (n659) 143 & 145-147. 
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universally known as the ‘political question’ doctrine. 665  Writings that ponder on 
whether or not South African jurisprudence incorporates the political question doctrine 
also illustrate the precarious nature of this doctrine in South Africa.666 The overall 
conclusion reached in academic literature refutes the applicability of the political 
question doctrine, as understood and applied in the United States.667  
In actual fact, there is general consensus that the post-apartheid South African 
jurisprudence never adopted any doctrine which resembles the political question 
doctrine.668 Further support for the denunciation of the political question doctrine is 
also located in the possibility that even in the United States, which has been very much 
familiar with this doctrine, the use of the doctrine is declining, and is perhaps nearing 
the point of extinction.669  
 
7.2.3 Other developments that enhance access to the courts 
An indication of the fruition of the full enjoyment of the right of access to the courts in 
South Africa can be observed from the possibility that an otherwise non-justiciable 
matter may nonetheless receive the attention of the court if so doing is in the interests 
                                                          
665 Ellman op cit (n40) 67-68. The author further notes that the South African Constitution creates an 
obligation on the courts to rule on matters before them (ibid at 67). This implies that the courts cannot 
hide under some legal niceties to avoid deciding cases. This includes doctrines such as that of 
minimalism, deference and that of political questions. 
 
666 See C Okpaluba ‘Justiciability, constitutional adjudication and the political question in a nascent 
democracy: South Africa (part 1)’ (2003) 18 SA Public Law 331-348; and  C Okpaluba ‘Justiciability, 
constitutional adjudication and the political question in a nascent democracy: South Africa (part 2)’ 
(2004) 19 SA Public Law 114-131.  
 
667 It is noteworthy that South Africa has not had cases that call directly for the invocation of the political 
question doctrine. Instead, the South African cases which come close to requiring the invocation of the 
political question doctrine have been in the administrative-law context, particularly in cases where the 
courts had to decide whether particular conduct falls within the purview of the Legislature or the 
Executive and is therefore exempt from judicial review. Although decisions which are political in nature 
or which amount to policy decisions (i.e. the so-called executive and legislative decisions) are not 
subject to judicial review, it does not always follow that such decisions are always non-justiciable. This 
is because judicial review based on the principle of legality has since been recognised and utilised by 
the courts as the basis for reviewing such executive and legislative acts. The foregoing proves that even 
executive and legislative decisions are not, as a rule, non-justiciable political questions (see generally 
Okpaluba (part 1) op cit (n666)  333).  
 
668 Swart & Coggin op cit (n268) 363. See also Ellman op cit (n40) 67. 
 
669 Swart & Coggin op cit (n268) 362-363. 
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of justice.670 Ellman671 correctly observes that a matter that is not ripe for adjudication 
or is moot may nonetheless be admitted for adjudication if it is in the interests of justice 
to do so. This is in line with the inherent jurisdiction given to the superior courts in 
South Africa to regulate their own procedures in accordance with the interests of 
justice.672  
Moreover, the Constitutional Court is enjoined to hear not just constitutional matters673 
(as was the case previously), but also ‘any other matter if the Constitutional Court 
grants leave to appeal on the grounds that the matter raises an arguable point of law 
of general public importance which ought to be considered by that Court’.674 
To further enhance access to the courts, the South African Constitution provides for 
flexible or wide locus standi (i.e. legal standing) requirements especially in 
constitutional matters. 675  The locus standi requirements in section 38 of the 
Constitution notably lower the threshold for accessing the courts by allowing the courts 
to hear a matter brought by a person acting on behalf of a class of persons or even in 
the public interest. Thus, section 38 extends locus standi to litigants beyond those with 
a direct and substantial interest in the subject-matter and outcome of the litigation.676 
Consequently, virtually any stakeholder or person with an interest in security laws, be 
it government, non-governmental organisations, pressure groups or any private 
                                                          
670 On the notion of interests of justice generally, see note 662 above. For a critical engagement with 
the notion of the interests of justice criterion, see K Moshikaro ‘Against the interests of justice: Ignoring 
distributive justice when certifying class actions (2015) 7 Constitutional Court Review 291-319. 
 
671 Ellman op cit (n40) 68. 
 
672 See s 173 of the Constitution. 
 
673 Section 167(3)(b)(i) of the Constitution. 
 
674 Section 167(3)(b)(ii) of the Constitution. 
 
675 See generally CF Swanepoel ‘The judicial application of the interest requirement for standing in 
constitutional cases: A radical and deliberate departure from common law’ (2014) 47 De Jure 63-84. 
See also E Hurter ‘Class action: Failure to comply with guidelines laid down by courts ruled fatal 2010 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 409  at 410. See further Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell 
NO 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 1065G-I; and Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern 
Cape 2001 2 SA 609 (EC) 618I-619F. 
 
676 Ellman (op cit (n40) 67) contrasts the South African position regarding locus standi with that of the 
United States and concludes that the United States does not have such relaxed rules for standing, 




person, has access to a platform that will objectively consider whatever security-
related issue being raised.677  
It would not be a strange occurrence in South Africa should organisations enter into 
litigation on behalf of their members, even in political cases. This happened during the 
tenure of the authoritarian apartheid regime, though in very limited cases. In Wood v 
Odangwa Tribal Authority,678 the court took a rather bold and unprecedented step to 
grant church leaders an interdict against the future infliction of corporal punishment by 
tribal authorities on certain identified members or sympathisers of political parties on 
behalf of whom they (the church leaders) were acting. Such infliction of punishment 
by tribal authorities typically proceeded without there having been a trial and legal 
representation for accused persons. The court therefore preferred a wide 679 
interpretation of the locus standi requirements in cases involving violations of life, 
liberty or physical intergrity.680 Parties to cases that did not involve violations of life, 
liberty or physical integrity were however not afforded the benefit of a relaxed 
approach to locus standi.681  
Continuing along the same line of reasoning as that of the court in the Wood case,  the 
court in African National Congress (Border Branch) v Chairman, Council of the State 
of the Republic of Ciskei682 granted locus standi to a political party acting on behalf of 
                                                          
677 C Loots ‘Standing to enforce fundamental rights’ (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 
49. 
 
678 1975 (2) SA 294 (A). 
 
679 Loots (op cit (n677) 49-51) also presents a compelling case of how the locus standi jurisprudence in 
India was also moving in the same direction adopted by the court in the Wood case. 
 
680  Loots op cit (n677) 51. The Rhodesian court (now Zimbabwean court) in Deary NO v Acting 
President, Rhodesia1979 (4) SA 43 (R) relied on the Wood case when it upheld the locus standi of 
applicants acting in the interest of those who would be subject to executions conducted under martial 
law. Clearly the violation of the right to life was a real possibility, and so the court deemed it proper to 
extend the locus standi principle emanating from the Wood case. 
 
681 See, for instance, National Education Crisis Committee v State President of the Republic of South 
Africa (W) unreported case no 16736/86  of 9 September 1986, a case which concerns the 
determination of the locus standi of a group representing the interests of black school children’s right to 
education. See also Cabinet of the Transitional Government for the territory of South Africa v Eins 1988 
(3) SA 369 (A) concerning the determination of the locus standi of a citizen in an application to have a 
piece of legislation declared unconstitutional. Loots (op cit (n677) 52) points out that the courts in both 
cases mentioned above could have bypassed the locus standi barrier by extending the application of 
the locus standi principle in the Wood case beyond its narrow limits. 
 
682 1992 (4) SA 434 (Ck). 
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its members in claiming an order declaring certain security legislation unconstitutional 
and invalid. From then onwards, a relaxed approach to determining locus standi, which 
was propelled further by the adoption of the Interim Constitution with identical locus 
standi provisions as those presently in section 38 of the South African Constitution, 
was, and continues to be, openly acknowledged and embraced.683 Consequently, it is 
prudent to claim that virtually any stakeholder with an interest in security matter can 
approach the courts. 
In addition to the flexible rules of standing, the full enjoyment of the right of access to 
the courts is also bolstered by the possibility of amicus curiae participation in litigation. 
By definition, ‘[a]n amicus curiae (‘friend of the court’) is a non-litigious party that joins 
the litigation to assist the court to reach its decision’.684 Therefore, interested third 
parties who probably do not have locus standi have the option of joining the litigation 
as amici curiae.685 Traditionally, an amicus was a neutral friend of the court who 
assisted it not to err.686 Indeed, this was the understanding based on which the court 
in Connock’s (SA) Motor Co Ltd v Pretorius687 incorporated amici curiae into South 
African law.  
However, today, amici curiae often intervene on the basis of their own interest and 
that of the public.688 Thabane689 further observes that the role of an amicus is shifting 
                                                          
683 See Loots op cit (n677) 56-59. 
 
684 A Spies ‘Reconsidering the amicus curiae participation in S v Zuma: Lessons for future participation’ 
(2015) 28 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 59 at 62. Other definitions can be found in T 
Thabane ‘Stacking the odds against the accused’: Appraising the curial attitude towards amici 
participation in criminal matters’ (2011) 24 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 19. 
 
685 JC Mubangizi and C Mbazira ‘Constructing the amicus curiae procedure in human rights litigation: 
What can Uganda learn from South Africa’ (2012) 16 Law, Democracy and Development 199 at 203. 
For reasons as to why not all third parties would have locus standi to join as parties or why it may be 
inappropriate to admit every interested third party as a party to the litigation, see C Murray ‘Litigating in 
the public interest: Intervention and the amicus curiae (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 
240 at 240-241. 
 
686 Thabane op cit (n684) 25. 
 
687 1939 TPD  355. The court (at 357) expressed that an amicus curiae is:  
‘a bystander – someone who is present in court and not concerned with the matter in hand, who 
may be counsel or may not. He is a person who, if he observes the judge in doubt about something, 
or likely to fall into error through failure to recollect a fact of which he ought to take cognizance, 
such as a legal decision or a statute, asks leave to come to his assistance and to mention it, and 
thus help the judge by pointing out what appears to be in danger of being overlooked’. 
 




from that of being a friend of the court to that of being a friend of the party to the 
litigation, thus clearly illustrating the partisanship of an amicus today. Be that as it may, 
amici curiae are very useful ‘where the parties inadvertently, deliberately or due to 
want of expertise, do not address some of the most significant legal questions or 
angles of a case’.690 They can ‘provide contextual evidence to a court to ensure that it 
is aware of the point of view of those who will be affected by its judgment’.691  
Because security matters are typically complex such that counsel is normally required, 
the participation of amici curiae in security matters could well result from the courts’ 
use of its discretion to appoint amici curiae in the case of an unrepresented litigant.692 
Where the accused is well-represented, the courts could also invite an amicus curiae 
to appear and present argument if so doing is deemed necessary.693 Furthermore, 
security matters typically require the participation of an amicus because generally 
there would be a need for the court to assess the impact of the decision on the lives 
of citizens, and an amicus can advise the court in that regard.694  
A lesson from history could well be that institutions such as the Centre for Applied 
Legal Studies (CALS), the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), as well as the allies of 
these institutions (in the form of various community-based organisations) would be the 
typical third parties with an interest in security matters, as was the case under 
                                                          
689 Thabane op cit (n684) 23 & 25-27 
 
690 Thabane op cit (n684) 24. 
 
691 Spies op cit (n684) 62. 
 
692 Murray (op cit (n685) 241-243) details the various other instances where the participation of amici 
curiae is typically observed. One of these instances is when a matter raises complex issues and the 
court, in its discretion, facilitates the appointment of a legal representative in the case of an 
unrepresented litigant. Indeed, the Constitutional Court in the case of S v Okah 2018 (1) SACR 492 
(CC) at para 15 took it upon itself to open up the matter to interested third parties with expertise in 
international law. Two amici (namely, the Institute for Security Studies and the Southern African 
Litigation Centre) applied and were duly admitted, and the court expressed its gratitude for their 
contributions. 
 
693 One example of the case where arguments of the amicus were requested  at the behest of the Chief 
Justice was in the case of S v Molimi 2008 (2) SACR 76 (CC). See further Thabane op cit (n684) 31. 
 
694 On the role of an amicus in advising the court on the impact of its decision on the rights of citizens, 
see Thabane op cit (n684) 22-25). 
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apartheid.695 The aforementioned institutions notably organised legal representation 
or funded the legal representatives of detainees under the old apartheid security laws.  
The challenge that interested third parties in security matters face should they wish to 
litigate in security matters is therefore no longer that of locus standi, as there is the 
option of joining as amici curiae. Indeed, the Rules of the various superior courts in 
South Africa accommodate the participation of amici curiae. However, the position 
regarding the admission of amici curiae, especially in criminal law matters, is still rather 
controversial. The difficulty with admitting amici curiae in criminal matters arises when 
the amici curiae supports the case for the state, and, in so doing, prejudices the free 
trial rights of the accused person who, after the admission of amici curiae, must answer 
the state’s case which is strengthened by the submissions of amici curiae. 696  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, fortunately, future challenges to South Africa’s post-
apartheid security laws are,  as seen under subheading 6.2.3 in chapter 6 (during the 
discussion of the various approaches to interpreting the impugned security provisions), 
most likely to raise a constitutional issue697 and, as a result, the participation of amici 
curiae would  not be controversial even in the High Court.698 Furthermore, as some 
security matters would, in one way or another, end up in the Supreme Court of Appeal 
                                                          
695 See S Golub ‘Battling apartheid, building a new South Africa’ in S Golub & M McClymont Many 
Roads to Justice: The Law Related Work Of Ford Foundation Grantees Around The World (2000) 23. 
For an account of the public interest litigation which the LRC and CALS engaged in during apartheid, 
see S Golub op cit 25-33.  
As reflected under note 692 above, other amici with an interest in security matters include the Institute 
for Security Studies and the Southern African Litigation Centre. 
 
696 For a full discussion of the complex issues involved, see Spies op cit (n684) and Thabane op cit 
(n684). 
 
697 There are various ways through which a constitutional issue might arise in the context of South 
Africa’s security laws. The most obvious is the fact that some of the current security provisions violate 
certain fundamental rights. A constitutional issue can also arise from the fact that each of the suggested 
approaches to interpreting security provisions test the limits of the principle of legality to the extent that 
it might well be that, on a deeper analysis, they might be in violation of the legality principle or the rule 
of law, and thus unconstitutional. The possibilities are indeed endless.   
 
698 Note that Rule 16A of the Rules applicable in the High Court permits the participation of amici curiae 
only in matters that raise a constitutional issue. This however is not the requirement in the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and in the Constitutional Court (see J Brickhill ‘The intervention of amici curiae in 




and/or in the Constitutional Court, fortunately, the Rules of these courts allow amici 
curiae participation in any matter, and not just constitutional matters.699  
In closure, given that the first technique of the interpretation regime eliminates 
whatever external obstacles there may be to having security matters come before 
court and to having them subjected to proper constitutional scrutiny and interpretation 
in light of the rule of law and human rights, it follows that this technique is therefore 
the procedural component of the interpretation regime. Indeed, none of the methods 
for ensuring the proper and full enjoyment of access to the courts in security matters 
have any bearing on the actual substance of security laws. 
 
7.3 TECHNIQUE 2: THE USE OF RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION, 
SEVERANCE, READING-DOWN AND READING-IN  
The second technique of the interpretation regime follows naturally after the first 
technique has been fully observed (i.e. after access to the courts has been fully 
realised). This second technique emerges from the suggestions (made in the 
discussion under subheading 6.2.3 in chapter 6 above) as to how best the courts can 
approach the interpretation of security laws, bearing in mind the need to uphold and 
protect of the rule of law and human rights in the process. In analysing the said 
interpretative suggestions, it is observed that all the suggestions made boil down to 
the use of restrictive interpretation,700 severance,701 reading-down702 and/or reading-
in.703 These then become tools that work best in the context of the interpretation of 
security laws.  
To understand the operation of restrictive interpretation, severance, reading-down and 
reading-in in the context of legal interpretation, it is important to note the ordinary rules 
                                                          
699 Note that Rule 16 which is applicable in the Supreme Court of Appeal as well as Rule 10 applicable 
in the Constitutional Court allow the admission of amici curiae if they are ‘interested in any matter before 
court’. See also Brickhill op cit (n698) 392.  
 
700 For what restrictive interpretation entails, refer to note 532 above. 
 
701 The detail on severance can be found under note 583 above. 
 
702 For an explanation of what reading-down entails, see note 533 above. 
 
703 For a description of reading-in, see note 534 above. 
177 
 
of interpretation expounded in the recent judgment of the Constitutional Court in Cool 
Ideas 1186 v Hubbard and another,704 to the effect that:  
 ‘A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that the words in a statute must be given 
their ordinary grammatical meaning, unless to do so would result in an absurdity. There are 
three important interrelated riders to this general principle, namely: 
(a) that statutory provisions should always be interpreted purposively; 
(b) the relevant statutory provision must be properly contextualised; and 
(c) all statutes must be construed consistently with the Constitution, that is, where 
reasonably possible, legislative provisions ought to interpreted to preserve their 
constitutional validity. This proviso to the general principle is closely related to the 
purposive approach referred to in (a)’. 
The pursuit of the ordinary grammatical meaning of security provisions would 
undoubtedly lead to absurd results, the worst of these being the unenviable 
infringement of the rule of law and some fundamental human rights and freedoms. The 
interpretation of apartheid security and emergency legislation (detailed in the 
discussion under heading 4.5 in chapter 4 above), which was driven by executive-
mindedness on the part of judges of the courts and the literal interpretation of legal 
provisions, is a glaring example of the absurd results the pursuit of ordinary 
grammatical meaning of words in security and emergency legislation can give rise to. 
However, through restrictive interpretation, severance, reading-down and reading-in, 
the courts are able to formulate constitutionally sound interpretations which salvage 
the absurd results stemming from the ordinary grammatical meaning of security 
provisions. 
The foregoing shines light on restrictive interpretation, severance, reading-down and 
reading-in, and makes these the vital tools for use in the interpretation of the 
substantive content of security laws. Because the second technique has a bearing on 
the actual substance of security laws (i.e. it directs how the impugned provisions of 
security laws must actually be interpreted), it becomes the substantive component of 
the interpretation regime.  
                                                          
704 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC) para 28. 
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Ultimately, the interpretation regime in its entirety guides the courts towards 
interpreting security laws in a manner that is cognisant and respectful of the rule of 
law and human rights, thus achieving the necessary balance and preserving the 
constitutional validity of security laws.  
 
7.4 FURTHER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE INTERPRETATION REGIME 
The discussion which follows in 7.4.1 to 7.4.3 below presents other justifications for 
the interpretation regime, which justifications are in addition to the fact that the regime 
has the ability to facilitate the interpretation of security laws in a manner that is 
consistent with the rule of law and human rights. 
 
7.4.1 Argument for the interpretation regime based on the judicial policy  
It is submitted that the strength of the security laws’ interpretation regime lies in its 
ability to give effect to a transformative, liberal, purposive and substantive 
interpretation of security laws, as desired by the South African ‘judicial policy’705 as 
well as the values, ideologies and ethos encapsulated therein.706 Although the South 
                                                          
705 The notion of a judicial policy is an unacknowledged but existing policy underpinning the judiciary in 
all of its tasks, which includes legal interpretation. It came to the fore in the mid-1980s through the 
writings of Cora Hoexter who motivated for the recognition of the fact that judges, too, have their own 
judicial policy which they should be allowed to pursue (C Hoexter ‘Judicial policy in South Africa’ (1986) 
103 South African law Journal 436 at 442). In justifying the existence of the judicial policy, Hoexter (in 
C Hoexter ‘Judicial policy again’ (1990) 6 South African Journal on Human Rights 412 at 415) argued 
that the judicial policy is:  
‘…rooted in self-defence; for, while judges have honourably kept their promise not to meddle in 
politics, politicians have steadily encroached on the common law and on legal and judicial 
autonomy. Judicial policy offers a means of defending that autonomy, and of regaining lost ground’. 
During apartheid, judicial policy became a solution to the dilemma faced by liberal and conscientious 
judges when they had to apply the manifestly unjust and immoral apartheid laws, as it provided 
justification for the judges’ choice of liberal rather than repressive values when deciding cases (Hoexter 
(2008) op cit (n656) 283). Therefore, judicial policy allowed judges to ‘break out of the constraints of 
parliamentary sovereignty and realise their own power to do good in a repressive legal system’ (Hoexter 
(2008) op cit (n656) 286).  
 
706 Hoexter openly acknowledges that the concept of a judicial policy is a term she uses for what others 
call legal ideology or legal ethos (Hoexter (1986) op cit (n705) 442). Therefore, encapsulated within 
South Africa’s judicial policy are liberal legal ethos or values, such as freedom, dignity, equality, the rule 
of law, the independent judiciary, and the legitimacy of judge-made laws, to mention but a few (Hoexter 
(2008) op cit (n656) 283; and Hoexter (1986) op cit (n705) 442). Ultimately, what lies at the heart of the 
judicial policy is simply the rendering of justice by the judiciary, especially when interpreting legal 
provisions. Enabling the rendering of justice might even entail acknowledging the political role of judges, 
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African judiciary has not openly acknowledged its observance of, or adherence to, a 
judicial policy when deciding cases, remnants of the existence of a judicial policy and 
adherence thereto by the courts are nonetheless visible and have been identified by 
legal scholars and jurists.707  
The prevailing judicial policy currently goes by the name of transformative 
adjudication.708 It operates mainly by bolstering the judiciary to prefer transformative, 
liberal, purposive and/or substantive interpretations of the law, instead of the 
conservative, mechanical, artificial and/or technical interpretations associated with 
legal formalism.709 To arrive at a transformative, liberal, purposive and/or substantive 
interpretation of the law, judges must be creative or constructive in their interpretation 
of the law, they must look beyond existing authority and factor in the prevailing moral, 
social, political and economic conditions on the ground, and must  ultimately strive for 
an interpretation that promotes justice to be done.  
                                                          
and that legal adjudication goes beyond the mere consideration of legal authority to the consideration 
of moral values or ideas.        
 
707 Refer to the work of scholars and judges cited throughout Hoexter’s 1986, 1990 and 2008 articles.  
 
708 Hoexter (2008) op cit (n656) 286. Transformative adjudication is a natural adjunct to transformative 
constitutionalism, which is a pillar of the South African Constitution. As Hoexter (in Hoexter (2008) op 
cit (n656) 284) correctly submits: 
‘The transformative project of the interim Constitution was made especially obvious by the ‘bridge’ 
metaphor used in its epilogue. The 1996 Constitution is a little less explicit about it, perhaps, but 
there is no mistaking the transformative aim of provisions that require the state to act positively to 
realise rights (s 7), that uphold a substantive conception of equality (s 9(2)) or that envisage the 
inexorable transmutation of the common law (s 39(2)). In view of these and other such provisions, 
there can be no doubt that our Constitution ‘offers a vision of the future’. Its transformative purpose 
has indeed been affirmed by the Constitutional Court on a number of occasions’. (footnotes omitted) 
Brand (op cit (n656) 622) further adds: 
‘I subscribe to the notion first put forward by Karl Klare and later developed by many others that the 
South African Constitution is a transformative document in that it has a certain political character; 
in short that it embodies a certain vision of society and requires positive action on the side of all 
agencies of the state toward the attainment of that vision. This transformative duty - the duty to 
work toward the achievement of the constitutional vision of society - is one that rests also on courts. 
Courts must also, in both the outcomes they generate in their judgments and the manner in which 
they reach their judgments (their reasoning and judicial "method"), to the extent that it "innovate[s] 
and model[s] intellectual and institutional practices" for the rest of society, work toward the 
achievement of the society envisaged in the Constitution’. (footnotes omitted) 
 
The judicial policy of transformative adjudication is therefore the judiciary’s vehicle for achieving the 
Constitution’s transformative agenda. What this means is that all facets of the judiciary in South Africa 
(from judicial mind-set, to legal culture, to legal procedure, to legal philosophy, to legal reasoning and 
to legal interpretation) are underpinned by the ideal of transformative adjudication, the end goal of which 
is to give effect to the Constitution’s ideal of transformative constitutionalism. 
 




It is at this point that we see both techniques of the interpretation regime being the 
practical manifestation of the ambitious aim of the judicial policy of transformative 
adjudication, which is to preach to the uninitiated judges with the view to convert them 
away from the indoctrinated culture of formalistic legal reasoning to being judges with 
fortitude and zeal for true justice resulting from constructive and liberal interpretations 
of the law informed by, or cognisant of, the prevailing moral, 710 social, political and 
economic conditions.711  
Therefore, owing to the existence of the interpretation regime, judges now have a 
proper yardstick guiding them towards a transformative, purposive and/or substantive 
interpretation of security laws, in accordance with the dictates of the prevailing judicial 
policy. Even more advantageous to the judges is the availability of suggested 
approaches to interpreting some of the impugned security provisions, 712  which 
suggestions are endorsed by the interpretation regime and are also consistent with 
the prevailing judicial policy. These suggestions are also cognisant and respectful of 
the rule of law and human rights. 
 
                                                          
710 This point is also recognised by researchers in the interpretation of law field. Singh (op cit (n532) 
165) makes this clear when she submits:  
‘It is submitted that in a transformative Constitution, as alluded to, the function of the judge has to 
be a moral function. What is therefore required in the process of interpretation, is that judges need 
to embrace the challenge to give effect to social justice, by paying particular attention to the ethical 
and moral considerations in the process of legal reasoning and analysis of cases before them’. 
 
711 Compare the interpretation advanced by the interpretation regime with the interpretation preferred 
by the majority of the Appellate Division, as it was then known, in a matter decided during a state of 
emergency and on the brink of the end of apartheid.  In S v Toms; S v Bruce 1990 (2) SA 802 (A), the 
notoriously executive-minded appeal court was asked to determine whether the penalty in the Defence 
Act 44 of 1957 was mandatory and therefore deprived the court of its usual discretion to impose a lesser 
sentence. The court therefore had to make a difficult choice between a liberal interpretation which vests 
the court with sentencing jurisdiction or a repressive interpretation depriving the court of jurisdiction. To 
the surprise of many, the majority of the court opted for a liberal interpretation and found that the court 
could impose a lesser sentence. This case marked a significant departure from the executive-minded 
approach typically characteristic of the appeal court during apartheid, to a more liberal approach to 
statutory interpretation (for an in-depth commentary on this case, see Hoexter (1990) op cit (n705)).  
 




7.4.2  Argument for the interpretation regime based on its ability to facilitate the 
interpretation of security provisions that is consistent with the text, context and 
purpose of the POCDATARA713 
It further bodes well for the interpretation regime that it is capable of facilitating the 
interpretation of security provisions that does not lose sight of, or that is consistent 
with, the text, context and purpose of the POCDATARA. As such, in the case of 
security provisions in the POCDATARA, the interpretation regime cannot be 
disregarded on the basis that it (especially through its second technique of using 
restrictive interpretation, severance, reading-down and reading-in) facilitates an 
interpretation that unduly strains the text or language of the legislation, or that extends 
the meaning of the words in the legislation beyond what they are reasonably capable 
of meaning.714 
                                                          
713 Supra (n22). 
 
714 A recent example of a case where the interpretation arrived at in reading-down the impugned 
provisions was found to unduly strain the text of the enactment is the case of Moyo v Minister of Police 
supra (n533). In this case,  a constitutional challenge was brought against, inter alia,  the broad offence 
of intimidation in s 1(1)(b) of the Intimidation Act 72 of 1982. The said challenge was on the basis that 
s 1(1)(b) unjustifiably infringed the right to freedom of expression in s 16 of the Constitution. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) had attempted to cure the potential unconstitutionality by reading-down 
the section in conformity with the Constitution. Thus, it added into the provisions of s 1(1)(b) the 
requirements of fault (mens rea) and unlawfulness, and that the intimidatory conduct complained of 
must induce an objectively reasonable fear of imminent harm (and not just a subjective fear of harm to 
the safety of another or the subjective fear of harm to one’s own safety, property and security of 
livelihood) (paras 14 – 19). 
When the matter came before the Constitutional Court, the court took the view that the requirements of 
fault (mens rea) and unlawfulness were not read into the legislation as alleged by the SCA, instead 
reading a statute (such as the Intimidation Act) as incorporating fault and unlawfulness was a 
recognised canon of construction of criminal statutes, and so doing formed part of a permissible manner 
of reading criminal statutes (para 61). The court reasoned further that the interpretative approach of the 
SCA fell outside the reasonable construction of the text of the legislation, such that it was a strained 
interpretation of the language or text of the statute. Therefore, it was found that the SCA’s ‘imminent 
harm’ requirement could not have been contemplated by the text, context and purpose of s 1(1)(b) (para 
67).  The Constitutional Court then concluded that s 1(1)(b) was unconstitutional.  
The decision in the Moyo case seems to have long been awaited given that various other restrictive 
interpretations of the Act (similar to those of the SCA) had long been questioned and rejected as not 
being appropriate (see S Hoctor ‘The intimidatingly broad crime of intimidation: S v Cele 2008 JDR 
0123 (N)’ (2008) 29 Obiter 283-290). Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be pointed out that the court 
in Moyo did not generally outlaw the use of reading-down and other similar techniques. Instead, the 
court rejected the manner in which reading-down was undertaken by the SCA in the matter, i.e. to use 
the reading-down method to interpret s 1(1)(b) in a manner that is inconsistent with text, context and 
purpose of the Act, thus ultimately rewriting the section and/or contributing to rendering the section so 
vague that the person who is charged would not understand the charge against him or her. Therefore, 
it is perhaps too much a  stretch of the finding of the court in Moyo to claim that the court found that ‘the 
overbreadth of criminal prohibitions cannot be cured by interpretation because people will inevitably be 
deterred into not engaging in constitutionally protected speech, erring on the side of caution – the so 
called “chilling effect” of speech prohibitions’ (J Botha ‘Constitutional Court declares draconian 
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In showing that the interpretation regime facilitates the interpretation of security 
provisions in the POCDATARA that is consistent with the text, context and purpose of 
the legislation, the reasoning process must mirror that of the Constitutional Court in 
post-apartheid South Africa’s recent terrorism case, that being the S v Okah715 case. 
In this case, the Constitutional Court had to interpret the jurisdiction clause in the 
POCDATARA in order to dispose of the issue as to whether the South African court 
had jurisdiction to try the bombing acts planned and financed in South Africa but 
executed elsewhere. The court’s reasoning process entailed interpreting the actual 
text of the relevant section or clause716 and thereafter proceeding to show that the 
interpretation so adopted does not strain the text or language of the legislation and 
that it is justified by the context and purpose of the Act, as derived from the short title, 
long title, preamble and the entire legislative scheme.717  
For many of the provisions in the POCDATARA, the need for the interpretation thereof 
would typically arise in the event of a constitutional challenge which results in some 
special interpretation being needed to preserve the constitutional validity of the 
impugned provision. Thus, in the event of a constitutional challenge to the overly broad 
provisions of section 1(1)(xxv) of the POCDATARA (the definition of terrorist activity), 
the interpretative approach (suggested by Roach 718  and also supported by the 
                                                          
Intimidation Act section unconstitutional: Plus, lessons in statutory interpretation (October 2019) e-
Mantshi Newsletter (issue 158) available at http://www.justiceforum.co.za/JET-LTN.ASP). 
 
715 Supra (n692). 
 
716 See paras 18-33. 
 
717 See paras 34-43. This approach is in fact a standard approach in the interpretation of statutes. It 
was, for instance, observed by the court in Moyo (supra (n533)) in its process of interpreting the 
impugned provisions of the Intimidation Act (supra (n714)), and it has been the standard approach in 
interpreting the provisions in the POCA (supra (n544)). Note that the Intimidation Act and the POCA 
are similar to the POCDATARA in that all these pieces of legislation comprise provisions that are 
worded broadly. Some of the leading POCA cases in which the courts the adopted the same reasoning 
approach as in Okah include National Director of Public Prosecutions v Carolus 2000 (1) SA 1127 
(SCA); National Director of Public Prosecutions v Rebuzzi 2002 (1) SACR 128 (SCA); National Director 
of Public Prosecutions v Mohamed NO 2002 (4) SA 843 (CC); National Director of Public Prosecutions 
v RO Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd; National Director of Public Prosecutions v 37 Gillespie Street Durban 
(Pty) Ltd and Another; National Director of Public Prosecutions v Seevnarayan 2004 (2) SACR 208 
(SCA); Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 (2) SACR 525 (CC); National Director 
of Public Prosecutions v van Staden 2007 (1) SACR 338 (SCA); S v Shaik 2008 (5) SA 354 (CC); and 
Mohunram v National Director of Public Prosecutions (Law Review Project as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (4) 
SA 222 (CC). 
  




interpretation regime) which would preserve the constitutional validity of the section 
entails reading-in the requirement of subjective fault into the provisions of this 
section.719 The question that follows is whether the text, context and purpose of the 
POCDATARA permits this reading of section 1(1)(xxv).  
It will be recalled that the Constitutional Court in the Moyo720 case found that to read 
criminal statutes as incorporating the elements of fault (mens rea) and unlawfulness 
is a recognised and permissible rule of interpreting criminal statutes. The same can 
be applied to section 1(1)(xxv) of the POCDATARA. Consequently, the only 
justification needed in the case of the suggested reading of section 1(1)(xxv) is for the 
preference specifically of subjective fault or intention, and not any other form of fault. 
This point is all the more crucial because there are a number of instances in the 
POCDATARA where the low fault standard (i.e. objective fault or negligence) is clearly 
the envisaged fault standard.  
A low fault standard contributes to having a wide offence of terrorism and related 
activities. In turn, such a wide offence enables South Africa to comply with its obligation 
to combat terrorism and any activity related to it, in whatever form or shape, thereby 
protecting the country’s constitutional democracy as per the Act’s short title. The wide 
offence of terrorism and related activities also propels South Africa towards fulfilling 
its international law obligations, as reflected in the long title and preamble to the 
POCDATARA.  
Notwithstanding the sound reasons for the Legislature’s desire for a wide offence of 
terrorism, the reality of the matter is that the POCDATARA is ‘anything but a paragon 
of clear or deft drafting’721 and the courts cannot, through lenient interpretation, come 
to the aid of the Legislature when it (the Legislature) could have made its intentions 
clear. As is the norm, the courts are bound to interpret criminal statutory provisions 
restrictively and in favour of maximum individual liberty. As such, it is justified to 
                                                          
719 It is submitted that, in addition to Roach’s suggestion, even the restrictive interpretation or reading-
down of the provisions of s 1(1)(xxv)  to require subjective fault could be just as effective in maintaining 
the constitutional validity of this provision. For a full account of the suggested approaches to interpreting 
the impugned provisions of s 1(1)(xxv), refer to the discussion under heading 6.2.3.3 in chapter 6 above. 
 
720 Supra (n533) at para 61. A summary of the case appears in note 714 above. 
 
721 Okah supra (n692) at para 25. 
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impose a strict reading of the extremely wide provisions of section 1(1)(xxv) by adding 
the requirement of subjective fault.  
A strict reading of the wide provisions of section 1(1)(xxv) would also lead to the 
acceptance of the argument by Roach,722 to the effect that where objective fault is the 
envisaged fault standard in the POCDATARA, clear indications to that effect are 
made.723 Consequently, any doubt as to the envisaged fault standard can be decided 
in favour of a stricter standard of subjective fault. This would certainly be an 
interpretation which maximises the liberty of an individual.  
Furthermore, incorporating the requirement of subjective fault would justify and render 
contextually appropriate the severe penalties prescribed for the offence of terrorism, 
which, in terms of section 2 of the POCDATARA, is committed by engaging in a 
terrorist activity as defined in section 1(1)(xxv). 724  Lastly, incorporating the 
requirement of subjective fault would also address the concerns around the issue of 
fair labelling, as no-one would be held liable for terrorism without having subjectively 
intended to commit this offence.725 Therefore, the text, context and purpose of the 
POCDATARA permits the reading of section 1(1)(xxv) as incorporating subjective fault 
or intention. 
A further constitutional challenge might arise in the case of the rather broad provision 
in section 1(1)(xxv)(a)(viii) of the POCDATARA. This provision makes it a terrorist act 
to create a serious public emergency or a general insurrection. The constitutional 
invalidity of this provision could however be avoided if, as per Roach 726  and in 
accordance with the interpretation regime, it is read-down to mean that the creation of 
such serious public emergency or general insurrection can only amount to a terrorist 
                                                          
722 Op cit (n564) 135. 
 
723 There are many instances in the POCDATARA where there is specific reference to objective fault or 
negligence if that is what the Legislature intended. For instance, the use of the phrase ‘ought reasonably 
to have known or suspected’ in ss 3, 4, 11 and 13 of the POCDATARA, is a clear indication that the 
Legislature envisaged objective fault. Section 1(7) of the POCDATARA even defines this phrase, thus 
confirming its objective fault standard. 
 
724 Cachalia op cit (n558) 514 
 
725 Ibid.  
 
726 Roach op cit (n564) 136 
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activity if there has been a declaration of a state of emergency in terms of section 37 
of the South African Constitution.727  
Of course, the text in paragraph (viii) of section 1(1)(xxv)(a) only mentions the creation 
of a serious public emergency or a situation of general insurrection, and does not 
mention the declaration of a state of emergency. However, sight must not be lost of 
the fact that paragraph (viii) creates a platform for dealing with events that ordinarily 
constitute a state of emergency without declaring a state of emergency. Such an 
approach is similar to that of the Disaster Management Act 728 which, during the 
COVID-19 crisis, appears to have given the government extensive powers similar to 
those applicable during an emergency, but without having to declare a state of 
emergency and be subject to the stringent controls available during an emergency. 
Avoiding having to declare a state of emergency is generally justified. Indeed, there 
are serious social, political and economic implications for so doing. However, there is 
even more of a danger if the legal instruments used to bypass having to declare a 
state of emergency give similar powers to those that would have been applicable 
during an emergency, but without putting in place the controls that come with a 
declared state of emergency. This invites the courts to  approach the reading of legal 
instruments such as the POCDATARA and the Disaster Management Act having the 
limitations applicable in an emergency in mind.  
Turning to the section 3 offences associated or connected with terrorist activities, it is 
noteworthy that, in wording the prohibitions, section 3 employs the phrase ‘knows or 
ought reasonably to have known or suspected’, which clearly implies both subjective 
and objective fault. Notwithstanding the clear and unambiguous wording, the ordinary 
meaning of the phrase employed leads to an absurd result, which is that those who 
negligently partake in terrorist activities and those who intentionally engage in terrorist 
activities are treated the same.729  
                                                          
727 Note that the conditions for the declaration of a state of emergency in terms of s 37 of the 
Constitution include, among other things, the existence of a public emergency and a general 
insurrection. 
 
728 57 of 2002. 
 
729 Roach op cit (n564) 143. 
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The foregoing impacts on the principle of proportionality between the offence 
committed and the sentence imposed. 730  Disproportionality of this nature further 
impacts negatively on one’s right to dignity and the right not to be subjected to cruel 
and inhumane punishment. The courts have also interpreted the right in section 12 of 
the Constitution (the right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just 
cause) to have a substantive component, such that this right is violated if a person is 
imprisoned for negligence and the reason for which the state is depriving an individual 
of his or her liberty is insufficient. 731  
A remedy to the unconstitutionality of labelling and punishing as terrorists those who 
negligently partake in terrorist activities, which remedy is also endorsed by the 
interpretation regime, might well be to restrictively interpret section 3 to require a 
‘sufficiently substantial relationship between the assistance provided and the 
prohibited criminal activity’. 732  Another option might be to either strike down as 
unconstitutional the requirement of objective fault or negligence, or sever this 
requirement leaving only subjective fault intact. 733  
The same remedy mentioned above would apply to the offences in sections 4, 11 and 
13(b) of the POCDATARA, as these also employ the phrase ‘knows or ought 
reasonably to have known or suspected’, yet the prescribed sentence for the offences 
in these sections are too severe for offences committed negligently.734 This suggested 
                                                          
730 In terms of s 18(1)(b)(i) of the POCDATARA, punishment for s 3 offences is up to 15 years in the 
High Court and in the Regional Magistrates’ Court. In the case of a District Magistrates’ Court, the 
sentence is any penalty which a District Court may lawfully impose (see s 18(1)(b)(ii)). 
 
731 Powell op cit (n553) 570. 
 
732 Cachalia op cit (n558) 517. 
 
733 Roach (op cit (n564) 142-143). Roach (ibid) also advances two strands of Canadian constitutional 
law which, if adopted and incorporated into South African law, would be used to justify the court’s 
departure from the objective fault requirement. The first strand comprises those principles of 
fundamental justice which require subjective fault for certain offences, owing to their stigma and the 
extent of punishment for those offences. The second strand is also another principle of fundamental 
justice which states that those who cause harm intentionally should be punished more severely than 
those who cause harm unintentionally. 
 
734 For s 4 offences, the High Court and Regional Magistrates’ Court can impose a fine not exceeding 
R100 million or a maximum imprisonment term of 15 years, whereas the District Magistrates’ Court can 
impose a fine not exceeding R250,000 or a maximum imprisonment term of five years (s 18(1)(c)(i) and 
(ii)).  
For s 11 offences, the punishment is the same as that of s3 offences, which is 15 years maximum in 
the High Court as well as in the Regional Magistrates’ Court (s18(1)(b)(i), and any penalty which a 
District Court may lawfully impose (see s 18(1)(b)(ii)).  
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remedy complements the entire legislative scheme of the POCDATARA, the content 
of which is gradually being exposed to be better served by the requirement of 
subjective fault rather than objective fault. This submission is also supported by the 
fact that the offences in sections 5 to 10 correctly require subjective fault, which is 
certainly apt for the penalties that these offences attract.735 
Regarding the wide and potentially unconstitutional accomplice liability or guilt by 
association provisions in sections 3, 4 and 11, the suggested interpretative solution 
entails the restrictive construction or the reading-down of the said sections to require 
a ‘sufficiently substantial relationship between the assistance provided and the 
prohibited criminal activity’ 736  before a person is held liable. This manner of 
interpretation (and that which follows in the few remaining paragraphs of this section) 
is endorsed by the interpretation regime, and it certainly complements the entire 
legislative scheme, text, context and purpose of the POCDATARA. 
Reading-down is also an interpretative solution that is supported by the interpretation 
regime when it comes to preventing the unconstitutionality occasioned by the lack of 
protection against self-incrimination should a person, in compliance with section 12 of 
the POCDATARA, make a report and that same report is used against the person 
making it. In such instances, the broad section 12 duty to report acts of terrorism has 
to be read-down so that it does not apply if its operation would lead to self-
incrimination. 737  Alternatively, there may be the reading-in of the ‘use indemnity’ 
provision, in terms of which the information provided may not be used against the 
person who gave that information.738  
                                                          
The offence in s 12 attracts a fine or an imprisonment term not exceeding five years in the case of the 
High Court and the Regional Magistrates’ Court, whereas the District Magistrates’ Court can impose 
any penalty which it may lawfully impose (s 18(1)(e)). 
For the offence in s 13(1)(a) or (b), the High Court and Regional Magistrates’ Court can impose a fine 
or a maximum imprisonment term of 10 years, whereas the District Magistrates’ Court can impose any 
penalty which it may lawfully impose (s18(1)(d)(i) and (ii)). 
 
735  The maximum penalty which the High Court can impose for these offences is a fine or life 
imprisonment, the Regional Magistrates’ Court can impose a fine or the maximum of 18 years’ 
imprisonment, and the District Magistrates’ Court can impose a fine or the maximum of five years 
imprisonment (see s 18(1)(a)(i) to (iii)). 
 
736 Cachalia op cit (n558) 517. 
 
737 Roach op cit (n564) 146. 
 
738 Powell  op cit (n553) 569; and Roach op cit (n564) 146. 
188 
 
A further interpretative solution recognised and supported by the interpretation regime 
is advanced in response to the constitutional challenges to section 25 of the 
POCDATARA. This section empowers the Executive to designate certain groups as 
terrorist groups. In most instances, the Executive simply adopts the listing by the 
United Nations Security Council of certain groups as terrorist groups. The difficulty 
here is that there is no provision which allows a legal challenge to the Executive listing 
of groups as terrorist groups.739 Also, the determination by the Executive as to which 
group is a terrorist group might violate the separation of powers doctrine, which vests 
the making of decisions as to the guilt or otherwise of any person in an independent 
judiciary after a rigorous and fair adversarial process.740  
Furthermore, the adoption of the United Nations Security Council’s list of terrorist 
organisations could amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by 
Parliament. 741  It is even more unacceptable that such power is delegated to an 
international body with no democratic mandate from South Africans.742 To salvage the 
potential unconstitutionality of section 25, the solution might well be to read-in the right 
to challenge the categorisation of a group as a terrorist group.743  
The wide investigative powers provided for in section 22 of the POCDATARA, which 
powers can be exercised without judicial authorisation, also stand to be read-down to 
require prior judicial authorisation, in order to avoid the far-reaching effects and 
potential unconstitutionality of this provision.  
 
                                                          
739 This could be unconstitutional on various grounds. One instance could be when, for example, a 
person charged with a s 4 offence of financing a terrorist group has his/her right to be presumed 
innocent violated because s 4 accepts the mere decision of the Executive as proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the group being financed is indeed a terrorist group (Roach op cit (n564) 143-144.). Likewise, 
in the case of freezing orders under s 23, a court may make an order freezing property which is believed 
on reasonable grounds to be controlled by an entity identified as a terrorist group, yet it is not possible 
to challenge the listing of that entity as a terrorist group (Powell op cit (n553) 564-565). 
740 Roach op cit (n564) 144. 
 




743 Ibid at 569. 
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7.4.3 Argument for the interpretation regime based on its ability to facilitate the 
development of common-law security crimes within the limits of legality  
In the discussion under subheadings 6.2.3.1 and 6.2.3.2 in chapter 6 above, an 
observation was made to the effect that the approaches to developing the common-
law security crimes of treason and sedition, as suggested by Snyman,744 Burchell745 
and Milton,746 all boil down to the use of restrictive interpretation, reading-down and 
reading-in. This coincides with the second technique of the interpretation regime, and 
so the suggested ways of developing these crimes definitely enjoy the backing of the 
interpretation regime. The one point of contention, however, could well be whether the 
interpretation regime endorses or facilitates the development of common-law security 
crimes in a manner that is permitted by the principle of legality.  
The requirements of the principle of legality are neatly summarised by Hoctor:747  
‘These are inter alia that a court may convict an accused only if the act performed by him 
or her is recognised by the law as a crime (ius acceptum); that a court may convict an 
accused only if the act performed by him or her was already recognised as a crime at the 
time of its commission (ius praevium); that there should be strict construction of penal 
statutes, as a device to preclude analogical extension of the language of penal provisions 
(ius strictum) and; that the definitions of common-law and statutory crimes should be 
reasonably precise and settled (ius certum)’.  
                                                          
744 Recognising the vagueness and possible unconstitutionality of that aspect of the definition of treason 
that makes it treasonable to violate, threaten, or endanger the existence, independence or security of 
the Republic, Snyman (op cit (n129) 307-308) suggests qualifying this aspect by inserting the proviso 
to the effect that such acts are only treasonable if ‘… the conduct is of such a nature that there is a real 
possibility that it will seriously violate, threaten or endanger the existence, independence or security of 
the Republic’. 
 
745 Also recognising the possible constitutional invalidity of the crime of treason, Burchell  (op cit (n132) 
840-841) suggests that another approach to developing the crime of treason may be to establish a post-
medieval form of the crime of treason that distinguishes between internal and external treason. Internal 
treason encompasses conduct that is equally punishable as sedition or public violence (and is perhaps 
better regarded as such in a democratic state in which the rights to freedom of expression and assembly 
envisage there being opposition to the government and the staging of protests to advance grievances 
or to advocate for change and reform). External treason arises when the country is in a state of war or 
is invaded by alien forces and the perpetrator betrays his/her country to its enemies. 
 
746 Milton (op cit (n149) 51) recognises that having the crime of sedition being committed by means of 
non-violent conduct may be unconstitutional because that would most likely infringe the right to freedom 
of expression and the right to gather and protest. He then suggests that the crime of sedition should be 
developed by effectively interpreting non-violent gatherings as not constituting sedition. 
 
747 Hoctor op cit (n126) 81. 
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Two of the requirements of legality (namely, the ius strictum and ius certum) have 
historically rendered the process of developing the common-law crimes extremely 
controversial.748 As a result, even today there are conflicting views as to the extent 
of the courts’ power to develop the common law, particularly the common-law 
crimes.  
One view on the extent of the courts’ power to develop the common-law crimes is 
that the development thereof historically ‘did not entail extending the proscribed 
ambit of crimes, but entailed extending the applicability of existing definitions to new 
factual situations as necessitated by social changes’.749 Put differently, the correct 
exercise of the courts’ inherent power to develop the common-law crimes entails 
extending the applicability of an existing definition of a common-law crime, but 
without altering that definition.750 
                                                          
748 For cases in which the development of the common-law principle concerned was refused by the 
courts on the basis that such development violates the ius strictum and ius certum principles, see R v 
Sibiya 1955 (4) SA 247 (A); S v Smith 1973 (3) SA 945 (O); S v Augustine 1986 (3) SA 294 (C); Ex 
parte Minister van Justisie: in re S v J en S v Von Molendorff 1989 (4) SA 1028 (A); and S v Mintoor 
1996 (1) SACR 514 (C).  
 
749 R Ramosa ‘The limits of judicial law-making in the development of common-law crimes: revisiting 
the Masiya decisions’ (2009) 22 South African Journal of Criminal Justice (2009) 353 at 367. For 
concurring views, see K Phelps ‘A dangerous precedent indeed – a response to CR Snyman’s note on 
Masiya’ (2008) 125 South African Law Journal 648 at 651. 
 
750 One example in point is the development of the common-law crime of rape, which Ramosa (op cit 
(n749) 367-368) observes to have historically maintained its exact definition but has been developed 
by applying its definition to new situations. To illustrate, the development of the crime of rape to no 
longer recognise the ‘marital rape exemption’ (which simply entailed that a husband could never rape 
his wife) was done without changing the definition of the crime though the crime was applied to a novel 
situation (Ramosa op cit (n749) 368-369). Ramosa (ibid at 368) also points out that consent in respect 
of the crime of rape was at some point understood to be vitiated only by physical force, but, as time 
went by, the courts developed the crime to the extent that it was recognised that even non-violent 
conduct could also vitiate consent. Examples of non-violent conduct that vitiates consent include 
instances where consent is obtained through fraud or threat of violence, or where consent is not valid 
because the victim was mentally incapable of giving consent, or the victim was sleeping, or was 
intoxicated, or was by law incapable of giving consent. 
Furthermore, the development of the common-law crime of theft to cover other factual situations without 
changing the definition is observed in cases where the definition of theft was extended to cover the 
threat of credit by manipulating cheques and credit cards (see R v Solomon 1953 (4) SA 518 (A); and 
S v Graham 1975 (3) SA 569 (A)). In respect of the development of the crime of defeating or obstructing 
the course of justice without changing its definition, see S v Burger 1975 (2) SA 601 (C) and  S v 




In a subtle acquiescence with the foregoing, Snyman751 goes a step further and 
submits that: 
‘To clear up existing points of doubt in the definitions of crimes, to hold that certain conduct 
is not punishable in terms of existing definitions of crimes, or perhaps even to fill an 
obvious lacuna in the definition of a crime, are all examples of how courts may apply the 
provisions of s 39(2) to ‘develop’ the common law’…However, it is an accepted principle 
of our law that a provision of criminal law defining the outer limits of liability should not, 
without very good reason, be extended by means of analogy (R v Oberholzer 1941 OPD 
48 at 60; S v Smith 1973 (3) SA 945 (O) at 947). The use of analogy to the advantage of 
the accused (so-called interpretation in bonam partem), that is, the use of analogy in order 
to limit the field of operation of a criminal definition, is something different, and may be 
admissible. The use of analogy to create a new defence is also admissible (S v Campher 
1987 (1) SA 940 (A); S v Wiid 1990 (1) SACR 561 (A)), but that is not the form of analogy 
used in this judgment. In this case analogy was used to the opposite effect, namely to 
broaden the legal definition of a crime’. 
The foregoing views capture what the development of common-law crimes embraces. 
Although there may be some resistance from Hoctor752 who perhaps regards some of 
the above-mentioned views on the proper development of common-law crimes as 
reflecting the case law position dating back to some thirty years ago, thus flying in the 
face of the principle of legality in the Constitution, the weight of opinion nonetheless 
overrules his stance.  
Controversy in respect of the development of common-law crimes only arises in the 
case where there is change being introduced to the existing definition of a crime, such 
as in Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria753 where the Constitutional 
Court extended the definition of the common-law crime of rape to cover not only the 
non-consensual vaginal penetration of a female by a penis (this being the traditional 
position), but also the non-consensual anal penetration of a female. This judgment 
                                                          
751 CR Snyman ‘Extending the scope of rape – a dangerous precedent’ (2007) 124 South African Law 
Journal 677 at 679. 
 
752 Hoctor op cit (n126) 81. 
 




sparked a debate between those in support of the extension of the definition of rape 
and those against it.754  
Fortunately, the suggested ways of developing the common-law security crimes of 
treason and sedition (which suggestions are endorsed by the interpretation regime) 
fall within the uncontested terrain of judicial development of common-law crimes, as it 
is clear that developing a crime by limiting its scope is acceptable. This is exactly what 
Snyman, Burchell and Milton proposed in respect of the crimes of treason and sedition.  
It is therefore futile to enter the contested terrain raised by cases such as the Masiya 
case. However, it suffices to merely mention that the judicial policy of transformative 
adjudication discussed in 7.4.1 above could well demand the manner of development 
adopted by the court in Masiya, instead of the restraint and formalism that would have 










                                                          
754 For commentary in support of the court’s extension of the definition of rape, see K Phelps and S 
Kazee ‘The Constitutional Court gets anal about rape – gender neutrality and the principle of legality in 
Masiya v DPP’ (2007) 20 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 341-360; SA Dersso ‘The role of 
courts in the development of the common law under s 39(2)’ (2007) 23 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 373-385; T Maseko ‘The impact of separation of powers on the development of common law 
and the protection of the rape victim’s rights’ (2008) 29 Obiter 53-68; and Phelps op cit (n749). For 







OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has made good its promise to study and analyse the South African security 
and emergency laws,755 and thereafter show that there evolve two broad techniques 
that can be relied upon to secure an interpretation of security laws that upholds and 
protects the rule of law and human rights, thus striking a balance between security 
laws, on the one hand, and the rule of law and human rights, on the other. The two 
techniques constitute what in this thesis is referred to as the security laws’ 
interpretation regime.  
This interpretation regime becomes necessary in light of the fact that the role of 
ordinary security laws is expanding significantly,756 yet security laws still face the 
problem of comprising the overly broad and vague provisions which stand in violation 
of the rule of law and some fundamental rights. Hastening to declare the impugned 
security laws as unconstitutional on the basis of their non-compliance with the rule of 
law and human rights should be resisted, as neither the rule of law and human rights 
can guarantee their existence in the absence of security laws, nor can security laws 
do the same without being consistent with the rule of law and human rights.757 What 
is therefore required is to strike a balance between security laws and the rule of law 
as well as human rights. 
The preferred method for striking the necessary balance is the use of the courts’ power 
of interpretation (as dictated by the separation of powers doctrine).758 Be that as it 
may, the courts have been shown not to have a consistent record when it comes to 
                                                          
755 For reasons as to why emergency laws are studied alongside the security laws, refer to note 64 
above. 
 
756 Refer to the discussion under subheading 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 in chapter 1 above. 
 
757 For a further discussion on the point, refer to the discussion under heading 2.3 in chapter 2 above. 
 
758 Refer to the discussion under subheading 1.1.3 in chapter 1 above. The point is also illustrated 
throughout chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
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interpreting security laws in a manner that upholds and protects the rule of law and 
human rights.759 It is at this point that the proposed interpretation regime becomes 
relevant as it operates to bolster the courts’ interpretation of security laws in a manner 
that is cognisant and respectful of the rule of law and human rights.  
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the interpretation regime is made up of 
two broad techniques that can be relied upon in seeking to secure the interpretation 
of security laws in a manner that upholds and protects the rule of law and human 
rights. These two techniques are identified in chapter 7 above, and they include: (a) 
ensuring the proper and full enjoyment of the right of access to the courts;760 and (b) 
the use of restrictive interpretation, severance, reading-down and reading-in, as the 
techniques suitable for interpreting the impugned security provisions.761 
The two techniques constituting the interpretation regime can be observed emerging 
or evolving from the already existing South African security and emergency 
jurisprudence, which is highlighted in chapters one to six of this thesis.762 Thus, all that 
this thesis has done is to extract and bring together the two techniques under the 
banner of what is called the security laws’ interpretation regime. The collection of these 
techniques under a single interpretation regime has the advantage of eliminating the 
the practices, principles and doctrines that prevent proper judicial scrutiny of security 
laws (as demonstrated in the discussion on the first technique under heading 7.2 in 
                                                          
759 Refer to the discussion under subheading 1.1.3 in chapter 1 above, as well as the discussion under 
heading 6.2.4 in chapter 6 above. 
 
760 The evolution of the first technique of the interpretation regime takes shape in chapter 4 when the 
techniques which were used to prevent legal challenges to, or based on, the draconian apartheid 
security and emergency laws are laid bare and are also shown to have a common feature, which is to 
exempt the security and emergency laws from being subjected to judicial scrutiny and interpretation in 
the light of the rule of law and human rights. Reversing this old stance and subjecting security laws to 
judicial scrutiny and interpretation in light of the rule of law and human rights has an obvious starting 
point, which is to do away with the known barriers to accessing the courts. This opens way for the courts 
to properly execute their interpretative task. 
 
761 The second technique of the interpretation regime evolves from the discussion under subheading 
6.2.3 in chapter 6, which discussion outlines the suggested approaches to interpreting the impugned 
provisions of security laws. The dominant theme in the suggested approaches is that restrictive 
interpretation, severance, reading-down and reading-in, is suited for the interpretation of security laws.  
 
762 Chapters one to six of the present thesis set out the content underlying the security and emergency 
laws of South Africa with the view to enable a careful study and critical analysis thereof. The said study 
and analysis eventually culminates in the emergence of the two techniques which are argued to be 
crucial for enabling an interpretation of security laws in a manner that upholds and protects the rule of 
law and human rights, thus constituting the security laws’ interpretation regime. 
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chapter 7), and of facilitating the transformative, liberal, purposive and substantive 
interpretations of security laws (as demonstrated in the discussion on the second 
technique under headings 7.3 and 7.4 in chapter 7).  
To the extent that the interpretation regime reflects the practice in South Africa when 
it comes to the interpretation of security laws, what the interpretation regime does 
uniquely is, for the first time, to formalise what is being practiced by organising it into 
a regime, model or theory that can be readily consulted by the courts when it is 
necessary to do so, and can be studied further by legal scholars and practitioners in 
the state security field, for the benefit of the democracies from which they emerge. 
After all, it is a common practice in the state security and emergency field to study and 
analyse good practices in certain jurisdictions and thereafter formulate a model, 
theory, or, as in the present case, a regime embodying those practices.  
The foregoing occurred a lot in the aftermath of the 9/11 bombings era, with many 
scholars studying and analysing good practices in various jurisdictions and fashioning 
new models or theories of emergency systems.763 Some scholars advanced models 
or theories drawn from their reading of the work of Albert Venn Dicey. Other models 
or theories were premised on the study of the Roman law approach to regulating 
emergencies. Others can be traced back to the Roman-Dutch and English law notion 
of martial law. Other models and theories emerge from the study of the practice during 
emergencies in various jurisdictions, mainly the advanced democracies such as that 
of the United States and the United Kingdom.  
Through the establishment of the interpretation regime based on the study and 
analysis of existing security and emergency laws in South Africa, there is no doubt 
that South Africa is indeed a precedent of good practice when it comes to the 
availability of techniques for the interpretation of security laws in a manner that upholds 
and protects the rule of law and human rights. The interpretation regime is also a 
precedent of transformative, liberal, purposive and substantive interpretation of 
security laws expected to be undertaken by judges of truly democratic states in 
seeking to strike an appropriate balance between security laws and the rule of law as 
well as human rights.  
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